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executive summary
This research deals with the interaction of family provision law and charitable bequests •	
in wills, including qualitative research relating to the practical issues arising with both 
legal practitioners and charities’ bequest officers. 
In recent years challenges to charitable bequests by testators’ family members have •	
become more common in Australia. Courts are vigorous in upholding proper family 
provision as against charitable bequests, portraying this provision as based on moral 
obligation. 
Proper provision for family and other dependants is supported by both legislation •	
and the courts on public policy grounds. This concept is confined to Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and to a lesser extent England, which are the only countries with 
comprehensive family provision legislation.
In more recent years, as the concept of ‘family’ has been extended to include de facto •	
partners, same sex partners, wider family, and various dependants not envisaged by 
the framers of the original legislation, the primacy of family claims has become even 
more difficult for charities to overcome. 
The original purpose of family provision law was to enforce the proper maintenance •	
and support of a testator’s spouse and children. In the 108 years since their 
introduction in New Zealand, family provision laws have had their influence extended 
through judicial interpretation and active promotion of the priority of family claims on 
a testator’s estate as part of public policy. Testamentary freedom, although never 
completely dominant in English law, is now seriously challenged in Australia.
Charities are seeking to position themselves strategically to benefit from the expected •	
intergenerational wealth transfer from the baby boomer generation. Bequests from this 
source are needed to resource the increasing capital requirements required by charity 
as the welfare system is wound back due to demographic and fiscal pressures. 
That the clearly stated philanthropic intentions of a testator should be overturned in •	
favour of family members or other claimants is a contentious issue in family provision 
jurisdictions. The generational transfer of wealth by baby-boomers over the coming 
decades provides a scenario for increasing conflict between families and charities over 
bequests.
The significant findings of this research are:•	
1. Why is there an apparent increase in family provision 
applications?
Charities and estate law practitioners both report that there is an increase in applications. 
The reasons they advance for this trend include: 
a.  changes in the concept of ‘family’
Multiple marriages, with partners and children of each blended family vying for shares •	
of the estate of a deceased, especially in the case of wills made some time ago which 
fail to take into account the situation at time of death
Changing notions of what constitutes a ‘family’ relationship•	
Increasing numbers and legal recognition of de facto and same sex partnerships •	
leading to claims on estates from partners and children of these relationships
Growing numbers of elderly and dependent parents•	
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Growing numbers of Generation Y young people living at home into their 20s and 30s •	
who may be classed as ‘dependent’ or ‘under a disability’
More cultural groups in Australia who value and support extended family •	
arrangements, with associated possibilities for findings of dependency
b. changes in expectations and values
Growing numbers of persons expecting a share of an estate as of right, but who are •	
not included as beneficiaries of a will and so file an application for provision
Changing value systems which mean that it is no longer considered inappropriate •	
behaviour to challenge a will
c. changes in the legal environment
The wide range of permitted applicants in the legislation and wide discretion allowed •	
to judges to decide on the award which is appropriate in all the circumstances of the 
case
A perception of increasing numbers of ‘plaintiff’ law firms competing for work in the •	
family provision area, particularly where cost caps or other limits have been applied to 
personal injuries claims
d. changes in levels of Wealth
Increasing general wealth levels in Australia with consequent larger estates available•	
Increasing real estate prices in Australia with consequent effects on what might •	
previously have been very modest estates
2. What can charities do to put themselves in the best position 
With a donor before the donor dies?
Ensure they have appropriate policies for bequest solicitation and disputed bequests, •	
informed by specialist legal advice
Encourage gift-giving while donors are alive. This can be done by donations and other •	
direct gifts, or by encouraging donors to establish a tax-effective vehicle for gift-giving 
such as a Prescribed Private Fund (PPF) or ancillary fund (sometimes known as a ‘gift 
fund’, ‘community foundation’ or ‘donor advised fund’
Encourage people to:•	
make a will •	
seek independent professional legal advice •	
keep their will current •	
under no circumstances use a ‘DIY will’•	
Make sure there is independent legal advice for the will-maker who intends to make a •	
bequest to charity – this may be crucial to a successful defence to a family provision 
claim in order to avoid accusations of undue influence 
Have an arms length relationship between the charity and the will-maker, without •	
any undue influence, harassment, intimidation or coercion from the fundraiser to the 
donor while the donor is alive (these things can give rise to a claim in equity under 
the doctrine of undue influence/unconscionable conduct/unconscionable dealings, or 
the possibility of a claim of unconscionable bargain which could result in the bequest 
being invalid and brought back into the estate after the donor’s death) 
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In appropriate circumstances, have a family member or legal personal representative •	
present during bequest negotiations to avoid any allegations of undue influence or 
coercion
If the testator is near death, or is elderly, or is incapacitated physically or mentally, the •	
measures above are absolute requirements 
Encourage will-makers to let your charity know about their bequests•	
Where the charity is aware of the bequest, make sure that that the will states the full •	
legal name of the organisation that will receive the bequest, and uses appropriate 
words to indicate the type of bequest, including use of a recommended form of 
bequest clause – this will avoid the need for an application to the court to clarify the 
bequest, or for a cy-près application, which may fail in the light of a family provision 
application
3.  What can charities do to put themselves in the best position 
When a family provision claim is notified?
subject to legal advice:
Charities are usually disadvantaged by their attitude of taking the path of least •	
resistance, so stand up for your bequests – engage a qualified legal advisor, take their 
advice, and if appropriate, file an affidavit defending the bequest at the least. Although 
this is not free (unless legal advice is given pro bono), it usually represents a better 
position than adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude to obtaining something from a will 
Always appear personally at mediations with your lawyer (unless advised otherwise). •	
Explain clearly what the money is to be used for, and the public benefits of your 
organisation
Instruct your lawyers clearly of any demonstrable connection to the testator making •	
the bequest. Charities have very little competing moral claim as the law stands – 
provision for family comes first, and the only hope of improving that position is to show 
a history of previous connection which is both strong and provable. Did that person 
have a prior connection with your charity? A prior history of donations? Or a history of 
services provided by or to the charity? 
Keep good file notes of contact and discussions, a record of regular donations, a •	
record of regular contact via membership or receipt of newsletters, and preferably a 
record of continuous contact from the time the bequest is made in the will until the 
time of death. Be able to provide your legal advisor with an orderly complete record – 
this will save you legal costs
If more than one charity is involved in the bequest (e.g. each has been left an equal •	
share of the residual estate), then those charities should consider adopting a common 
stance 
Put the pursuit of bequests on a more business-related footing e.g. it may be desirable •	
for groups of charities to place a law firm on retainer for the purpose of ensuring that 
bequests are obtained by the group, thus sharing legal costs and obtaining better 
quality legal advice 
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4. moves to reform the laW of family provision
There is a uniform Family Provision Bill 2004 drafted as part of a review of family provision 
law in Australia. The uniform bill recommends that applicants as of right be limited to 
spouses, de facto spouses (which may include same sex partners at the discretion of 
the states), and adult children over 18 years. This would considerably limit the pool 
of applicants for family provision in Australia, if matters to be taken into account only 
applied to those applicants. New South Wales has adopted the uniform measures in the 
new Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), except that it has not adopted the 
limited pool of applicants as of right. Thus the reform involved, though attempting to 
confront excessive costs, and some technical legal matters, does not address the issues 
of adult child applicants, and the increase in the number of claims through moral duty 
arguments. Other states have not yet made any reform moves. 
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Glossary
Administration of an estate – term used for the work of the executor in carrying out the terms 
of a will
Ancillary fund – a public fund that is established under a will or instrument of trust that 
invests its funds only as permitted by Australian law applying to trustees and is established or 
maintained solely for:
the purpose of providing money, property or benefits to DGRs; or•	
the establishment of DGRs•	
Ancillary funds are often known popularly as ‘gift funds’, ‘community foundations’ or ‘donor 
advised funds’
Beneficiary – person or organisation benefiting under a will 
Bequest – gift of an identifiable asset (not money) to person/organisation in will. However, the 
terms bequest and legacy are often used interchangeably in general usage
Blended family – a family formed by a combination of two or more families following 
remarriage(s) after divorce
Civil law jurisdiction – a jurisdiction using European civil law as its basic legal system
Codicil – a change or addition to an existing will
Common law jurisdiction – a jurisdiction using English common law as its basic legal system 
(e.g. Australia, New Zealand, England and Wales, Canada (except for Quebec), and the United 
States (except for Louisiana))
Community foundation – see ancillary fund
Consanguinity – relationship based on shared family blood lines 
Contingent bequest – gift of an asset dependent upon an event occurring
Curtesy – provision for a widower (no longer applies)
Deductible gift recipient (DGR) – a DGR is an entity that is entitled to receive income tax 
deductible gifts. All DGRs are endorsed by the Australian Taxation Office
Discretionary jurisdiction – a legal jurisdiction which allows judges to make the decisions on 
essential matters based on the particular facts of a case
Donor advised fund – see ancillary fund
Dower – provision for a widow (no longer applies)
Estate – the totality of the property which the deceased owned or had some interest at the 
time of death
Estates in fee simple or in fee tail – legal terms denoting real estate
Equity – a part of the English law system, based on principles of fairness, originally separate 
from common law, but now part of the overall system used in Australia and in other common 
law countries
Executor (m)/executrix (f) – a person appointed by a will-maker to ensure that the intentions 
in a will are carried out. It is no longer essential to differentiate these terms on the basis of 
gender. However, judges still often do so in judgements.
Family provision – term used in Australia and New Zealand for provision made for family 
members in a will 
Family protection – term used in New Zealand for family provision; alternative term used is 
testator’s family maintenance
Forced share – a fixed share of an estate left to a family member
4Forfeiture – the loss of the right to an inheritance by egregious conduct e.g. killing the testator
Inter vivos – while alive
Intestate – Dying without leaving a will, or leaving an invalid will, so that the property of the 
estate passes by the laws of succession rather than by the direction of the deceased
Legacy – a gift of money to a person/organisation in will
Life interest – a lifetime gift, such as giving someone the right to live in a property until that 
person’s death. On the death of the person given the life interest, the asset or capital is 
distributed according to the will.
Mortmain – literally ‘dead hand’; originally referred to act of parliament which sought to 
prevent the bequest of land and buildings to the Church; in later succession law referred to 
acts of parliament which prevented bequests to charity, originally of land and buildings, and 
later, of money. Mortmain never applied in Australian law, and no longer applies in English law.
Mutual wills – wills which leave assets to each person in the same way (commonly applies 
between spouses)
Notional estate – assets which are returned to the estate of the deceased after death because 
they should not have been disposed of before death. This increases the estate for distribution 
(currently applies only in New South Wales)
Patrimony – traditionally, inheritance from a father’s estate; in modern terms, the total 
inheritance in an estate
Pecuniary legacy – fixed sum of money expressed as a gift in a will
Pretermitted child – a child omitted from the will of a testator because it had not been born at 
the time the will was made
Privy Council – an English court which hears appeals from former colonies of Britain (no 
longer applies in Australia)
Probate – the granting of the right to administer a will
Residuary legacy – remainder of your (money) estate left as a legacy after bequests and 
specific legacies have been distributed and all debts cleared 
Residue of estate – possessions, property and money remaining after all debts and gifts are 
distributed in accordance with the will
Reversionary legacy – a legacy consisting of the assets or money left after a life interest has 
been fulfilled.
Specific bequest – the gift of an identifiable asset such as jewellery or furniture 
Succession law– the law relating to wills and estates
Testate – dying having made a will
Testamentary – referring to a will
Testation – the statements of intent in a will
Testator (m) /testatrix (f) – person who makes a will. It is no longer essential to differentiate 
these terms on the basis of gender. However, judges still often do so in judgements.
Testator’s family maintenance – alternative (older) term for family provision
Will – a legal document expressing the intentions of a person for the distribution of their assets 
after death
Will-maker – a plain English term now sometimes used instead of testator or testatrix
Glossary
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The purposes of this paper are three-fold. Firstly, to examine the operation of family 
provision law and the interaction between family provision law and the freedom of a 
testator to leave a bequest to charity in a will; secondly, to investigate family provision 
practice through interviews with practitioners and representatives of charities; thirdly, 
to suggest to charities how best to deal with family provision applications which might 
otherwise deprive them of bequests in wills, including a consideration of current law 
reform proposals.
In recent years legal challenges to charitable bequests by testators’ family members have 
become more common in Australia. Many charities faced with the prospect of a disputed 
bequest have been reluctant to pursue the matter in the courts. A review of leading 
reported cases involving charitable bequests in wills reveals that the courts are vigorous 
in upholding proper family provision as against charitable bequests, portraying this 
provision as based on moral obligation. Proper provision for family and other dependants 
is supported by both legislation and the courts on public policy grounds. This concept 
is confined to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and to a lesser extent England, which 
are the only countries with comprehensive family provision legislation. The generational 
transfer of wealth by baby-boomers over the coming decades provides a scenario for 
increasing conflict between families and charities over bequests. 
The original purpose of family provision law was to enforce the proper maintenance and 
support of a testator’s spouse and children. In the 108 years since their introduction in 
New Zealand, family provision laws have had their influence extended through judicial 
interpretation and active promotion of the priority of family claims on a testator’s estate 
as part of public policy. Testamentary freedom, although never completely dominant in 
English law, is now seriously challenged in Australia.
In more recent years, as the concept of ‘family’ has been extended to include de facto 
partners, same sex partners, wider family, and various dependants not envisaged by the 
framers of the original legislation, the primacy of family claims has become even more 
difficult for charities to overcome. At the same time, charities are seeking to position 
themselves strategically to benefit from the expected intergenerational wealth transfer 
from the baby boomer generation to their children and grandchildren. Bequests from 
this source are necessary to resource the increasing capital requirements of the charity 
sector as an ageing population’s care needs increase, and the welfare system is wound 
back due to demographic and fiscal pressures. 
This paper first briefly examines the historical development of inheritance law in both civil 
and common law jurisdictions to provide a context for the subsequent discussion (section 
1). This is followed by a brief consideration of the scope of the legislation, including a 
discussion of current law reform proposals (section 2). The paper then considers in detail 
the way in which family provision laws operate in Australian jurisdictions, demonstrating 
the primacy of family and of moral claims to provision (section 3). The paper then turns to 
practical considerations in family provision claims, including costs and dispute resolution 
procedures (section 4). The contest between charitable bequests in wills and family 
provision law in Australia is covered next, illustrating that although the position has varied 
widely historically, it is now firmly entrenched not only in testamentary duty, but also 
moral duty to a wide range of dependants (section 5). This is followed by an analysis 
introduction
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of the views of lawyers and charity bequest officers obtained through interviews about 
family provision and charitable bequests (section 6), and recommendations for charities 
which are suggested by the outcomes from this research (section 7).
Appendix A contains a review of major reported cases involving family provision applications 
and charitable bequests. This shows that charities have been deprived of bequests, or had 
bequests substantially reduced, as a result of the primacy of family claims. 
Fact sheets from the research contained in this paper are available at  
www.bus.qut.edu.au/research/cpns/publications/currentissue.jsp.
Further information is also available from 
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/cpns/planned+giving+-+bequests
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overview oF the historical develoPment 
oF inheritance law
history of family provision laW
In developed legal systems, testamentary freedom is never absolute. The right to inherit 
is limited by either relationship or by amount. Either the group of related persons on 
whom inheritance may devolve is limited, or the amount any one person can receive from 
inheritance is limited.1 In addition, it seems to be an accepted norm in most cultures that 
inheritance should be linked to blood ties, but legal systems vary as to the amount of 
freedom permitted in disinheriting family members. 
The English common law system originally required that estates in fee simple and in fee 
tail general be bequeathed to the eldest son of the testator, with all other children being 
excluded. However, it was possible even in the earliest common law times to deprive 
an heir by inter vivos transfer.2 After The Statute of Wills was passed in 1540, a testator 
could also deprive his heir by will,3 and after 1646 all children could be deprived of land 
inheritance. Widows were protected by the law of dower, which allowed a widow the use 
for her life of one-third of her husband’s real property, and widowers by curtesy, which 
allowed a widower with a child of the marriage the use for life of all of his wife’s land. 
Neither dower nor curtesy could be defeated by will or by inter vivos transfer.
As to personal property, at common law all of a wife’s personal property passed to her 
widower absolutely, unless he consented to a different disposition in her will, or by inter 
vivos transfer. A deceased husband’s personal property was subject to forced (fixed) 
shares. A surviving wife was entitled to half of her deceased husband’s net personal 
property by forced share where there were no children of the marriage. This rule also 
applied where there were surviving children but no widow. The remaining half of the 
personal property could be left by will as the testator pleased. Where a wife and children 
survived, the wife was entitled to a one-third forced share, and the children to a one-third 
forced share, with the remainder to be disposed of by will as the testator wished.4 Forced 
shares were first recognised in 1215,5 but had largely fallen out of use in England by 
1400, in Wales by 1696, and were completely abandoned in all areas of England in 1724.6
1 Max West, ‘The Theory of Inheritance Tax’ (1893) 8(3) Political Science Quarterly 426, 429.
2 In the period between 1290 and 1540. See generally: William F. Fratcher, ‘Protection of 
the Family against Disinheritance in American Law’ (1965) 14(1) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 293, 294.
3 Ibid. The land which could be left elsewhere was two-thirds of land held by military 
tenure and all land held by socage. After 1660, all military tenure was converted to 
socage, so that all land could be left away from the heir by will.
4 Forced shares for widows could be reduced by jointure or settlement, both of which 
were commonly used, and by advancements for children.
5 Magna Carta Ch 26: ‘If anyone holding of us a lay fief shall die, and our sheriff or bailiff 
shall exhibit our letters patent of summons for a debt which the deceased owed us, it shall 
be lawful for our sheriff or bailiff to attach and enroll the chattels of the deceased, found 
upon the lay fief, to the value of that debt, at the sight of law worthy men, provided always 
that nothing whatever be thence removed until the debt which is evident shall be fully paid 
to us; and the residue shall be left to the executors to fulfill the will of the deceased; and if 
there be nothing due from him to us, all the chattels shall go to the deceased, saving to his 
wife and children their reasonable shares.’
6 The only remaining area where these applied after 1696 was in London.
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embedded in the common law. The Dower Act 1833 (UK) allowed a husband to overturn 
his wife’s dower by will or by inter vivos transfer. In the absence of forced shares, this 
allowed husbands to leave their entire estates away from their widows and children if they 
so wished. After the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 (UK), wives could likewise leave 
all their property away from their widowers and children. 
Civil law jurisdictions have traditionally favoured the forced share approach to 
testamentary dispositions, with spouses and children entitled to definite shares of an 
estate by statute, or by custom. This Roman law concept is still seen today in many 
jurisdictions, including in most European countries, most South American countries,7 
Japan, Scotland, South Africa, in a modified form in Quebec in Canada and in Louisiana 
in the USA, and to a partial extent in Ireland. The relevant Roman law principles are those 
of terce (the right of a surviving spouse to a life interest in one-third of the realty of the 
estate), jus relictae (the right of a surviving spouse to one-half of the moveable property 
of a deceased spouse if there are no children, or to one-third if there are children) and 
legitim (the right of children to one third of the parent’s moveables if there is a surviving 
parent and to one-half if there are no surviving parents, all to be shared equally). In civil 
law jurisdictions, these were often expressed in the law of dower. 
In modern civil law terms, dower has been abolished. In Quebec, for example, the term 
used is now ‘family patrimony’, and a surviving spouse is entitled to half the value of 
the divisible patrimony. The remaining half is distributed according to the will, or the 
intestacy rules of the Code Civil du Quebec.8 In Scotland, the terms now used are ‘prior 
rights’ and ‘legal rights’ to property.9 Prior rights only apply in the case of intestacy, 
and allocate specific amounts to a spouse or children. There are also ‘legal rights’ to 
moveable property applicable in intestacy. Legal rights can also apply if there is a will, 
but the beneficiary has to choose between the legal rights and the amount left in the 
will. In Japan, there is a statutory division of the estate of half to a spouse and half to all 
lineal descendants. If there are no lineal descendants, then the statutory division is two-
thirds to a spouse and one-third to any lineal ascendants. If there are no descendants 
or ascendants, then the division is three-quarters to a spouse and one-quarter to living 
brothers and sisters. There is no allowance for testamentary independence unless a 
specific will is made.10
7 Melanie B. Leslie, ‘The Myth of Testamentary Freedom’ (1996) 38  
Arizona Law Review 235, 270.
8 C.C.Q., L.Q., 1991, chapter 64, arts. 414-426. 
9 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 sections 8 and 9 read with The Prior Rights of Surviving 
Spouse (Scotland) Order 2005.
10 Ministry of Finance Japan (2006) Comprehensive Handbook of Japanese Taxes, Chapter 
IV, Inheritance and Gift Tax.
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The situation in the US is mixed, and confusing. The Uniform Probate Code11 has been 
adopted in 16 states of the US,12 although in various Revisions. Some states have 
adopted the Code in part in their legislation, but most have their own legislation on 
provision by elective forced shares.13 Louisiana, still retaining a civil law system, has a 
forced share, the legitime, for children under 23, or who are mentally infirm or otherwise 
disabled from inheritance.14 In the Uniform Probate Code, in intestate succession a spouse 
is entitled to all the deceased’s estate unless there are surviving parents or descendants 
not also the descendants of the spouse.15 In effect, this disinherits the children of the 
marriage. Where there is a will, the Code provides for an elective share amount for a 
surviving spouse of between 3% and 50% of the estate depending on the length of the 
marriage.16 This variable forced share applies regardless of the terms of the will.
The modern forced share approach can be contrasted with that of statutes in a small group 
of common law countries which give a wide discretion to the Courts to divide an estate 
under dispute, commonly referred to as either family or dependants’ provision or testator’s 
family maintenance. Family provision legislation confers rights on applicants, typically 
spouses, de facto spouses, children (including adopted and stepchildren), grandchildren 
and parents, to apply to the court to overturn bequests in wills which do not adequately 
provide for the maintenance and support of the applicants. This is clearly an interference 
with testamentary freedom, and is supported by both legislation and the courts on public 
policy grounds. The notion of total testamentary freedom was a construct of the nineteenth 
century, an offshoot of the style of English laissez-faire liberalism fashionable at the time. 
However, it was recognised late in the nineteenth century that testamentary freedom of 
this type allowed some testators to ignore their responsibilities to close family, particularly 
spouses and children. This was regarded as particularly a problem in the then newly 
developing, but very wealthy, dominions of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and was 
fanned by an indignant press which reported several notorious cases of wealthy men 
leaving their widows and children unprovided for in their estates.17 
11 Original version 1969, with Revisions in 1989 and 1990.
12 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah.
13 Elective share statutes allow the surviving spouse to take either an elective (forced) 
share of the estate, or to take whatever share they have been left in the will. See 
generally: Lawrence Waggoner, ‘Spousal Rights in our Multiple Marriage Society: The 
Revised Uniform Probate Code’ (1992) 26 (4) Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 
683; Ronald Chester, ‘Should American children be protected against disinheritance?’ 
(1997) 32(3) Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 405.
14 Louisiana Civil Code (Ann.) Articles 1493, 1494. See generally: Ray D. Madoff, Cornelia 
R. Tenney and Martin A. Hall, Practical Guide to Estate Planning, 2006 edition, chapter 
6, 6-15.
15 Article II, Part 2, 2-102
16 Article II, Part 2, 2-202.
17 James Mackintosh, ‘Limitations on Free Testamentary Disposition in the British Empire’ 
(1930) 12(1) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (3rd Series) 13, 13.
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The legislation introduced into the law of the various Australian states was based on 
innovative New Zealand legislation, the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900, which 
attracted much attention in the common law world at the time and was later copied 
for both testate and intestate situations in English law, and the provinces of Canada 
(except Quebec). The New Zealand legislation of 1900 had its genesis in an 1877 Act 
which enabled illegitimate children under 14 to apply for maintenance out of the estate 
of deceased parents,18 the Destitute Persons Act 1894 (NZ),19 and the Native Land Court 
Act 1894 (NZ) which provided that Maori applicants were to be left with ‘sufficient land 
for their maintenance’ after claims alienating Maori land reserves to white settlers.20 It 
is also possible that the introduction of the legislation was intimately connected with 
New Zealand’s avant garde approach to social welfare, with old age pensions being 
introduced in New Zealand in 1898, and widows’ pensions in 1911.21 It could be argued 
that these state pensions encouraged even wealthy testators to leave their estates away 
from their spouses, especially wives. 
The first incarnation of the legislation was in 1896, when a Bill on the Limitations of 
Disposition by Will was introduced into the New Zealand legislature by Sir Robert Stout, 
later Chief Justice of New Zealand. This Bill proposed a type of civil law forced share 
arrangement by which only one third of a testator’s estate could be disposed of by will if 
he left a wife and children, and one half if he left only children. This Bill was not approved 
because of its too obvious interference with testamentary freedom. A variation introduced 
in 1897 increased the amount to be disposed by will to one half in all cases, but was 
also unsuccessful. In 1898, the idea of forced shares was abandoned, and the first draft 
of totally discretionary testator’s family maintenance legislation was introduced, with a 
second draft Bill being introduced in 1900. This latter Bill became the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1900 (NZ).22
18 Bruce James Cameron , ‘Family ‘Protection’, An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand 1966 
available at www.teara.govt.nz/F/FamilyProtection/FamilyProtection/en, accessed on 11 
October 2007. The name of this Act is not stated.
19 This Act provided that in the case of intestacy, a widow was to receive one-third of any 
estate, and the children equal shares of one third of the estate.
20 Section 131(2). See Waitangi Tribunal, The Te Roroa Report 1992, Te Roroa Claim, 03 
Nga Whenua Rahui (Reserves), 3.1 Official Attitudes and Policies at www.waitangi–
tribunal.govt.nz/reports/, accessed on 11 October 2007. No doubt the Maori claimants 
would not have seen this as appropriate. As the Report states: ‘By the time of the Native 
Land Court Act 1894 the 50 acre guideline (the original amount of land set aside for 
each Maori claimant)] had been watered down to a requirement that ‘the owners have 
sufficient land left for their maintenance’. It was, of course, entirely up to the Government 
Officials to decide how much land would be ‘sufficient’.’ This Act also provided in 
section 46 that: ‘If a native leaves children without enough land to maintain then, his will 
disposing of his land otherwise is invalid’. 
21 Ann Beaglehole, Benefiting Women, Department of Internal Affairs, New Zealand., 
accessed on 17 July 2008 at www.msd.govt.nz/documents/publications/msd/journal/
issue03/spj3-benefiting – women.doc
22 See generally Joseph Dainow, ‘Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada’ (1938) 36(7) Michigan Law Review 1107, 1108-1110.
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The relevant provision of the 1900 Act was:23
  Should any person die leaving a will, and without making therein adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance and support of his or her wife, husband, 
or children, the Court may, at its discretion, on application by or on behalf of the 
said wife, husband, or children, order that such provision as the said Court shall 
seem fit shall be made out of the estate of the said deceased person for such 
wife, husband or children: Provided that the Court may attach such conditions 
to the order made as it shall think fit, or may refuse to make an order in favour of 
any person whose character or conduct is such as in the opinion of the Court to 
disentitle him or her to the benefit of an order under this section.
This original New Zealand legislation of 1900 was replaced by the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1906, which extended the time period for applications from six months 
to twelve months from the date of probate, and allowed for provision to be made in the 
form of either lump sums or periodical payments.24 This Act was in turn repealed, and 
replaced by the Family Protection Act 1908.25 Meanwhile, the idea of family provision 
quickly spread throughout Australia, and eventually to Canada and the UK.
23 Section 33(1).
24 See generally: James Christie, ‘Testators’ Family Maintenance in New Zealand’ (1918) 
18(2) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (New Series) 216-219.
25 The testators’ family maintenance provisions were contained in Part II of the Family 
Protection Act 1908 (NZ), particularly at section 33. This latter Act was repealed by the 
current legislation, the Family Protection Act 1955: see section 16(1) of the 1955 Act and 
the Schedule to that Act.
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The first jurisdiction to copy the New Zealand legislation was Victoria in the Widows 
and Young Children Maintenance Act 1906, and then Tasmania in the Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1912, Queensland in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1914, 
Victoria (consolidating) in the Administration and Probate Act 1915, sections 108-117, 
New South Wales in the Testator’s Maintenance and Guardianship of Infants Act 1916, 
South Australia in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1918, Western Australia in 
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1920 section 11, British Columbia in the Testator’s 
Family Maintenance Act (R.S.B.C. 1924 c.256),26 the Australian Capital Territory in 
the Administration and Probate Ordinance 1929, Part VII, the Northern Territory in the 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Order 1929,27 and England in the Inheritance (Family 
Provision) Act 1938. The English act differed from the other legislation in that the 
discretion allowed to the Court was much more restricted in monetary terms, though the 
statute required that the Court could intervene when the will did not make ‘reasonable 
provision’ for the maintenance of dependants.
26 James Mackintosh, ‘Limitations on Free Testamentary Disposition in the British Empire’ 
(1930) 12(1) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (3rd Series) 13, 18.
27 The provisions relating to family provision in each jurisdiction in Australia (and elsewhere) 
were later extended to intestate estates: for Australia, see the Conveyancing, Trustee 
and Probate (Amendment) Act 1938 (NSW), and the Administration of Estates Act 
1954 (NSW); the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1957 (Tas); the Administration 
and Probate Act (Family Provision) Act 1962 (Vic); Succession Acts Amendment Act 
1968 (Qld); Family Provision Ordinance 1969 (ACT); Family Provision Ordinance 1970 
(NT); Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA); Inheritance (Family and Dependants 
Provision) Act 1972 (WA). Family provision applications can therefore be made whether 
the deceased died testate or intestate. Note that the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission has reviewed intestacy law in that state and published Report 116 (2007) 
– Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy including a draft Intestacy Bill 2007. This law, if 
adopted, will be a further amendment to the Succession Act 2006 (NSW).
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current leGislation and reForm 
initiatives For Family Provision in 
australia and other jurisdictions
2.1 australian jurisdictions
As the issue of family provision is a state responsibility constitutionally, each state in 
Australia has separate family provision legislation, and there are differences in wording of 
the relevant sections in each jurisdiction:
table 1: family provision legislation in each australian jurisdiction
jurisdiction act section Wording
New South Wales Succession Act 
2006, Chapter 3 (on 
commencement) – 
note that this Act replaces 
the Family Provision 
Act 1982 (NSW). The 
Succession Amendment 
(Family Provision) 
Bill 2008 passed the 
Legislative Council on 24 
September 2008, and was 
passed to the Legislative 
Assembly on that date for 
concurrence.
59(2) …for the maintenance, 
education or advancement in 
life of the eligible person, having 
regard to the facts known to the 
Court at the time the order is 
made.
Victoria Administration and Probate 
Act 1951
91(1) …the Court may order that 
provision be made out of the 
estate of a deceased person for 
the proper maintenance and 
support of a person for whom 
the deceased had responsibility 
to make provision.
Queensland Succession Act 1981 41(1) …adequate provision is not 
made from the estate for the 
proper maintenance and 
support of the deceased 
person’s spouse, child or 
dependant
Western Australia Inheritance (Family and 
Dependants Provision) Act 
1972
(Note that amendments 
to this Act are currently 
under consideration – see 
the Inheritance (Family and 
Dependants Provision) 
Bill 2007 (WA)). These 
proposed amendments are 
not substantive.
6(1) ..is not such as to make 
adequate provision from 
the estate for the proper 
maintenance, support, 
education or advancement in 
life of any the person [eligible]…
South Australia Inheritance (Family 
Provision) Act 1972
7(1)(b) …a person entitled to claim the 
benefit of this Act is left without 
adequate provision for his 
proper maintenance, education 
or advancement in life.
section 22
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jurisdiction act section Wording
Tasmania Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act 1912
3(1) …any person by whom or on 
whose behalf application for 
provision may be made under 
this Act is left without adequate 
provision for his proper 
maintenance and support…
having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case.
Northern Territory Family Provision Act 1970 8(1) … if the Court is satisfied 
that adequate provision is 
not available…for the proper 
maintenance, education  
and advancement in life of  
the person…
Australian Capital 
Territory
Family Provision Act 1969 8(2) …adequate provision for the 
proper maintenance, education 
or advancement in life of the 
applicant is nor available…
As can be seen, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria refer to ‘proper maintenance and 
support’.28 New South Wales, South Australia, and the Australian Capital Territory use the 
term ‘proper maintenance, education or advancement in life’,29 the Northern Territory has ‘for 
the proper maintenance, education and advancement in life’,30 while the Western Australian 
legislation has the term ‘proper maintenance, support, education or advancement in life’.31 
These differences in wording have not caused undue confusion since there has been 
encouragement to uniformity of interpretation across the States by the High Court of Australia 
in its decisions on appeal on the issue of family provision in wills.32 
28 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) section 41; Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) 
section 3(1); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) section 91.
29 Succession Act 2006 (NSW) section 59(2); (previously) Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) 
sections 7, 8, and 9(2); Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) section 7(1); Family 
Provision Act 1969 (ACT) section 8(1).
30 Family Provision Act 1970 (NT) section 8(1).
31 Inheritance (Family and Dependants Provision) Act 1972 (WA) section 6(1).
32 In Coates v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 494 at 507, 
Dixon CJ said: ‘The legislation of the various States is all grounded on the same policy 
and found its source in New Zealand. Refined distinctions between the Acts are to be 
avoided.’
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2.2 other jurisdictions 
The only countries with family provision legislation are Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the UK. India and Ireland have partial provision requirements. The current applicable 
Acts in other jurisdictions are:
table 2 : equivalent legislation in other family provision jurisdictions
jurisdiction act section Wording
New Zealand Family Protection Act 1955 4(1) …adequate provision is not 
available from his or her estate 
for the proper maintenance and 
support of the persons…
England and Wales Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) 
Act 1975
2 …is not such as to make 
reasonable financial provision 
for the applicant…
Northern Ireland Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) 
(Northern Ireland) Order 
1979
3(1) …on the ground that the 
disposition of the deceased’s 
estate…is not such as to make 
reasonable financial provision 
for the applicant.
Canada: Alberta Family Relief Act 2000 3(1)(a) …for the proper maintenance 
and support of the person’s 
dependants…
Canada: Ontario Succession Law Reform 
Act 1990
58(1) Where a deceased, whether 
testate or intestate, has not 
made adequate provision 
for the proper support of his 
dependants or any of them…
Canada: 
Saskatchewan
Dependants’ Relief Act 
1996
3 …for an order to provide 
reasonable maintenance for the 
dependant.
Canada:
British Columbia
Wills Variation Act 1996 2 …make adequate provision for 
the proper maintenance and 
support of the testator’s spouse 
or children…
Canada: Manitoba Dependants Relief Act 
1990
2(1) If it appears to the court that a 
dependant is in financial need, 
the court… may order that 
reasonable provision be made…
for the maintenance and 
support of the dependant.
Canada: 
Nova Scotia
Testators’ Family 
Maintenance Act 1989
3(1) Where a testator dies without 
having made adequate provision 
in his will for the proper 
maintenance and support of a 
dependant…
Canada: 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador
Family Relief Act 1990 3(1) …without having made in his 
or her will adequate provision 
for the proper maintenance 
and support of his or her 
dependants or 1 of them…
Canada: 
New Brunswick
Provision for Dependants 
Act 1991
2(1) …are not sufficient to 
provide adequately…for the 
maintenance or support of the 
dependant or dependants.
16
jurisdiction act section Wording
Canada:
Prince Edward 
Island
Dependants of a Deceased 
Person Relief Act 1988
2 Where a deceased has not 
made adequate provision for 
the proper maintenance and 
support of his dependants or 
any of them…
Canada: 
Yukon Territory
Dependants’ Relief Act 
2002
2 …for the proper maintenance 
and support of the dependants 
or any of them.
Canada: 
Northwest 
Territories
Dependants’ Relief Act 
1988
2(1) …for the proper maintenance 
and support of his or her 
dependants or any of them…
Canada: Nunavut Dependants’ Relief Act 
1988
2(1) …for the proper maintenance 
and support of his or her 
dependants or any of them…
Ireland (a hybrid 
system of partial 
provision and 
partial forced 
shares)
Succession Act 1965 
(read together with the 
Intestates’ Estates Act 
1954, s5)
56 A spouse has a forced share 
(called a legal right share) of 
one half the estate if there 
are no children, and one third 
if there are children. This is 
to be enforced over all other 
bequests and devises, or shares 
on intestacy. However, section 
56 allows a surviving spouse 
to require appropriation of the 
dwelling he or she occupied with 
the deceased, and household 
chattels, out of the estate to her/
his use, as part of the above 
share. 
117 This section allows a Court to 
decide that if a testator has 
‘failed in his moral duty to make 
proper provision for the child 
in accordance with his means, 
whether by his Will or otherwise’, 
to order such provision for the 
child out of the testator’s estate 
as it thinks just. This applies 
to all children born in or out 
of marriage. The Court must 
consider this application from 
the point of view of a prudent 
and just parent. This is not to 
affect the legal right share of the 
surviving spouse.
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2.3   reform of family provision laW – uniform legislation 
proposals in australia
Discussion has been ongoing on the need for a uniform approach to family provision 
legislation in Australia. The Queensland Law Reform Commission has been coordinating 
a joint project with the Standing Committee of Attorneys General to investigate uniform 
succession laws for some time. The project is divided into four stages, of which one is 
family provision. The papers so far produced on family provision have been:
Issues Paper W47: The Law of Family Provision (1995); also published by the Law •	
Reform Commission of NSW as Issues Paper 11 (February 1996)
The National Committee’s Final Report to the Standing Committee on Family Provision •	
(No. 28, December 1997) 
Supplementary Report on Family Provision, (No. 58, July 2004); also published by the •	
Law Reform Commission of NSW as Report 110 (May 2005), including a model Family 
Provision Bill.33
In the 1997 report, the National Committee recommended the curtailment of family 
provision in the uniform laws in that the only appropriate applicants would be a 
husband, wife, a non-adult child,34 and a person for whom the deceased person had a 
responsibility to make a provision (as defined in the Victorian Administration and Probate 
Act 1958 ). De facto spouses were not included. However, in the supplementary report of 
2004, de facto spouses were included,35 and this was reflected in the Family Provision Bill 
2004 which accompanied the report. Clause 6(1) of that Bill lists:
the wife or husband of the deceased person at the time of the deceased’s death,•	
a person who was, at the time of the deceased person’s death, the de facto partner of •	
the deceased person,
a non-adult child of the deceased person.•	
Clause 7(1) further provides that a person to whom the deceased owed a responsibility to 
provide maintenance, education or advancement in life may apply for provision. 
The recommended approach therefore combines a status criterion and a circumstances 
criterion for application.36 The status of the applicant as wife, husband, de facto partner 
or minor child will be considered, or, if persons other than those listed in clause 6(1) 
apply, a circumstances approach based on whether the deceased had responsibility to 
make provision for the applicant will be used. Adult children would clearly fall into the 
‘circumstances’ category in this regime, presumably based on dependency. The issue 
of whether same sex partners should be included in either the clause 6(1) category, the 
clause 7(1) category, or not at all, has been left for each separate jurisdiction to decide. 
33 New South Wales has adopted the model provisions as Chapter 3 of the amended 
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) – see the Succession Amendment (Family Provision) Bill 
2008, introduced into the New South Wales parliament on 26 June 2008. The Act was 
passed by the New South Wales Legislative Council on 24 September 2008, and sent 
to the Legislative Assembly on the same date for concurrence. The Act repeals the 
previous Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW).
34 This meant a child less than 18 years of age.
35 Supplementary Report on Family Provision, (No. 58, July 2004) paragraph 2.92.10.
36 Rosalind F. Croucher, ‘Towards Uniform Succession Laws in Australia’ Keynote address 
to the National Council of the Trustee Corporations of Australia, 18 April 2007.
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Clause 6(2) defines a ‘non-adult child’ as a child of the deceased person who was a 
minor when the deceased person died, or who was born after the deceased person 
died,37 but does not include a step-child of the deceased person in the definition. The 
time limit for applications is not later than 12 months after the deceased’s death: clause 
9(1). Clause 10(1) is the operative provision allowing the court to make an order for 
provision if the person is an appropriate applicant, and the will has not made adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of that person. 
The numerous matters to be taken into account by the court are listed in clause 11(2).
The National Committee also recommended that the concept of a ‘notional estate’ in 
the New South Wales legislation be adopted nationally. Notional estate refers to assets 
of the estate which are brought back into an estate after having been disposed of by 
the testator before death. In particular, the recommendations promote the necessity of 
severing joint tenancies before death in appropriate situations,38 and the clarification of 
the situation when the recipient of provision subsequently dies and passes the provision 
assets on to third parties.39 These issues are discussed further below at section 3.5.3.
It should be noted, however, that agreement on the inclusion of notional estate is far from 
uniform across the various state law societies. For example, the Queensland Law Society 
believes that notional estate provisions are not a necessary reform,40 given the decision 
in Bridgewater v Leahy.41 However, New South Wales has now adopted the model 
provisions (except as to permitted applicants) as Chapter 3 of the amended Succession 
Act 2006 (NSW) – see the Succession Amendment (Family Provision) Bill 2008, 
introduced into the New South Wales parliament on 26 June 2008, and passed by the 
Legislative Council on 24 September 2008.42 This amendment repeals the former Family 
Provision Act 1982 (NSW), and may give impetus to the adoption of the model provisions, 
or some of them, in other states.
At the same time as the Australian review has been taking place, the New Zealand 
Law Commission has reviewed the family provision legislation in that country and has 
recommended that adult children should not be appropriate applicants on the basis that 
such children are seldom in need and that a moral basis for provision for adult applicants 
over 19 is absurd, and a mere gloss on the legislation unsupported by the parliament.43 
No action has been taken on any of the recommendations made in New Zealand to date. 
37 This refers to what is currently called in some jurisdictions a child en ventre sa mere, the 
traditional legal term for an unborn child.
38 Clause 27(2)(b).
39 Clause 27(2)(a).
40 John de Groot, Family Provision Claims and the Family Law Intersection, STEP seminar, 
Brisbane, 28 July 2008.
41 (1998) 194 CLR 457, where property disposed of inter vivos was held to be subject to 
claims in equity under the doctrine of undue influence and of unconscionable bargains. 
See further at 3.5.1 below.
42 The bill was sent to the Legislative Assembly for concurrence on the same date.
43 New Zealand Law Commission, Report 39: Succession Law – A Succession 
(Adjustment) Act: modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997). 
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In Canada, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) produced a uniform 
Dependants’ Relief Act in 1974 which was enacted by Ontario, Manitoba, New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island, North West Territory and Yukon Territory, and adopted in similar 
form in the Code Civil du Quebec. Apart from Manitoba, which was the last province 
to adopt the uniform Act in 1990, the other Canadian jurisdictions which enacted the 
uniform legislation have renamed, reviewed, or adapted it since it was first implemented. 
Although the uniform Dependants’ Relief Act remains as a recommendation of the 
ULCC, no further adoptions have occurred since 1990. In addition, British Columbia 
has produced the Report on Statutory Succession Rights, from which there have been 
no resulting alterations to the law,44 and Manitoba the Report on Wills and Succession 
Legislation which recommended some very minor alterations to the law of family 
provision.45As only Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan 
have law reform commissions in Canada, any strong impetus to reform family provision 
law has not been observable beyond academic writings.46
However, most of the Canadian provinces already do not allow applications for family 
provision from adult children, unless disabled in some way,47 or from step-children,48 
and some restrict applications from de facto49 and same sex partners.50 Nevertheless, 
this type of restriction in family provision laws could be difficult to implement in Canada 
because of the operation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially 
article 15(1),51 and it seems that the interaction of family provision law and the non-
discrimination provision of the Charter has not been fully worked through to date.
44 British Columbia Law Institute WP 35, December 1983. 
45 Manitoba Law Reform Commission Report 108, March 2003. 
46 G. Bale, ‘Palm Tree Justice and Testator’s Family Maintenance – The Continuing Saga 
of Confusion and Uncertainty in the B.C. Courts’ (1987) 26 E.T.R. 295; D.C. Simmonds, 
‘Succession Law Reform in Ontario: An Old Cat Needs a New Kick’ (1991) 10 Estates 
Journal 297; L. Amighetti, The law of dependants’ relief in British Columbia, Carswell 
Legal Publications, 1991; Ronald Chester, ‘Disinheritance and the American Child: an 
alternative from British Columbia (1998) 1 Utah Law Review 1; Cameron Harvey and 
Linda Vincent, The Law of Dependant’s Relief in Canada , 2nd edition, Carswell legal 
Publications, 2006; Sheila Nemet-Brown, Canada Quantum Digest – Spousal Support 
and Dependant’s Relief, International Press Publication, 2007.
47 Saskatchewan is alone in having a ‘needs’ category for children over 18, while British 
Columbia, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Ontario do not specify an age 
for the definition of ‘child’. Five provinces specify a ‘child under 18’, although Yukon has 
a ‘child under 16’, and the North West Territories and Nunavut have a ‘child under 19’.
48 Ontario, Manitoba, the North West Territories and Nunavut have categories of 
‘dependant’ which could include a step-child, though this is not made explicit.
49 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador. This can also depend on the definitions 
used. For example, in Alberta, the definition that could include a de facto is that of ‘adult 
interdependent partner’, but not all de facto spouses will fit this description. 
50 Same sex partners are excluded in all provinces except Prince Edward Island. 
51 Article 15 (1) states: Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, 
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) legislation requires that applicants be awarded ‘reasonable financial 
provision’ from an estate. Whilst there is a large pool of applicants, the provision awarded 
is more restricted than in Australia, New Zealand or Canada. This is because provision 
for spouses (as defined) is awarded at a reasonable level in the circumstances, whether 
or not it is required for their maintenance, but for other applicants provision is limited to 
an amount appropriate for maintenance only. The UK is not currently reviewing family 
provision laws as they apply in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but an increasing 
number of high profile family provision claims has recently made news in the British 
press.52 One case yet to be decided in court is illustrative of a similar situation for 
charities in Britain as in Australian case law reports. In that case, an adult daughter is 
seeking provision from her parents’ will in which they left an entire estate of £2.3 million 
to the RSPCA. On the facts as presented, the daughter has a very good case for a large 
share of the estate.53
52 Olivia Gordon, ‘Inheritance disputes: where there’s a will there’s a war’ The Telegraph 
(London), 20 August 2008. In that article, one firm is quoted estimating an increase of 
200% in family provision cases in the past three years.
53 The claimant is Dr Christine Gill, aged 58. The case will be heard in November 2008.
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the oPeration oF Family Provision  
law in australia
Family provision law is a discretionary jurisdiction, and outcomes vary from case to case 
depending on the particular circumstances of the family in question. However, there are 
overarching principles to be discerned from consideration of the case law. Some of these 
principles are relatively fixed, while others are still unsettled or in flux because of changing 
social conditions and expanding notions of what constitutes a family in Australia.
3.1 jurisdiction
Determining jurisdiction in family provision cases has been held to be a two-stage 
process in Australia.54 The two issues to be resolved are, respectively, jurisdictional and 
discretionary. The court has first to determine whether the applicant is an appropriate 
applicant, and if so, if the applicant has been left without adequate provision for his or 
her proper maintenance and support. The second issue is whether the court will exercise 
its discretion to make an order in the particular circumstances, and the nature of that 
order. This neat division is subject, however, to any moral claims which are found to be 
present (see 3.4 below), and a consideration of all the relevant circumstances.55
3.2 differences in Wording of legislation among jurisdictions
The courts have been consistent in emphasising that the differences in wording of family 
provision legislation among the various jurisdictions in Australia (and indeed elsewhere) are 
not to be regarded as crucial to outcomes. This means that the legislation is interpreted 
widely. In Coates v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd,56 Dixon CJ made 
this clear, stating that: ‘The legislation of the various States is all grounded on the same 
policy and found its source in New Zealand. refined distinctions between the acts are 
to be avoided…’ (at 506-507, emphasis added). In the same case, Fullager J, at 517, said 
that ‘…the searching out of nice distinctions is to be deprecated, and the approach which 
presumes uniformity of intention is the correct approach’ (emphasis added).57
54 Goodman v Windeyer (1980) 144 CLR 490, 502; Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 20.
55 Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11; Serle v Walsh [2006] QSC 377; 
Bowyer v Wood [2007] SASC 321.
56 (1956) 95 CLR 494.
57 See also on the same point: Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) (1938) AC 463; 
Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1961-62) CLR 9, 18. 
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Whilst true uniformity of interpretation cannot be guaranteed in these cases, since each 
will turn on its facts to some extent, and the jurisdiction is wholly discretionary, the only 
word regarded as really important in the cases seems to be ‘proper’. Has the provision 
made to the applicant been proper? In McCosker v McCosker, Dixon CJ and Williams J, 
in a joint judgement, said:58
  ‘The question is whether, in all the circumstances of the case, it can be said that 
the respondent has been left by the testator without adequate provision for his 
proper maintenance, education and advancement in life. As the Privy Council said 
in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) 1938 A.C. 463, the word ‘proper’ in this 
collocation of words is of considerable importance. It means ‘proper’ in all the 
circumstances of the case…If the court considers that here has been a breach 
by a testator of his duty as a wise and just husband or father to make adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance education or advancement in life of the 
applicant, having regard to all these circumstances, the court has jurisdiction to 
remedy the breach and for that purpose to modify the testator’s testamentary 
dispositions to the necessary extent.’
There has also been discussion of the difference in meaning between ‘proper’ and 
‘adequate’. In Bowyer v Wood,59 in a unanimous decision, the Full Court of South 
Australia said:
  ‘When determining whether the testatrix has failed to make adequate provision out 
of her estate for the proper maintenance of the plaintiff, it is necessary to consider 
what is meant by the words ‘adequate’ and ‘proper’. This meaning has been 
considered on many occasions. The words ‘adequate’ and ‘proper’ are always 
relative...There are no fixed standards and the court is left to form opinions upon 
the basis of its own general knowledge and experience of current social conditions 
and standards...The word ‘proper’ connotes something different from the word 
‘adequate’…The word ‘proper’ connotes an ethical position as to what allowance 
should be made.’
This follows on from the words of Privy Council in Bosch v Perpetual Trustees in 1938:60
  ‘The use of the word ‘proper’ in this connection is of considerable importance. 
It connotes something different from the word ‘adequate’. A small sum may be 
sufficient for the ‘adequate’ maintenance of a child, for instance, but, having 
regard to the child’s station in life and the fortune of his father, it may be wholly 
insufficient for his ‘proper’ maintenance. So, too, a sum may be quite insufficient 
for the ‘adequate’ maintenance of a child and yet may be sufficient for his 
maintenance on a scale that is ‘proper’ in all the circumstances. A father with a 
large family and a small fortune can often only afford to leave each of his children 
a sum insufficient for his ‘adequate’ maintenance. Nevertheless, such sum 
cannot be described as not providing for his ‘proper’ maintenance, taking into 
consideration ‘all the circumstances of the case’ as the sub-section requires shall 
be done.’ 
58 (1957) 97 CLR 566, at 571-572.
59 (2007) 99 SASR 190, [2007] SASC 327 at paragraphs [39] – [40].
60 Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1938] AC 463, at 476.
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The comparison has also been alluded to by the High Court in the following terms:61 
  ‘Adequacy of the provision that has been made is not to be decided in a vacuum, or 
by looking simply to the question whether the applicant has enough upon which to 
survive or live comfortably. Adequacy or otherwise will depend upon all of the relevant 
circumstances, which include any promise which the testator made to the applicant, 
the circumstances in which it was made, and, as here, changes in the arrangements 
between the parties after it was made. These matters however will never be conclusive. 
The age, capacities, means and competing claims, of all of the potential beneficiaries 
must be taken into account and weighed with all of the other relevant factors.’ 
It seems clear that ‘proper’ and ‘adequate’ are not to be considered as having the same 
meaning, but although not all jurisdictions use the same combination of words in their 
family provision legislation, these words individually are to be interpreted consistently.
3.3 appropriate applicants
The original purpose of the legislation was to provide for widows and dependent children 
of testators who disinherited them, or left them without adequate provision for a normal 
life. However, again the courts have been liberal in their interpretation, and legislators 
have followed the trend, so that the pool of applicants has steadily widened. 
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New South 
Wales
x x x x x x
Victoria
‘Person for whom 
the deceased had 
responsibility to make 
provision’
Queensland
x x x x x
x (limited – see 
paragraphs below)
South 
Australia
x x x x x x
x (includes brother or 
sister entitled because 
of care given to 
deceased)
Western 
Australia
x x x x x x
Tasmania x x x x x x
Northern 
Territory
x x x x x x
Australian 
Capital 
Territory
x x x x x
61 Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA 11, per Callinan and Heydon JJ at paragraph [122].
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Although summarising the situation generally, this table does not reflect the subtle 
differences in the wording pertaining to applicants permitted in the various state 
provisions. For example, Victoria only has ‘a person for whom the deceased had 
responsibility to make provision’ which clearly can be widely interpreted. New South 
Wales previously had an ‘eligible person’ which is a term defined to include a spouse, 
a person in a domestic relationship, a child of those relationships, a former spouse, a 
grandchild (if dependent), or a member of the deceased’s household (if dependent). 
The new Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) lists at section 57 a spouse, a 
de facto spouse, a child of those relationships, a former spouse, a person who was 
wholly or partly dependent on the deceased person, a grandchild who was a member 
of the deceased person’s household, and a person in a close personal relationship with 
the deceased at the time of the death. Many of these terms can be interpreted by the 
court. The New South Wales Attorney-General, in his second reading speech for the new 
legislation in New South Wales, specifically noted that New South Wales had not adopted 
the suggested claimant list from the model Bill of 2004 because the New South Wales 
listing, seemingly wide though it is, was more specific. He said:62
  ‘The model bill restricts the list of those who are automatically entitled to make 
an application for provision to spouses, de facto partners and non-adult children 
of the deceased. It contains a ‘catch-all’ category of claimant permitting anyone 
to whom the deceased owed a responsibility to provide maintenance, education 
or advancement in life to apply to the court for a family provision order. such 
a change may lead to a flood of new claims being made on estates from 
people who are not currently entitled to apply in new south Wales. adult 
children would also be forced to demonstrate the requirement of the 
deceased’s responsibility to them. This may lead to more lengthy and expensive 
litigation, as adult children seek to prove they meet this requirement. The bill, 
therefore, does not adopt the model bill eligibility provisions.’(emphasis added)
In Queensland, the issue is one of dependency – a claimant can be a spouse, defined to 
include a de facto spouse, or dependent former spouse, a child, defined to include an 
adopted or step child, or a dependant. The latter term is defined to be a parent, a parent 
of a surviving child, or a child less than 18 years. South Australia allows application by a 
spouse, divorced spouse, de facto partner, child, child of a spouse or de facto partner 
who is entitled to be maintained, grandchild, parent entitled to provision (because of care 
given to deceased), or brother or sister entitled to provision (because of care given to 
deceased). Western Australia lists spouse, de facto partner, former spouse or de facto 
partner, child (including en ventre sa mere), grandchild if parent dead, even if only en ventre 
sa mere, and parent. Tasmania permits application by a spouse (includes de facto spouse), 
children (includes adopted and step children), parents (if no spouse or children), or an 
ex-spouse or ex-de facto spouse entitled to receive maintenance at the time of the death. 
The Australian Capital Territory allows application by a partner, a person in a domestic 
relationship for more than two years, child, step-child (if being maintained), grandchild (if 
the parent who is child of the deceased is dead, or the grandchild is not being 
62 The Hon. John Hatzistergos, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, second reading 
speech, 26 June 2008.
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maintained by parent or parents), or parent (if being maintained, or there is no partner 
or child of the deceased). The Northern Territory has spouse or de facto partner, 
former spouse or de facto partner, children of those relationships, step-child (if being 
maintained), grandchild (if parent has died or parents are not providing), parent (if being 
maintained or there is no spouse, partner or child). In New Zealand, the home of family 
provision law, applications are permitted by a spouse or civil union partner, a de facto 
spouse, children, grandchildren living at the time of death, step-children entitled to be 
maintained immediately before the death of testator, parents (if being maintained before 
death of testator, or if there is no spouse, civil union partner, de facto spouse or children 
of these relationships).
Clearly this multiplicity of expressions could be streamlined. The model bill provisions 
allow applications as of right only by a spouse, a de facto spouse, or a non-adult child, 
with an extra provision for those falling under a general rubric of dependency. The new 
legislation in New South Wales does not adopt this formula at section 57, but rather 
maintains the status quo as to the permitted applicants in that state. There are no 
proposals to alter the situation as to applicants in any other state or territory.
3.3.1 spouses
The purpose of family provision legislation was originally to provide support for widows 
and children of testators who might have willed their estates away from their immediate 
families for whatever reason, but particularly to charities, strangers, or to those remoter 
family members who might have unduly influenced the making of the will. In this sense, 
the legislation introduced into New Zealand and then Australia, Canada and the UK was 
somewhat in the vanguard of legal history in that it was aimed, in the context of its time, 
at the protection of women.63
In introducing the Bill for what became the 1916 Act, the New South Wales Attorney-
General said:64 
  ‘It is remarkable that in Australia, where the rights of women have developed so 
rapidly in the matter of property, we have wiped out whatever right a woman has in 
the estate of her husband. The dower which existed here for many years exists no 
longer. It was abolished in the year 1890, and to-day a man may leave the whole 
of his property, both real and personal, to any stranger to whom he chooses to 
leave it. The wife may have been with him as a partner for forty or fifty years. She 
may have assisted him in acquiring whatever wealth he possesses; yet he, dying, 
may will the property away and leave her dependent on the kindness of friends or 
the charity of the State. During his lifetime he cannot do that, for it is incumbent on 
him to maintain his wife. The object of the bill is to secure that after her husband’s 
death the right of the wife to get sufficient from his estate to maintain her shall 
continue, and the right of his children shall be equally preserved.’
63 Indeed New Zealand, and to a lesser extent Australia, have always been in the vanguard 
on like issues. For example, New Zealand first introduced old age pensions in 1898 
and widows’ pensions in 1911. Some argue that one of the drivers for New Zealand’s 
legislation on family provision was the wealthy testators could leave nothing to their 
widows expecting that they would receive the widow’s pension. However, as the 
legislation was introduced in 1900, the driver in this context could not have been the 
widow’s pension but rather the old age pension.
64 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 August 1916, 1239 
(Attorney-General).
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This remained the thrust of the legislation in relation to widows until relatively recent 
times. In Schaefer v Schuhman Lord Simon of Glaisdale said:65
  ‘Men and women necessarily have different functions to perform…The social 
function carried out by women in the bearing and upbringing of children puts 
them at an economic disadvantage…Moreover, the rights and obligations do not 
necessarily come to an end on the death of the husband and parent. The wife’s 
needs and, generally, her economic impairment subsist…Most societies enforce 
by law the husband and parent’s duty to provide for dependants not only during 
joint lives but after death as well…The legislative intention cannot therefore be 
in doubt; it was to prevent family dependants being thrown on the world with 
inadequate provision…’
Of course, in the light of the equality and financial independence gained by women over 
the 108 years since family provision legislation was first introduced, we might argue that 
such paternalism is unnecessary in the 21st century, but the case law does not support 
that contention. A testator’s duty to his widow is still to ensure that she is secure in her 
home, that she has enough to permit her to live in the style to which she is accustomed, 
and that she has a fund to meet any unforseen contingencies.66 This duty has changed 
very little in the case law since it was first enunciated in Allardice v Allardice in 1910 as 
consisting of such maintenance as a wife has been accustomed to during the life of her 
husband, taking into account the station in life of the parties, the means of the testator, 
the personal property and income of the widow, her age and health, and the general 
circumstances in which she finds herself at the time of the testators’ death.67 Moreover, 
this duty is above all others including any desire to be generous to charity.68
In general, the same principles apply in the case of widowers, but nature having 
provided a longer life span for women, the majority of the cases in this category concern 
the position of widows. The seminal case on the position of widowers is Nosworthy 
v Nosworthy.69 In that case, the testatrix left two sizeable legacies to charity and the 
residue of her estate to her husband. His application for further provision resulted in a 
reduction of the legacies to charity in his favour. The court took into account his financial 
circumstances and his age in making this provision. This position has also changed very 
little in 102 years.70
65 [1972] A.C. 572, 595-596.
66 See White v Barron (1980) 144 CLR 431; Luciano v Rosenblum (1985) NSWLR 65; 
Gregory v Hudson [1999] NSWCA 221; Sayer v Sayer; Garbutt v Sayer [1999] NSWCA 
340; Oun v Brimelow [2006] NSWSC 1115.
67 (1910) NZLR 959, 969.
68 Orr v Public Trustee [1930] NZLR 732, 735. See on the same point: Pulleng v Public 
Trustee [1922] NZLR 1022, 1029; Collins v Public Trustee [1927] NZLR 746, 750.
69 (1906) 26 NZLR 285.
70 Blundell v Curvers (2002) NSWSC 436.
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However, some recent case law has cast doubt on the validity of the Allardice style duty 
to widows and widowers. In Marshall v Carruthers71 and Bladwell v Davis,72 views were 
expressed by the court that the duty enunciated in Luciano v Rosenblum to provide a 
home, a similar lifestyle to the situation before widowhood, and a fund for unforeseen 
contingencies,73 was too widely stated, especially for widowers, and also for widows 
‘not in a position of economic disadvantage’, or where the marriage had been short-
term.74 Despite this, the discretionary nature of family provision means that most widows 
are continuing to be provided for on a Luciano v Rosenblum basis,75 while others have 
some inroads made into their provision in order to provide legacies for children.76 It is 
particularly notable that a life interest is seldom seen as a suitable mode of provision for 
a spouse, for the reason that the house may be needed to raise a bond for an aged care 
hostel entry fee. It was said in Golosky v Golosky, by Kirby P. (as he then was):77
  ‘A mere right of residence will usually be an unsatisfactory method of providing for 
a spouse’s accommodation…because a spouse may be compelled by sickness, 
age, urgent supervening necessity or otherwise, with good reason, to leave the 
residence.’
Nevertheless, there are circumstances where life interests are awarded to claimants, 
particularly in cases of marriages of short duration, or where conduct has been found to 
be inappropriate, but not disentitling.78
In the case of former spouses, the key to obtaining provision is dependence on the 
testator immediately before his or her death. In these cases, ‘dependence’ means more 
than financial, economic or material dependence, but can include, in addition to those 
categories, emotional dependence.
71 [2002] NSWCA 47.
72 [2004] NSWCA 170. 
73 (1985) 2 NSWLR 65, 69-70.
74 See on the issue of length of marriage, and its influence on an award of provision, Serle 
v Walsh [2006] QSC 377 at [51]-[53]; Manly v The Public Trustee of Queensland [2007] 
QSC 388 at [102].
75 O’Loughlin v Low [2002] NSWSC 222; Reynolds v Stanley [2004] NSWSC 685; Oun v 
Brimelow [2006] NSWSC 1115. This is also true in other jurisdictions. In Canada e.g. 
Tataryan v Tataryan [1994] 2 S.C.R. 807, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
from British Columbia; and Erlichman v Erlichman [2002] 45 ETR (2d.) 215 (British 
Columbia Court of Appeal).
76 Dwyer v Mulligan [2007] NSWSC 841. This seems also to be the position in New Zealand 
for which the principles are laid out in Williams v Aucutt [2000] NZCA 289. See generally: 
Richard Sutton and Nicola Peart, ‘Testamentary Claims by Adult Children – The Agony of 
the ‘Wise and Just Testator’’ (2003) Otago Law Review 6.
77 Golosky v Golosky, unreported New South Wales Court of Appeal, 5 October 1998, at 10-11.
78 See Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215, at [23].
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3.3.2 de facto and same sex partners
All jurisdictions in Australia allow for de facto partners, as defined in each jurisdiction, 
to apply for family provision. Such applications are not, in general, controversial.79 In 
most jurisdictions this can extend to same sex partners, if they are persons in a close 
or genuine domestic relationship, or are otherwise entitled to be maintained by the 
deceased. In the 2007 case of Nelligan v Crouch,80 the claimant for provision had been 
left nothing in the will of the deceased, and, because of the failure of a bequest to the 
executor, the whole estate was left to the Royal Flying Doctor Service (RFDS). The 
plaintiff had been the same sex partner of the deceased for a long period of time, though 
they had for some years been separated by the demands of personal and family illness. 
The judge determined that they were not living together in the sense of de facto partners, 
nor were they in a ‘close domestic relationship’ at the time of death. However, he found 
that the claimant had been part of the deceased’s life for more than 30 years, and that:
  ‘It was the fact that they lived together for a long time, the fact that the relationship 
did not cease even though they lived separately and apart after 1997 in the sense 
that the contact remained and the care and consideration for each other still 
remained in those years thereafter. There were also the obvious contributions to 
the property…’
The judge awarded the claimant $100 000 from an estate of approximately $180 000 after 
costs. The RFDS received the remainder, which represented a third of the original legacy.
However, in an almost identical same sex partner situation in Queensland, decided the 
month before Nelligan, the claimant failed to prove a relationship analogous to that of a 
de facto partner, and thus to a spouse, and could not obtain provision.81 This illustrates 
one area of family provision law, which, because the concept of ‘family’ is fluid in the 21st 
century, has not been worked through fully. 
The complexities in this area can be illustrated more vividly by the Victorian case of 
Bentley v Brennan; Re Bull (dec’d).82 In that case, the applicant for provision was an 
adult male who had maintained a same sex relationship for twenty years in adulthood 
with the deceased who had also abused the applicant for eight years as a minor. Was 
the applicant entitled to provision? Was this to be a means of, in effect, compensation 
for a crime? Section 91(1) of the Victorian legislation allows provision to be made 
for the proper maintenance and support of any person for whom the deceased had 
responsibility to make provision. Despite the circumstances, the judge concluded that the 
applicant was not someone in this position. He said:83
  
79 Summers v Garland [2006] QSC 85 and Houston v Butler [2007] QSC 284 are examples 
of substantial provision being made for a de facto partner. Underwood v Underwood 
[2008] QSC 159 is an example of further provision being made for a de facto spouse of 
only three years, but who had cared for the testator in his last illness.
80 [2007] NSWSC 840 at paragraph [60].
81 Barker v Linklater [2007] QSC 125.
82 [2006] VSC 113.
83 [2006] VSC 113 at [24] and [31].
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  ‘…reference to accepted community standards requires a consideration of 
what those standards of the general community are…They may change from 
time to time. For example, I would have little difficulty in concluding today that 
a relationship between the testator and an unmarried heterosexual partner or 
between a testator and a homosexual partner would today be seen by the general 
community as one which might give rise to a moral obligation just as a relationship 
with a spouse. The challenge presented by a case such as the present arises at 
a different level. I am required to…form an assessment of the true relationship 
which existed between the deceased and the claimant in order to determine the 
existence or not of the moral duty...Difficulty arises where this is a relationship 
between members of a community with which the judge is not familiar. This may 
be a particular ethnic or social community; it may be a community whose bond 
is that of sexual orientation…the judge must do the best he or she can, bringing 
to bear wisdom, an openness of mind drawing upon long experience of life and 
human conduct and attitudes, and above all, resisting the temptation to apply 
perceived stereotypes. Another temptation to be resisted is to assume that all 
members of the community think and conduct themselves like the judge and share 
the same values and moral imperatives…It is here that one must be cautious of 
the concept of moral obligation. Doubtless on his deathbed the wise and just 
testator might be encouraged to see as his moral obligation to hold out a hand 
of friendship to those whom he had wrongfully rejected; a hand of forgiveness to 
those who had wronged him; and to make good, if this be possible, any damage 
which he has caused to another in his lifetime. it may be that the general 
community would applaud his decision to make provision in his will for 
such a person by way of atonement. but this is not the role of part 4 of the 
Administration and Probate Act 1958…’ (emphasis added).
It seems clear then that the purpose of this type of legislation is to make provision for 
those left without proper maintenance and support. It is not to make good any familial or 
moral lapses, despite its discretionary nature. To make family provision laws a means of 
compensation, revenge, or atonement would be to take the discretionary element too far.
3.3.3 adult children
The most contentious category of applicant is that of adult children, especially adult 
sons. The position of adult children was first discussed in the New Zealand decision of 
Allardice v Allardice.84 In that case, the testator had been married twice, with four adult 
married daughters and two adult sons by his first wife, and a widow and six children from 
his second marriage. He left his entire estate to his second family, with no provision for 
the adult children. At first instance, the Supreme Court denied any provision to all of the 
six adult children of the testator’s first marriage. However, on appeal to the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal, three of the married daughters were granted provision of small amounts 
by monthly instalments. The court was not entirely dismissive of the claims of the adult 
sons, but felt that they should be self-supporting, stating:
  ‘As to the sons, I have doubts whether some provision ought not to be made for them. 
They are, however, physically able…If they had any push, they should, considering 
their age, have ere this done something for themselves, and to settle money on them 
now might destroy their energy and weaken their desire to exert themselves.’
84 (1910) 29 NZLR 959, at 969-975.
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In Australia, the adult son issue was discussed by Fullager J in In re Sinnott:85 
  ‘No special principle is to be applied in the case of an adult son. But the approach 
of the Court must be different. In the case of a widow or an infant child, the Court 
is dealing with one who is prima facie dependent on the testator and prima facie 
has a claim to be maintained and supported. But the adult son is, I think, prima 
facie able to ‘maintain and support’ himself, and some special need or some 
special claim must, generally speaking, be shown to justify intervention by the 
Court under the Act.’ 
McTiernan J in Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales,86 stated that:
  …the fact that an applicant is an adult son does not necessarily mean that relief 
in applications of this character must be refused. But such cases present special 
difficulties and, of course, before relief can be granted it must appear that the 
circumstances are such that the applicant is …left without ‘adequate provision for 
his proper maintenance and support’. But what is ‘adequate’ and what is ‘proper’ 
must be determined in the light of all the circumstances of the case’.87
The special need requirement has been gradually lessened, however. Gibbs J in Hughes 
v National Trustees, Executors and Agency Company of Australasia Ltd said:88
  ‘In some cases a special claim may be found to exist because the applicant has 
contributed to building up the testator’s estate or has helped him in other ways. 
In other cases a son who has done nothing for his parents may have a special 
need. This may be because he suffers from some physical or mental infirmity, 
but it is not necessary for an adult son to show that his earning powers have 
been impaired by some disability before he can establish a special need for 
maintenance and support. He may have suffered a financial disaster; he may be 
unable to obtain employment; he may have a number of dependants who rely 
on him for support which he cannot adequately provide from his own resources. 
there are no rigid rules; the question whether adequate provision has been 
made for the proper maintenance and support of the adult son must depend on all 
the circumstances…’(emphasis added).
Later cases (see Appendix A) established that there are no strict principles in awarding 
provision to adult sons, or to adult children generally.89 Each case is subject to judicial 
discretion with the circumstances of the adult child, whether of health, finances or any 
other relevant issue, being discussed in some detail before the judge awards whatever 
provision he or she thinks ‘proper’.
85 (1948) VLR 279, at 280.
86 (1961-62) 107 CLR 9, at 18.
87 See also on the same point: McCosker v McCosker (1957) 97 CLR 566; Stott v Cook 
(1960) 33 A.J.L.R. 447; Hughes v National Trustees, Executors and Agency Company of 
Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134.
88 (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 147.
89 Bondelmonte v Blanckensee [1989] WAR 305; Hawkins v Prestage (1989) 1 WAR 37; 
Wilson v Wilson (1993) unreported judgement, Supreme Court of Western Australia; 
Banks v Seemann [2008] QSC 202.
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The more recent reviews by law reform bodies of family provision laws have all 
recommended that adult children should not be appropriate applicants for family 
provision. The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) has pointed to anomalies in the 
Family Provision Act 1955 (NZ) stating:90
  ‘Claims by adult children under the Family Provision Act 1955 are often made on 
the basis not of need but on the basis that the will-maker breached an undefined 
moral duty. This regime is indefensible because will-makers cannot determine 
and comply with its requirements in advance, and because it may disregard moral 
imperatives of the will-maker that are not shared by whichever judge is called 
upon to decide the claim. Will-makers, during their lifetime, are required by law to 
provide economic support only to certain children under 19.’
The NZLC is making it clear that it favours the same provision being required before 
and after the death of the will-making parent. Two cases are discussed in the report to 
illustrate what the NZLC sees as judicial over-expansion of the original concept of family 
provision. In Re Blakely,91 the judge found that an adult son did not require any provision 
because he was not in any need. His father’s will, which had left a large part of his estate 
to charity, was therefore not interfered with to make provision for the adult son, since the 
father had fulfilled his obligations to his widow and children. However, in Re Forward,92 
the judge did not permit the testator to leave his money as he chose because of a breach 
of moral duty to his two adult sons. The effect of this expansion of the law over 40 
years is that adult children in New Zealand now have a right to apply for a share in their 
parents’ estate, whatever their age or financial position.93 
The NZLC therefore recommends in its report that only children, as defined,94 be entitled 
to make a ‘support claim’ under family provision legislation. Adult children should be 
denied the right of claim in all but three situations:95
Where adult, independent children have conferred valuable benefits on a parent during •	
the parent’s lifetime 
Where there is genuine need, and it is possible to meet the claim without unfairness to •	
other beneficiaries, to allow periodic payments to the adult child to alleviate their need 
(designated a ‘needs claim’ for a ‘needs award’)
Where what is sought by the adult child is no more that a memento or keepsake of •	
modest value. 
90 New Zealand Law Commission, Report 39: Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) 
Act: modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997), ‘Introduction’ at 
paragraph 4.
91 [1957] NZLR 875, 877.
92 Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, 1996, 6.
93 New Zealand Law Commission, Report 39: Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) 
Act: modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997), ‘Problems of the 
present law’, paragraph 32. 
94 Ibid, ‘Overview of the draft act’, paragraph 70, defines children as ‘minors, or under 
25 and undertaking educational or vocational training, or unable to earn a reasonable, 
independent livelihood because of a physical, intellectual or mental disability which 
occurred before the child reached 25’.
95 Ibid, paragraphs 72, 77.
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Stepchildren are recommended to be denied claims unless the will-maker ‘has assumed 
in an enduring way, the responsibilities of a parent’. No other relatives are to be permitted 
to make claims.96
The Queensland Law Reform Commission, as lead agency in the Australia-wide review 
of succession law, also recommends that adult children not be able to make a claim for 
provision, or increased provision. In clause 6 of the proposed model legislation, the eligibility 
for claim is limited to the wife or husband, a de facto partner (as defined in each jurisdiction 
in Australia), and non-adult children. Clause 7 additionally permits a claim by a person 
to whom a deceased person owed a responsibility to provide maintenance, education or 
advancement in life. Clause 11 lists matters to be taken into account, which may include:97
any family or other relationship between the person in whose favour the order is a. 
sought to be made (the proposed beneficiary) and the deceased person, including the 
nature and duration of the relationship,
the nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased b. 
person to the proposed beneficiary, to any other person in respect of whom an 
application has been made for a family provision order or to any beneficiary of the 
deceased person’s estate,
the nature and extent of the deceased person’s estate (including any property c. 
that is, or could be, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) and of 
any liabilities or charges to which the estate is subject, as in existence when the 
application is being considered,
the financial resources (including earning capacity) and financial needs, both present d. 
and future, of the proposed beneficiary, of any other person in respect of whom an 
application has been made for a family provision order or of any beneficiary of the 
deceased person’s estate,
any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the proposed beneficiary, any other e. 
person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order 
or any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate that is in existence when the 
application is being considered or that may reasonably be anticipated,
the age of the proposed beneficiary when the application is being considered,f. 
any contribution, whether made before or after the deceased person’s death, for which g. 
adequate consideration (not including any pension or other benefit) was not received, 
by the proposed beneficiary to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of 
the estate of the deceased person or to the welfare of the deceased person or the 
deceased person’s family,
any provision made for the proposed beneficiary by the deceased person, either during h. 
the deceased person’s lifetime or any provision made from the deceased person’s estate,
the date of the will (if any) of the deceased person and the circumstances in which the i. 
will was made,
whether the proposed beneficiary was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the j. 
deceased person before the deceased person’s death and, if the Court considers it 
relevant, the extent to which and the basis on which the deceased person did so,
96 Ibid, paragraph 79.
97 These matters are modelled on the current Victorian legislation, the Administration and 
Probate Act 1958 (Vic), section 91(4) (e)-(p).
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whether any other person is liable to support the proposed beneficiary,k. 
the character and conduct of the proposed beneficiary or any other person before and l. 
after the death of the deceased person,
(any relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander customary law or other customary law,m. 
any other matter the Court considers relevant, including matters in existence at the n. 
time of the deceased person’s death or at the time the application is being considered.
3.3.4 adult children Who are disabled
A subset of applicants who are adult children are those adult children who have a 
recognised physical or mental disability, or are otherwise unable to look after themselves. 
It may be argued that children in this category of claimant have a priority claim on a 
parent’s estate, particularly where they have substantial care needs or are in a care home. 
In addition, if disabled adult children are in receipt of a pension, any provision they receive 
may affect the pension entitlement. In Warland v Reece,98 the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal said that the loss of pension entitlement in such cases was something ‘which ought 
to be avoided at all costs’. The general position in the cases seems to be that where the 
estate is capable of properly providing for the disabled child, it should do so and provision 
or further provision will be made accordingly. Where the estate is a small one, the pension 
entitlement should be preserved. In Whitmont v Lloyd,99it was stated that:
  ‘The protection of public funds from claims by indigent persons is not a purpose 
of family provision legislation but they are incidentally protected by the legislation, 
which was not enacted solely for the protection of private interests and serves 
public policy. ... in my opinion, the availability of aged pensions and other 
social benefits is a circumstance which should be regarded, and particularly 
in small estates it may be appropriate to leave an applicant wholly or partly 
dependent on them or to mould the provision made so that their availability 
is preserved in whole or in part’. (emphasis added)
More recently, in Gunawardena v Kanagaratnam Sri Kantha100 Young CJ said:
  ‘the question as to how far, if at all, courts should take into account benefits 
that may flow to applicants and beneficiaries by way of pensions and other 
public benefits given to the poor is one which has not yet been finally 
settled. In Parker v Public Trustee, 31 May 1988, unreported, I indicated that, 
generally speaking, the object of the legislation is to compel persons to make 
provision for their dependants and not throw the maintenance of the dependants 
upon the public purse, though a testator has no duty to organise his or her affairs 
so that the beneficiaries receive the maximum benefit from his estate so long as 
he or she makes adequate provision for them…Ordinarily, when one has a very 
disabled person, it does not take much for one to draw the conclusion that that 
person should have the whole estate. However, as in Ridge’s case, providing the 
whole estate to the plaintiff in the instant case does very little good in view of my 
finding that he is better cared for in the…Nursing Home.’(emphasis added).
98 [2000] NSWCA 380 at [9]
99 New South Wales Supreme Court, unreported, 31 July 1995, per Bryson J at 14. See 
also: Foster v Lisle [2003] NSWSC 1243; Chan v Tsui [2005] NSWSC 82; Ridge v Public 
Trustee [2006] NSWSC 400
100 [2007] NSWSC 151 at paragraph [57].
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Therefore, it seems that the provision of government benefits is just one more factor 
which needs to be taken into account when determining the question of adequate 
provision from an estate. Whether the amount awarded causes the applicant to lose 
his or her pension entitlement needs to be balanced with the (moral) obligation of the 
testator to provide a ‘proper’ sum for the maintenance of a disabled adult child. This 
obligation probably only arises in the case of very large estates.
Even in cases of large estates, it is possible to preserve government pension entitlements 
by the use of a Special Disability Trust (SDT) set up under the Social Security Act 1991 
(Cth).101 An SDT can be set up inter vivos or by will. This type of trust allows a family 
to set aside up to $500 000 in the trust to provide for care and accommodation for a 
disabled family member, without affecting the disabled person’s pension entitlements. 
Only persons with a ‘severe disability’102 can make use of this exception to the normal 
means test requirements of the Social Security Act, and there have consequently been 
few SDTs set up to date.103 There is currently a Senate Inquiry into SDTs looking at their 
low take up rate, restrictive application, and taxation treatment.104
3.3.5 adult children Who are ‘lame ducks’
Another subset of adult children as claimants in family provision cases is that of children 
often crudely characterised by the courts as ‘lame ducks’ or ‘life’s losers’. This category 
of claimant perhaps represents a clear example of the courts seeing charity as beginning 
at home, and may to some extent overlap the categories of disabled adult children105 and 
those who are disentitled from provision because of moral deficiency or other reasons.
The category has always been recognised in family provision cases. In the 1943 case of 
Re Hatte, Philp J said:106
  ‘... I do not think that the Legislature intended that provision under the Act should 
be given rather to those who are efficient and successful than to those who are 
not. A just father’s moral duty is to assist the lame ducks amongst his offspring, 
provided they be not morally or otherwise undeserving.’
101 Part 3.18A added to the Act on 20 September 2006.
102 Defined in section 1209M. A person with a ‘severe disability’ will be either a ‘profoundly 
disabled child’ under the Social Security Act or a person over 16 years of age who is 
entitled to a disability support pension, has a carer entitled to a carer’s payment, or who 
lives in a care home funded by the Commonwealth.
103 There were 26 SDTs set up as at 31 March 2008 under the Social Security Act 1991 
(Cth). There are probably many more set up in wills (e.g. the Public Trustee of Western 
Australia reported 29 SDTs set up in wills under their control as at June 2008), but these 
have not yet been activated.
104 Parliament of Australia, Senate, Inquiry into Special Disability Trusts. The inquiry was 
established on 15 May 2008, and the closing date for submissions was 13 June 2008. A 
report is expected in late September 2008.
105 See for example, Charlesworth v Herring [2007] NSWSC 312 where it was held that the 
testator had no obligation to a disabled son because of a long period of estrangement, 
and because he was not in need.
106 [1943] St R Qd 1, at 26. See also Grey v Harrison [1977] 2 VR 245, at 359; Hughes v 
National Trustees, Executors and Agency Company of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 
134; [1979] HCA 2; Collicoat and Others v McMillan and Another [1999] 3 VR 803; 
Killiner v Freeman [2000] NSWSC 263; Lee v Hearn [2002] VSC 208; Benham v Benham 
[2004] NSWSC 416.
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Even more pointedly, it was said in Killiner v Freeman:107
  ‘[The plaintiff ] presented as a pathetic creature, who, despite the financial benefits 
which he has received from his father and despite the various incidents of unfilial 
conduct of which he was clearly guilty, appeared, both medically and emotionally, 
to be one of life’s losers . It is for just such a person that the exercise of the 
discretion of the Court should be available. It should be emphasised that an order 
for provision is not made as a reward for good conduct; neither is such an order (if 
otherwise justified) withheld as a punishment for bad conduct.’
Similar value judgements abounded in Benham v Benham:108
  ‘I intend no discourtesy to him when I describe the Plaintiff as one of life’s 
losers... At the age of fifty-four the Plaintiff has little in the way of assets. He has 
even been bankrupt. He has no qualifications. He is employed in a lowly paid 
position. He suffers significant health problems. He cannot afford a necessary 
health procedure or the acquisition of a hearing aid.’
Lame duck adult children are consistently adjudged to be entitled to their parents’ 
testamentary charity, even ahead of other siblings, in order to redress their various 
lacks.109 Whatever characteristics render them ‘lame’ or ‘losers’ are not so morally 
deficient as to disentitle them from provision or further provision, but rather represent an 
illustration of the court’s interpretation of testamentary duty of testator parents as a moral 
duty to their heirs.
3.3.6 step children
In all Australian jurisdictions stepchildren can make family provision claims. The usual 
issue in these cases is family property which has passed by joint tenancy survivorship 
to the surviving step-parent. On the death of the step-parent, the question the court has 
to consider is whether the step-parent gained an advantage by the survivorship which 
should now be passed to the stepchild, even if an adult. In Powell v Monteath,110 this 
issue was resolved by a consideration of the surrounding circumstances. The applicant 
stepson was in relatively necessitous circumstances and the court’s decision that he 
had been left without adequate maintenance and support was arrived at despite the 
fact that the claimant was 63 years old. In Freeman v Jacques,111 the applicants were 
seven stepchildren, aged between 53 and 61, seeking provision from their deceased 
stepmother’s estate. The children had never been in a familial relationship with the 
deceased, and had already benefited from their father’s estate. The testatrix’s estate 
of $1 million was left to a friend and carer of 30 years. At first instance, only two of 
the seven stepchildren had been awarded provision, on the basis of their necessitous 
circumstances. This was upheld unanimously on appeal:112 
107 [2000] NSWSC 263 at[51] and [52] per Master Macready. 
108 [2004] NSWSC 416 at [95] and [96] per Master McLaughlin.
109 Underwood v Underwood [2008] QSC 159 at [38] and [39].
110 [2006] QSC 24.
111 [2005] QCA 423.
112 [2005] QCA 423, per Keane J at paragraphs [27] and [28].
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  ‘The appellants’ contention is that the learned trial judge erroneously applied 
a test of ‘extreme need’ in order to determine the jurisdictional issue… In my 
respectful opinion, the appellants’ contention in this regard seeks to put an 
impermissible gloss on the reasons of the learned primary judge. Her Honour was 
plainly not applying a test of ‘extreme need’ in relation to the determination of the 
jurisdictional issue. Rather, her Honour was making the point that necessitous 
circumstances would be necessary to give rise to a moral claim on the 
bounty of a stepmother, who has had no familial relationship at all with the 
claimant, where the claimant has already received a distribution from the estate 
of his or her natural parent, and where the estate of the stepmother substantially 
reflects her contribution to the joint wealth of herself and her deceased husband…’ 
(emphasis added).
In the New South Wales jurisdiction, issues relating to joint tenancy survivorship can 
be more complicated, because New South Wales is the only State which has adopted 
the idea of ‘notional estate’. The notional estate of a deceased can include property the 
subject of a joint tenancy which should have been severed before the testator’s death. 
This issue is discussed further in 3.5.3 below. 
3.3.7 killers and other applicants With moral deficiency
Should a person who kills the testator benefit from the killing under the testator’s will? 
The original position was that the answer to this question in succession law generally 
turned on the degree of culpability of the killer,113 but these were in cases of forfeiture 
rather than family provision. Forfeiture means that a beneficiary will not take a bequest 
under a will where it would be unjust and unconscionable to benefit by his or her crime. 
This is clearly a position of public policy. This principle remains a common law principle 
in most jurisdictions in Australia,114 but in New Zealand the principle has now been 
expressed in a statute, the Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 (NZ).115 The New Zealand 
Act provides that any person who recklessly or intentionally kills a testator cannot inherit 
anything from the estate of the testator killed, nor can the killer make an application 
under the Family Protection Act 1955 (NZ) for provision from the estate of the victim.116
113 Public Trustee v Evans (1985) 2 NSWLR 188; Public Trustee v Fraser (1987) 9 NSWLR 
433; Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Freedom From Hunger Campaign (1991) 25 NSWLR 
140; Re Keitley [1992] 1 VR 583. 
114 Legislation has been enacted in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. 
See the Forfeiture Act 1995 (NSW) and the Forfeiture Act 1991 (ACT). The UK also has 
enacted the Forfeiture Act 1982 (UK).
115 This Act is a response to the New Zealand Law Commission, Report 38: Succession law 
– Homicidal Heirs (July 1997), and is intended to clarify the common law rule and allow 
for certainty in its application.
116 Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 (NZ), sections 7-9.
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It is clear that the forfeiture rule in Australia can be modified, particularly where the 
killers are young and perhaps vulnerable.117 But the need for flexibility in the application 
of the forfeiture rule has also been raised, though less successfully, in the context of the 
killing of abusive partners by women.118 No doubt there is a difference to be discerned 
between a child or very young person who kills under provocation, distress or through 
lack of understanding, and an adult woman of full understanding who may be under the 
same influences of abuse and distress, but as an adult should deal with these influences 
differently. Flexibility in application of the forfeiture rule is obviously necessary in such 
cases, given the difficulties of proof and that the deceased cannot give evidence. 
Argument has even been raised that abuse (physical, emotional or financial) of an elderly 
testator should invoke the forfeiture rule, or a ‘reverse family provision application’.119 This 
would mean that an abusive beneficiary’s bequest would be set aside by the court. Since 
this is an extension of the current common law or legislative rule relating to forfeiture, 
legislation would be required to implement it. The idea of an abusive ‘unworthy heir’ has 
been adopted in various states of the US including California and Illinois. However, this 
idea fits better into US law since the right of disinheritance of heirs is almost absolute in 
estate law in the US. In family provision jurisdictions, alleged abusive behaviour towards the 
testator does not often result in disentitlement to provision, unless it is truly egregious.120
There have also been cases of family provision applications being made by persons who 
killed the deceased. Should such a person be successful in claiming family provision? 
Whatever the state of flexibility of the forfeiture rule, in Troja v Troja121 it was held that in 
a family provision case there was no room for a successful application by the killer of the 
deceased. This has continued to be the public policy principle applied. In Batey v Potts, it 
was stated that:122
  ‘…[the] rule provides that where a person who would otherwise obtain a benefit 
by the death of another, has brought about that other’s death by violent means, 
he shall not be entitled to take that benefit. The rule is usually invoked where 
a perpetrator kills a testator or testatrix…The public policy against benefiting 
from one’s crime is not limited to fixed categories. Nor does it focus upon the 
manner in which the felony results in benefit to the perpetrator. As Meagher JA 
pointed out in Troja … its principle is founded in public abhorrence of homicide. 
In Troja, the Court of Appeal held that the rule applied irrespective of the motive 
of the perpetrator, was absolute in its operation and there was no scope for its 
discretionary application.’
117 See e.g. R v R (unreported, 14 November 1997, Supreme Court of New South Wales) 
where a 13 year old killed his mother and sister, but was granted his share of his 
mother’s estate because of the surrounding circumstances of abuse by his father; 
Leneghan-Britton v Taylor [1998] NSWSC 218, Supreme Court of New South Wales 
where the plaintiff killed her grandmother, but could still inherit her share of the 
grandmother’s estate because of her previous care and support of her grandmother.
118 Barbara Hamilton and Elizabeth Sheehy, ‘Thrice Punished: Battered Women, Criminal 
Law and Disinheritance’ (2004) 8 Southern Cross Law Review 96.
119 Barbara Hamilton, ‘Be Nice to your parents: or Else!’ (2006) 4 Elder Law Review 9.
120 See e.g. Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215.
121 (1994) 33 NSWLR 269 per Meagher JA.
122 Batey v Potts (2004) 61 NSWLR 274, [2004] NSWSC 606, at [20]-[21].
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Where the situation is one where an applicant for provision has committed a crime, 
but not that of killing the deceased, the situation will turn on its facts, an appropriate 
response in a discretionary jurisdiction. In Hoadley v Hoadley,123 the applicant had a 
troubled and serious criminal history, but this had been precipitated by the attempted 
murder of his mother by his father, now the deceased. His criminal history did not affect 
the applicant’s standing to apply, but the judge constructed the award in such a way that 
he should be encouraged to remain out of prison, or forfeit his increased inheritance. 
Similarly, in Batey v Potts, the beneficiary did not kill the testatrix, his mother, but had 
killed his father prior to his mother’s death, thus accelerating his inheritance under his 
mother’s will. He was not disentitled from inheritance per se by his actions, but the 
judge held that his enjoyment of his inheritance should be postponed for the length of 
his father’s life expectancy, which expires in 2015. However, in Price v Roberts,124 the 
applicant for provision had murdered her husband, but was applying for provision from 
her mother’s will, from which she had been excluded. The court concluded that she was 
disentitled from provision by her own conduct in killing her husband, which had itself 
caused her necessitous circumstances. Lesser crimes will not usually disentitle otherwise 
entitled applicants from provision, though their provision may be reduced.125 
The concept of disentitling conduct is contained in the relevant Australian statutes,126 but 
has been interpreted by the courts differently over time as general views of what might be 
disentitling conduct have changed. For example, issues such as hostility or disharmony 
between the deceased and the applicant, disappointment in the life choices of the 
applicant, unfilial conduct or even isolated incidents of violence directed towards the 
deceased have been held not to be disentitling.127 Conduct which was disentitling in 
123 Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 17 February 1987, Young J, following 
the decision in Green v Perpetual Trustee (see Appendix A).
124 Unreported, Court of Appeal of New South Wales, 23 September 1992.
125 See e.g. Fletcher v Fletcher [2007] NSWSC 728.
126 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) section 41(2)(c); Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) 
section 8(1); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) section 91(4)(o); Succession Act 
2006 (NSW) section 60 (2) (m); previously, Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) section 9(3)
(b); Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) section 7(3); Family Provision Act 1970 
(NT) section 8(3); Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT) section 8(3)(a); Inheritance (Family 
and Dependants Provision) Act 1972 (WA) section 6(3).
127 Pontifical Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1962) 107 CLR 9; Wenn 
v Howard [1967] VR 91; Re Avenell (1991) 13 QLR 5; May v Ffrench [2000] QSC 478; 
Killiner v Freeman [2000] NSWSC 263; Edwards v Terry [2002] NSWSC 835; MacGregor 
v MacGregor [2003] WASC 169; Curran v Duncan [2006] WASC 9; McDougall v Rogers 
[2006] NSWSC 484; Green v Holtom & Spence [2006] WASC 1; Wheatley v Wheatley 
[2006] NSWCA 262; Lathwell v Lathwell [2007] WASC 83; Grech v Walsh [2007] NSWSC 
302; Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215.
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the past, but would not be now includes adultery, separation or desertion, drunkenness 
or drug-taking.128 In the current context of decisions in the area, disentitling conduct must 
be truly outrageous or egregious to cause a court to override what it considers to be the 
moral duty of a testator to provide for dependants in financial or other need.129
3.4 moral duty
The underlying public policy in family provision law has become infused with the notion of 
moral duty, in addition to legal rights. Because the area is one of almost total discretion 
for judges, to unravel the moral duty concept involves a detailed review of case law in the 
various Australian jurisdictions. A review of the major reported cases involving bequests 
to charity130 reveals that the courts are vigorous in upholding ‘proper’ family provision 
as against all other bequests, portraying this provision as based on moral claims, moral 
obligation, or moral duty.
In the High Court case of Vigolo v Bostin,131 Gleeson CJ stated that:
  ‘These basic features of what is commonly called testator’s family maintenance 
legislation have existed in Australia for almost a century. Such legislation is 
imbued with concepts of entitlement and disentitlement, claims and obligations, 
propriety and fitness, related to questions of inheritance…In its original form, the 
legislation conferred upon courts, in limited circumstances, a discretionary power 
to interfere with the exercise of freedom of testamentary disposition. Where such 
an interference was regarded as justified, it defeated the intention of a testator, 
and conferred a benefit upon an applicant at the expense of others whom the 
testator intended to benefit. From the beginning, a number of fundamental issues 
were obvious. Was this an extensive power to re-write a testator’s will to make 
it conform to a judge’s idea of how an estate should be distributed, or was it 
more limited, and, if so, in what way? Were issues of adequacy and propriety to 
be decided by reference only to minimum standards of subsistence? Was this 
merely a power to relieve the state of the burden of supporting indigent people? 
What account was to be taken of the expectations and needs of persons other 
than an applicant where a testator had made provision for such persons? In 
what circumstances should a testator’s decision to disinherit a family member on 
grounds of character or conduct prevail? ….By hypothesis, the testator had the 
legal right to dispose of his estate as he thought fit, and the person or persons left 
without adequate provision had no legal right to inherit beyond the extent 
128 Bienke v Bienke [2002] NSWSC 804; Herszlikowicz v Czarny [2005] VSC 354; O’Dea 
v O’Dea [2005] NSWSC 46; Fletcher v Fletcher [2007] NSWSC728; Underwood v 
Underwood [2008] QSC 159.
129 Troja v Troja (1994) 35 NSWLR 182 (murder of testator by applicant); Draper v Nixon 
[1999] NSWSC 629 (attempt to institutionalize a sane testator); Re Estate of Stewart; 
Murphy v Stewart [2004] NSWSC 569 (continuous and extreme domestic violence 
towards deceased spouse); Boniadian v Boniadian [2004] NSWSC 499 (blackmail 
of deceased by applicant, causing deceased’s suicide) Allen v Public Trustee [2006] 
NSWCA 49 (extreme criminal violence towards the deceased).
130 See Appendix A.
131 (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11 at paragraphs [8] to [18].
40
  provided for in the will. The justification for conferring upon a court a discretionary 
power to intervene, and to make an order modifying the legal effect of the will, 
was explained in terms of familial obligation, not unnaturally or inappropriately 
described as moral…Of all the cases that have come to this Court under the 
testator’s family maintenance legislation of the various States, I have been able to 
find only three in which there is no reference in any of the judgments to concepts 
of moral claims or moral obligations’ (emphasis added).
The general principles to be applied in family provision cases have been discussed widely 
in the cases. The seminal case in the discussion of moral duty in family provision is 
Allardice v Allardice,132 In that case, Stout CJ (referring to the Family Protection Act 1908 
(NZ)) stated that the principles applicable to family provision applications included that 
the Act was for the purpose of more than just an extension of the inter vivos obligations 
of persons to maintain family members; that the Act was not for the purpose of allowing 
the court to make a new will for the testator; that the Act permitted the court to alter a 
will to make adequate provision for a husband, wife or children of the testator; that in the 
case of a widow the court would make a more ample provision than for children, if the 
children were able to support themselves; and that even if the will was most unjust from 
a moral point of view, that is not enough to alter the will’s disposition of property – rather 
it is a question of whether there is sufficient maintenance and support for the applicant. 
This seems an appropriate statement of principle in the context of the history preceding 
the introduction of family provision legislation.
However, Edwards J in the same case said:133
  ‘It is the duty of the Court, so far as possible to place itself in all respects in 
the position of the testator, and to consider whether or not, having regard to all 
existing facts and surrounding circumstances, the testator has been guilty of a 
manifest breach of that moral duty which a just, but not loving, husband or 
father owes towards his wife or towards his children…’ (emphasis added).
Argument has ensued ever since as to whether the addition of a moral dimension into 
family provision law was ever intended by the various enacting parliaments, or whether it is 
merely some sort of judicial gloss on the bare words of the statutes. In Re Allen,134 another 
New Zealand decision, reference was made to enforcing the moral obligation of a 
testator to provide proper support for his wife and children, having regard to his means, to 
the means and deserts of the applicants, ‘and to the relative urgency of the various moral 
claims on his bounty’. Both these decisions were cited with approval by the Privy Council in 
Bosch v Perpetual Trustees.135 Canadian cases also refer to this principle, with the earliest 
case introducing the moral duty concept being Walker v McDermott in 1931.136
132 (1910) 29 NZLR 959, at 969 – 972, approved by the Privy Council [1911] 36 AC 730.
133 (1910) 29 NZLR 959 at 972-973.
134 [1922] NZLR 218, at 220 per Salmond J.
135 [1938] AC 463, 477-479. See also: Edmond H. Bodkin, ‘Testator’s Family Maintenance’ 
(1941) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, 3rd ser., 155, 157. 
136 Walker v McDermott (1931) SCR 94. See G. Bale, ‘Palm Tree Justice and Testator’s 
Family Maintenance – The Continuing Saga of Confusion and Uncertainty in the B.C. 
Courts’ (1987) 26 ETR 295 for a detailed examination of this case.
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In Australia, this moral dimension seemed accepted137 until the decision in Singer v 
Berghouse in 1994.138 In that case, references to ‘moral duty’ and ‘moral obligation’ were 
characterised as being no more than a gloss on the statutory language.139 However, as 
this part of the decision was not binding, other courts continued to apply a moral duty 
test in family provision applications.140 Kirby P (as he then was) in Permanent Trustee 
Co Ltd v Fraser141 referred to academic argument concerning the moral obligation 
gloss which characterises the way in which family provision cases had been decided 
as favouring ‘partisan idealised family sentiment (love?) rather than any objective view 
of justice’,142 and as ‘unsatisfactory and inappropriate’ in the light of ‘the current social, 
philosophical, political and economic climate, and people’s understanding of the 
family’.143 However, whatever the philosophical underpinnings of family provision,144 and 
whether or not family life should be thought of in terms of duty, or there is a familial right 
to inheritance, Australian courts have continued to apply the moral obligation concept 
with approval.
The High Court reconsidered the moral duty issue in Vigolo v Bostin in 2005.145 The 
applicant received no provision from a large estate which was divided equally among his 
four siblings. The applicant was wealthy, having assets in excess of $2 million. In referring 
to the decision in Singer, Gleeson CJ said:146
  ‘Their Honours went on to describe references to ‘moral obligations’ as a gloss on 
the statutory text. If, by that, they meant that such references are not to be used as a 
substitute for the text, I agree. If they meant that such references are never of use as 
part of an exposition of legislative purpose, then I regret that I am unable to agree’.
137 See e.g. Bosch v Perpetual Trustee [1938] AC 463, at 477 (on appeal from NSW); 
Worladge v Doddridge (1957) 97 CLR 1, at 11; Hughes v National Trustees, Executors 
and Agency Co. of Australasia Ltd. (1979) 143 CLR 158; Goodman v. Windeyer (1980) 
144 CLR 490. 
138 Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201.
139 Per Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ, where the remarks are obiter, and therefore not 
binding. The idea that the moral duty concept was a mere gloss had first emerged in 
the judgements of Murphy J in both Hughes at 158 and Goodman at 504-505. Murphy 
J saw the moral dimension in family provision as unwarranted and inconsistent with the 
language of the statutes, and as causing confusion when judges came to consider the 
adequacy of the applicant’s provision. 
140 See the discussion in Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Fraser (1995) 36 NSWLR 24, per Kirby P.
141 Ibid.
142 V. Grainer, ‘Is Family Protection a Question of Moral Duty?’ (1994) 24 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 141, 147. See generally: R.F. Atherton and P. Vines, 
Succession – Families, Property and Death, 2nd edition, 2003, 474-482.
143 V. Grainer, ‘Is Family Protection a Question of Moral Duty?’ (1994) 24 Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review 141, 161.
144 See further at section 4.
145 (2005) 221 CLR 191.
146 221 CLR 191 at paragraph [21].
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The other four judges were equally divided about the use of the concept to guide 
courts in family provision claims. They reflected the prevailing arguments that the moral 
claim concept is either an appropriate construction which refers to the history and 
philosophical ideas behind the statutes,147 or has become an inappropriate ‘shorthand’ 
way to express the language of the statutes which has become misleading.148 Thus, 
although the majority decision favoured the moral duty approach in Vigolo, the underlying 
argument has not been fully resolved.
However, in decisions subsequent to Vigolo,149 judges have continued to be enthusiastic 
in their embrace of the moral claim focus in assessing the adequacy of a testator’s 
provision. In the 2007 case of Bowyer v Wood, the Full Court of South Australia said:150
  ‘In Vigolo v Bostin a majority of the High Court held that it was helpful, when 
making the value judgment required on the jurisdictional question whether 
adequate provision had been made to a plaintiff, to have regard to considerations 
of moral claim and moral duty. It is a consideration which connects the general 
but value-laden language of the statute to the community standards which 
give it practical meaning... Moral duty and moral obligation may, according 
to circumstances, be relevant and within the contemplation of the Act but a 
moral claim cannot be a claim founded upon considerations not contemplated 
by the Act…However, considerations of moral duty and moral claim cannot be 
a substitute for the text of the Act…[In this case] the failure of the judge to 
consider whether the plaintiff had a moral claim was a serious omission 
especially given the substantial provision made by the testatrix for charities 
and her siblings…the judge erred in failing to give consideration to the moral 
claim of the plaintiff upon the bounty of her mother’ (emphasis added).
Moral duty to dependants can be reversed by disentitling conduct on the part of those 
dependants.151 However, the disentitling conduct has to be quite extreme in Australia to 
reverse the duty.152 The case of Edwards v Terry153 is illustrative of the position in 
147 Callinan and Heydon JJ at paragraphs [113-121].
148 Gummow and Hayne JJ at paragraph [63].
149 See Chapman v Yang [2005] ACTCA 37; Freeman v Jacques [2005] QCA 423; Powell v 
Monteath [2006] QSC 24; Hope v Tasmanian Perpetual Trustees Limited [2006] TASSC 
13; Wheatley v Wheatley [2006] NSWCA 262; Vincent v Rae [2006] VSC 346; Ashurst v 
Moss [2006] VSC 287; Bowyer v Wood [2007] SASC 327; Fung v Ye [2007] NSWCA 115; 
Ansett v Moss [2007] VSC 92; Carter v O’Brien [2007] VSC 21; Draskovic v Bogicevic 
[2007] VSC 36; Subasa v State Trustees Ltd [2007] VSC 399; Petersen v Micevski [2007] 
VSC 280; Devereaux-Warnes v Hall (No. 3) [2007] WASCA 235.
150 (2007) 99 SASR 190, [2007] SASC 327, at paragraph [44].
151 Barbara Hamilton, ‘Be Nice to your Parents: or Else!’ (2006) Elder Law Review 9, 11.
152 There are numerous cases considering disentitling conduct such as violence, domestic 
violence, killing, and many other categories. These are often matters incapable of proof 
after the death of the deceased, and so are not always of importance in the discretionary 
jurisdiction. See for example, Curran v Duncan [2006] WASC 8, Green v Holtom and 
Spence [2006] WASC 1, and Abrego v Simpson [2008] NSWSC 215 at [21]. However, 
compare Re Estate of Stewart; Murphy v Stewart [2004] NSWSC 569 where continuous 
domestic violence was disentitling conduct.
153 [2002] NSWSC 835. For a similar case where an only son had a very poor relationship 
with the will-maker, his mother, see Wheatley v Wheatley [2006] NSWCA 262.
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Australia. In that case, the testatrix left 40% of her estate to the Salvation Army, 40% 
to the Royal Blind Society, 5% to the executrix and 15% to her only child, a son aged 
56 at the time of the application. On application for further provision, the son, in very 
necessitous circumstances, was granted 71% of the estate, which, with the 5% to the 
executrix, limited the charities to 24% of the estate instead of the original 80%. This was 
despite the fact that the son had a troubled relationship history with his parents, including 
assaults on both, and an apprehended violence order being in place at one point. The 
judge did not see this as disentitling, but rather followed the two stage process described 
by the High Court in Singer v Berghouse:154 was the applicant one permitted by the Act; 
and was the provision provided in the will adequate? His Honour concluded that it was 
not and ruled accordingly. 
It could be argued that this is not an appropriate ruling. Why was the son not disentitled 
by his violence towards his aged and frail parents? Why did the judge ignore the fact 
that the testators, husband and wife in turn, had deliberately limited the amount left to 
their son? However, his Honour’s reasoning that the son’s diagnosed attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder was sufficient to forgive all transgressions, including his violence, 
is entirely in line with authority, which is clear that a poor relationship with a parent or 
parents does not mean that an applicant will not be entitled to provision.155 There are 
many similar cases in the reports, and, despite many affirmations of the proposition that 
it is not within the courts’ power ‘to recast the testator’s will or to redress inequalities or 
fancied injustice…’,156 the position in relation to such cases remains as it was expressed 
in the early New Zealand case of Welsh v Mulcock:157
  ‘No doubt the effect of the statute is to decree that a man’s will may be no more 
than a tentative disposition of his property and that the function of ultimately 
settling how his estate shall devolve must be exercised by the Court.’
In early cases on family provision, while disentitling conduct was taken more seriously by 
the courts, its effect was never regarded as fatal in all cases. As Mr Justice Edwards said 
in Plimmer v Plimmer:158
  ‘I do not think that the statute was intended to enable the Court substantially to 
make such a new will for the testator as it considers…ought to have been made. I 
do think that the powers conferred upon the Court ought to be exercised with very 
great caution. In the case of a widow the difficulties that surround the exercise of 
these powers are comparatively small. There are few persons who will not think 
that every testator, whatever may have been the difference between his wife and 
himself, ought to provide for his widow in a reasonable manner, unless she has 
clearly been guilty of some grave breach of the law or of conventional morality. The 
statute provides that, if she has, such matters may be brought before the Court in 
answer to her claim. In the case of adult children the case is 
154 (1994) 181 CLR 191.
155 See John K De Groot and Bruce W Nickel, Family Provision in Australia, 3rd edition, 
Lexisnexis Butterworths, 2007, at paragraph [2.32] – [2.42].
156 Allardice v Allardice [1910] 29 NZLR 959, at 975; affirmed [1911] AC 730.
157 [1924] NZLR 673, at 682 per Herdman J.
158 (1906) 9 Gazette Law Reports 10, at 21 (New Zealand).
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  far more difficult. No one can ascertain, and it is quite incapable of proof, what 
circumstances may justify a parent in disinheriting his child. Habitual disrespect, 
an evident determination not to devote himself to useful pursuits but to live upon 
the proceeds of his father’s labours rather than his own, or an idle, useless life, 
may well justify a father in leaving his son wholly unprovided for by his will…Yet 
it could be quite impossible to bring such matters before the Court in a tangible 
shape. It is of the breath of family life that the family skeleton be kept in the family 
cupboard.’
The New Zealand Law Commission has taken a firm view on this very flexibility 
recommending in its 1997 report that both the size of the applicant pool and the moral 
claim basis of awards be curtailed. The Report states:159
  ‘The test of a will-maker’s ‘moral duty’ has never been expressly approved by 
Parliament as a test for entitlement. The test assumes that there is a general 
acceptance of the exact content of a will-maker’s moral duty to adult children. No 
social inquiry the Commission knows about supports this assumption. The test 
also makes a second incorrect assumption: that New Zealand society is culturally 
and ethnically homogenous…The consequences of the absence of any norm of 
this kind are that a deceased’s perception of his or her moral duty is overruled 
by a particular judge’s assessment of current social norms. This assessment 
is necessarily based on the judge’s personal sense of the fitness of things…
Failure by the courts to articulate (beyond the obscure concept of moral duty) 
why precisely they are altering a will-maker’s arrangements results in a situation 
where wills are varied according to the subjective values of the particular judge 
who chances to deal with the matter. This makes it difficult to assess whether the 
court’s distribution is more commendable than the will-maker’s…’ 
The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, on the other hand, in its review of 
family provision law in that province in 1982 argued that the moral obligation dimension 
was important, stating that ‘a broad discretion under the Wills Variation Act is essential to 
protect the integrity of the family unit by ensuring that what is really family property is not 
disposed of to strangers’.160
159 New Zealand Law Commission, Report 39: Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) 
Act: modernising the law on sharing property on death (August 1997), ‘Introduction’ at 
paragraph 33 and 34.
160 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Statutory Succession Rights, WP 35, 
1982, 149. This is still the current view in British Columbia, especially since Tataryn v 
Tataryn [1994] 2 SCR 807. 
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3.5 property available in a family provision claim
The property available in a family provision claim has also been subject to varying 
interpretations by the courts. The basic principle is that family provision can only be 
made out of the estate of the deceased. Property which is not available to claimants, 
because it is not part of a deceased’s estate includes:
Property held under joint tenancy, which has an automatic right of survivorship •	
attached (e.g. a house owned by a husband and wife under joint tenancy would 
automatically become the property of the survivor when either husband or wife dies)161
Property the subject of a •	 donatio mortis causa (a gift made in contemplation of death), 
although this has been overturned by statute in Queensland,162 New South Wales163 
and New Zealand164 
Property disposed of •	 inter vivos (while the deceased was living)
Property which can be available to claimants, because it has been held to be part of a 
deceased’s estate, or because of statutory intervention, includes:
Property disposed of •	 inter vivos which was given as part of an unconscionable bargain
Property which is the subject of a mutual will, or other contractual arrangement•	
Property which is part of the ‘notional estate’ of the testator•	
All three of the latter categories may be regarded as contentious. 
3.5.1 inter vivos transactions Which are unconscionable bargains
Normally, property disposed of by the testator before death is not subject to family 
provision claims. However in Bridgewater v Leahy,165 property disposed of inter vivos 
was held to be subject to claims in equity under the doctrines of undue influence and 
unconscionable bargain. The property, a farm, had been disposed of by the deceased 
to a favoured nephew at a considerable undervalue, with the object of retaining the 
farming properties in the family line, as the deceased had no sons. The applicants, the 
deceased’s wife and four daughters, although provided for in the will, objected to the 
bargain which the nephew had made in acquiring a property worth $696, 811 for the 
amount of $150 000. After the applicants had lost the case and its appeal in Queensland, 
the High Court, by a majority of three to two, agreed that this was an unconscionable 
bargain, and the property was declared to be part of the estate as to the amount of the 
undervalue. Thus, although this was not a family provision case as such, payments from 
the estate to the wife and daughters were to be considerably increased. The principle 
arising from the case is that although inter vivos disposals of property are normally not 
part of an estate, unconscionable bargains will cause property to come back into an 
estate, and be available for family provision. 
161 For the position in New South Wales on this point, see below. 
162 Succession Act 1981 (Qld), section 41(12).
163 Where such gifts will be part of a deceased’s notional estate; Succession Act 2006 
(NSW) section 76; previously, Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), section 22.
164 Family Protection Act 1955 (NZ) section 2(5).
165 (1998) 194 CLR 457; see also Wittman v Wittman [2006] QSC 142 and Louth v Diprose 
(1992) 175 CLR 621.
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3.5.2  property the subject of mutual Wills, contractual arrangements 
or prenuptial agreements
In Barns v Barns,166 the High Court was faced with the choice from diametrically opposed 
decisions of the Privy Council in Dillon v Public Trustee of New Zealand167 and Schaefer 
v Schuhmann.168 In Dillon, a case from New Zealand, the Privy Council had held that 
a contract to leave property by will could refer to property available for an order under 
family provision, while in Schaefer, the Privy Council had held that it could not. In Barns, 
the High Court decided that the approach in Dillon was correct. In the latter case, Dillon 
had made a contractual arrangement with the children of his first marriage to leave 
them the family farm. In his will, this arrangement was honoured, and only the residue 
of the estate was left to his second wife. The second wife applied under the then New 
Zealand statute, the Family Provision Act 1908, on the basis that the will did not make 
adequate provision for her proper maintenance and support. The children of the first 
marriage argued that the will could not be varied as it merely gave expression to the prior 
contractual arrangement. The Privy Council ruled that this argument was incorrect. The 
contract had been fulfilled when Dillon had left the farm as he had promised in his will. 
Once the farm was left in the deceased’s will, it became part of the deceased’s estate, 
and open to a family provision application. The Judicial Committee said:169
  ‘The manifest purpose of the Family Protection Act …is to secure, on grounds of 
public policy, that a man who dies, leaving an estate which he distributes by will, 
shall not be permitted to leave widow and children inadequately provided for, if the 
court in its discretion thinks that the distribution of the estate should be altered 
in their favour, even though the testator wishes by his will to bestow benefits 
on others, and even though he has framed his will as he contracted to do’ 
(emphasis added).
In Schaefer v Schuhmann, the Privy Council was considering a case from New South 
Wales. The testator was an elderly man, who had recently taken on a new housekeeper, 
Schaefer. He promised to leave her his house, but she was otherwise unpaid for her 
work. He put this promise into his will by codicil. After he died, some six months later, 
one of his seven children applied for a family provision order. Street J in the NSW 
Supreme Court, followed Dillon and held that the house was part of the estate, and 
awarded provision to three of the deceased’s daughters. The Privy Council overturned 
Dillon, and found that the house was transferred under an enforceable contract. This 
meant that the house was not part of the deceased’s estate, and could not be available 
for a family provision award. The Privy Council was here characterising the house 
transaction as both contractual and inter vivos, and separating it out from the will 
completely. This characterisation places such a promise in the ‘property disposed of inter 
vivos’ category, and thus property not available for a family provision order.
The High Court, in Barns v Barns, took the view that the approach in Dillon was correct. 
Barns had made mutual wills with his wife, pursuant to a contractual deed that the wills 
would be made in a particular form and would not be revoked. The purpose of these 
wills was to ensure that the family farm devolved ultimately to the couple’s son, and that 
their daughter received no provision. Not unnaturally, the daughter applied for a family 
166 (2003) 214 CLR 169
167 [1941] AC 294
168 [1972] AC 572
169 [1941] AC 294 at 303-304.
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provision order when Mr Barns died. The High Court found that the property subject 
to the contract was part of the property subject to a family provision award, on the 
basis of construction of the relevant statute.170 There was no disposal of property inter 
vivos, so that the family farm formed the ‘estate’ for the purpose of family provision. The 
contractual obligation was to make a will in a certain way and no more. Once this was 
done, the property in the will was the estate. Gleeson CJ said:171
  ‘The effect of the legislation could have been avoided by a disposition inter 
vivos so that the deceased died with no estate; that is inherent in the scheme 
of the legislation. But the effect of the legislative restriction on freedom of 
testamentary disposition cannot be avoided by a promise to make a certain 
disposition.’(emphasis added).
The current principle arising here is that property purportedly subject to contractual 
arrangements or promises before death, later expressed in a will, is part of the 
deceased’s estate and thus available for family provision orders.
In addition, any prenuptial agreements as to finances or testamentary intentions which 
purport to prevent or exclude a later family provision claim are void for public policy 
reasons. However, such agreements can be taken into account as one of a large range 
of circumstances in determining an award, particularly in the context of short duration 
marriages.172 In Hills v Chalk, in agreeing that a husband had been adequately provided 
for in a will in accordance with a prenuptial agreement, Keane JA said that:173
  ‘There is no suggestion in the authorities that an agreement reflecting the mutual 
intentions and expectations of the parties, as expressed in the pre-nuptial 
agreement in this case, should not have a bearing on the evaluation which must be 
made as to whether the provision made for an applicant in the position of Mr Hills 
falls short of the adequate provision for his proper maintenance and support…
In this case, the voluntary statement of the parties of their mutual intentions and 
expectations in a form intended to be binding affords a reliable conspectus of the 
totality of the relationship of the parties and of their respective relationships with 
others who have a claim on their bounty. in my opinion, the court should have 
regard to such a voluntary statement by the parties of their intentions and 
expectations, unless there is good reason for the court to conclude that 
these intentions and expectations would not have shaped the thinking of the 
wise and just testator or testatrix postulated by the Act. There may be cases, 
for example, where the length of time and change in circumstances between the 
making of a pre-nuptial agreement and the death of one of the parties is such that 
the pre-nuptial agreement is no longer a true reflection of the parties’ relationship. 
Or it may be that the evidence shows that the execution of the pre-nuptial 
agreement was procured by economic or other pressure’ (emphasis added). 
170 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA).
171 (2003) 214 CLR 169, at 171
172 See for example, Manly v The Public Trustee of Queensland [2007] QSC 388; QCA 
[2008] 198; Hills v Chalk [2008] QCA 159.
173 Hills v Chalk [2008] QCA 159 at paragraphs [45] and [46].
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3.5.3 notional estate
The decision in Barns settles for the moment the question of what constitutes the 
‘estate’ for the purposes of family provision, in the absence of legislative intervention. 
However, it had been suggested in Schaefer that whether or not inter vivos transactions 
or testamentary dispositions made pursuant to contracts should be open to family 
provision applications is a matter of policy which should be dealt with by statute, but only 
New South Wales responded to that suggestion, formulating the concept of a ‘notional 
estate’ in the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), now continued in the Succession Act 
2006 (NSW) at Part 3.3, sections 74-86. The notional estate concept partly embraces the 
decisions in Dillon and Barns, in that property the subject of a contract to make a will is 
not part of the estate as such, but will be ‘notional estate’.
Part 3.3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) describes notional estate in terms of ‘relevant 
property transactions’, which are transactions for which full valuable consideration has not 
been given. Sections 80 (2) and (3) provide that the relevant property transactions are:
 (a)  a transaction that took effect within 3 years before the date of the death of the 
deceased person and was entered into with the intention, wholly or partly, of 
denying or limiting provision being made out of the estate of the deceased person 
for the maintenance, education or advancement in life of any person who is entitled 
to apply for a family provision order,
 (b)  a transaction that took effect within one year before the date of the death of 
the deceased person and was entered into when the deceased person had a 
moral obligation to make adequate provision, by will or otherwise, for the proper 
maintenance, education or advancement in life of any person who is entitled to 
apply for a family provision order which was substantially greater than any moral 
obligation of the deceased person to enter into the transaction,
 (c)  a transaction that took effect or is to take effect on or after the deceased person’s 
death.
 (3)  Property may be designated as notional estate by a notional estate order under this 
section if it is property that is held by, or on trust for:
 (a)  a person by whom property became held (whether or no as trustee) as the result of 
a relevant property transaction, or
 (b)  the object of a trust for which property became held on trust as the result of a 
relevant property transaction, whether or not the property was the subject of the 
relevant property transaction.
This concept even extends to the failure to sever a joint tenancy during the deceased’s 
life: section 76(2)(b).
Currently, only New South Wales has the notional estate concept in its legislation. 
However, the on-going review of succession law by the National Review Committee in 
Australia has completed its review of family provision law, and recommended that the 
idea of notional estate should be adopted nationally. In its Family Provision Report, the 
National Committee expressed the view that, although it generally favoured the 
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adoption of the New South Wales notional estate provisions, section 22(4)(b) of the 
(then) Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) would need to be ‘reworded and clarified’ in light 
of the existing case law,174 which has had difficulty in determining whether in any one 
factual situation, a joint tenancy should have been severed before death. The National 
Committee has recommended that the nationally adopted form of previous section 22(4)
(b) refer explicitly to a failure to sever a joint tenancy, and that it be worded to overcome 
the effect of Wade v Harding.175 The Committee recommended that: 176
  ‘The effect of that decision would be overcome if the model legislation were to 
provide that a person who dies without having severed an interest in property 
held as a joint tenant is not given full valuable consideration for not severing that 
interest merely because the person thereby retained, until his or her death, the 
benefit of the right of survivorship in respect of that property.’
The previous 1982 New South Wales legislation also referred to notional estate as that 
property which ‘is held by or on trust for’ a specified person. The National Committee 
stated that this does not make clear whether property can be notional estate of a 
deceased if the person for whom the property is held by or on trust has died. The case of 
Prince v Argue177 illustrated the point. In that case, the applicants sought provision from 
their father’s estate. His interest in a home had passed to his second wife by joint tenancy 
survivorship. She died fifteen months later, leaving her estate, including the home in 
question, to her children from a previous marriage. The applicants argued that their father’s 
failure to sever the joint tenancy before his death amounted to a prescribed transaction 
under the notional estate provisions in New South Wales, so that the home became part of 
his estate and passed to them. The court held that this could not be so, since the widow 
had herself died, and the property was no longer ‘held by or on trust for’ her. 
The National Committee criticised this interpretation of the notional estate provisions 
since it limits their application, and can result in unfair and arbitrary results for applicants. 
The Committee recommended that a provision should be included in the national 
legislation referring to property forming part of a ‘deceased transferee’s’ estate, which 
174 See Wade v Harding (1987) 11 NSWLR 551; Cameron v Hills unreported, Supreme Court 
of New South Wales, 26 October 1989; Barker v Magee [2001] NSWSC 563. Whether 
or not full valuable consideration had been given for the survivorship under the joint 
tenancy seems to have presented some difficulties for judges. 
175 (1987) 11 NSWLR 551. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, Commentary on 
model family provision legislation, Chapter 3, Property that may be the subject of a 
family provision order, paragraph 3.23.
176 Ibid, paragraph 3.28. See the model Family Provision Bill 2004 clause 27(2)(b).
177 [2002] NSWSC 1217.
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should be available for family provision awards. In the National Committee’s view, the 
model legislation should ensure that where:178
immediately before the death of a person (the •	 deceased transferee), the court had the 
power to make an order designating property held by, or on trust for, the deceased 
transferee as notional estate of the deceased person; and
since the relevant property transaction or distribution that gave rise to the court’s •	
power to make the order was entered into or made, the deceased transferee entered 
into a prescribed transaction; and
there are special circumstances that warrant the making of the order, the court may •	
make a notional estate order, designating as notional estate of the deceased person, 
property that is held by, or on trust for:
a person by whom property became held (whether or not as trustee) as the result of •	
the subsequent prescribed transaction; or
the object of a trust for which property became held on trust as the result of the •	
subsequent prescribed transaction.
Prince v Ague is overturned by section 82 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW).  
This section allows the court to designate as notional estate property that has been 
transferred to a person who has subsequently died, even if the property in question has 
been transferred to the dead person’s legal representative or has been distributed from 
the dead person’s estate. Thus, New South Wales has adopted the National Committee’s 
recommendation on notional estate. Whether other states will follow suit has not been 
made clear.
178 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Commentary on model family provision 
legislation, Chapter 3, Effect of the death of a person whose property could have been 
the subject of a notional estate order, paragraph 3.51. See the model Family Provision 
Bill 2004 clause 27(2)(a).
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Practical considerations in Family 
Provision claims
Whilst the statutes and reported cases discussed above construct the framework of 
family provision law, more mundane practical issues can influence whether such a 
framework is robust or weak, or leans in one direction, or is ever used for its intended 
purposes. In this section we examine some practical issues which influence the law 
in this area such as costs, alternative dispute resolution and time limits. Costs are a 
particularly important factor in family provision application behaviours.
4.1 costs
It is usually the case that no costs order will be made in a family provision case, and the 
costs of the parties will be borne by the estate. However, the increase in applications 
which the courts view as vexatious or frivolous, or without a reasonable prospect of 
success, and spiralling legal costs generally, make this proposition one which is under 
judicial review. The area of family provision law is not one which is entirely risk free for the 
applicant, though this might have been the traditional view.179
The issue of costs in family provision claims has come increasingly into focus since the 
2005 New South Wales case of Sherborne Estate.180 In that case, the claimants were 
two adult daughters and one adult granddaughter of the testatrix. The granddaughter’s 
claim was dismissed, but the two adult daughters had their provision increased from 
$20 000 each to $300 000 and $100 000 respectively. Thus a total of $360 000 extra 
had to be paid from the estate to the adult daughters. The judge ordered that this be 
paid from notional estate, a house which had been transferred to their half-brother 
under a joint tenancy agreement with the testatrix, valued at $490 000. This may appear 
uncontroversial on the facts, but the costs incurred by the granddaughter and the adult 
daughters were more than $400 000. The defendant half-brother, who had inherited the 
bulk of the estate, had costs of $205 000, so that total costs of the action were more 
than $605 000. Palmer J described these costs as ‘enormous’, stating:181
  ‘While this litigation is of great importance to the parties themselves, it must 
nevertheless be borne in mind that this is not a commercial dispute between 
corporations, involving millions of dollars. It is a family dispute between people of quite 
modest means: the amounts which all three of the Plaintiffs might reasonably have 
hoped to obtain by further provision from the deceased’s estate could never have 
come anywhere near the sum of $600 000 which has been expended in this litigation. 
What has happened in this case is a dark stain on the administration of justice. One 
might wonder whether anything has changed since Dickens’ Bleak House.’
179 Anthony Collins, Practical Considerations in Family Provision Applications, Continuing 
Professional Development Seminar, Brisbane, 27 March 2008.
180 Re Sherborne Estate: [1] Vanvalen v Neaves; [2] Gilroy v Neaves [2005] NSWSC 593 
(family provision decision) and Re Sherborne Estate (No 2): Vanvalen v Neaves; Gilroy v 
Neaves (2005) 65 NSWLR 268; [2005] NSWSC 1003 (costs decision).
181 Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) NSWLR 268 at paragraph [16].
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However, his Honour declined to cap the costs under any of the possibilities presented 
to him,182 and also declined to deny costs to one of the daughters, who had rejected a 
more advantageous offer prior to trial, and to the granddaughter, who had presented 
a seemingly hopeless claim. Therefore the costs were borne by the unsuccessful half-
brother. His Honour said:183
  ‘I have made no order as to what notional estate should bear the burden of the 
costs orders. It is for [the half-brother] alone as to what assets he marshals to pay 
the costs, whether or not those assets would be notional estate.’
The outcome of this case caused the New South Wales Attorney General to announce 
that he would introduce new legislation to cap legal costs in family provision cases.184 
The new Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) has now been passed by the New 
South Wales parliament.185 Section 99 provides that the court will have power to order 
costs as it thinks fit, and that regulations can be made to cap costs. Section 99 and 
regulations made under it will prevail to the extent of any inconsistency with the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (NSW) as to costs. Presumably this will discourage applications 
made in the belief that the estate will always bear the costs of the application, making 
litigation no longer virtually risk-free. Moreover, the new legislation also allows for 
regulations to be made to encourage settlement of family provision claims, and to control 
advertising by lawyers looking for family provision work. There is a general perception, 
which may or may not be correct, that the latter issue has greatly exacerbated the 
frequency of family provision applications in New South Wales in recent years.
In this context, in his second reading speech the New South Wales Attorney-General said:186
  ‘The majority of lawyers work hard to achieve a fair outcome for their clients. There 
is, however, a minority of practitioners who exploit the highly emotionally charged 
nature of these cases to their own benefit, on the assumption that all costs are 
paid out of the estate. The Supreme Court has recognised this problem and is 
currently implementing its own strategies, including intensive case management, 
the introduction of a new practice note for family provision, and a more restrictive 
182 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 rule 42.4(1); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) section 
98(4)(c). His Honour declined to use either of these alternatives on the basis that they 
could not relate to costs already incurred. See generally: The Honourable Mr Justice 
John P Hamilton, Containment Of Costs: Litigation and Arbitration, Address to the Bar at 
the opening of the Law Term, 1 June 2007.
183 Re Sherborne Estate (No 2) (2005) NSWLR 268 at paragraph [69].
184 Attorney General of New South Wales, the Hon. John Hatzistergos, announcement on 
Sunday 27 January, 2008. Reported by Lisa Carty, ‘Laws to cut costs in family disputes’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 27 January 2008; ‘Laws to cut costs in family 
disputes’ The Sun Herald (Sydney), 27 January 2008; ‘NSW to cap lawyers’ estate fees’ 
ABC News, January 27, 2008; Damien Carrick, The Law Report, ‘Wills’, ABC Radio 
National, 12 February 2008.
185 The legislation passed the Legislative Council on 24 September 2008, and was sent to 
the Legislative Assembly for concurrence on the same date.
186 The Hon. John Hatzistergos, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, second reading 
speech, 26 June 2008, 2.
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  approach to the recovery of costs… The bill also contains the power to make 
regulations regarding advertising of legal services in connection with proceedings 
for family provision: advertising that is often aggressive, unrealistic and seeks to 
exploit the vulnerable.’
Costs can be capped already in New South Wales under the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 2005 rule 42.4(1) and the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) section 98(4)(c), but as 
evidenced by the Sherborne Estate case, these cannot always be used since they are 
not retrospective. The Supreme Court of New South Wales has recently made orders 
capping legal costs in several family provision matters. In Dalton v Paull (No. 2),187 the 
plaintiff’s legal costs were capped at $25 000 from a small estate of $207 444, while 
in Blanchfield v Johnston,188 costs were also capped at $25 000 after total costs of 
$74 000 were incurred where the estate was worth only $70 000. In Gill v Smith,189 the 
Court capped costs for three plaintiffs at $40 000, and in Dinnen v Terrill190 a defendant 
executor’s costs of $92 000 were capped at $50 000 from an estate of $338 642. Costs 
have also been capped from quite large estates. In Abrego v Simpson191 the estate was 
worth more than $600 000 but the total costs of the claimant (of $60 000) were capped 
at $50 000. In the latter case, Windeyer J commented:192
  ‘[The plaintiff’s] costs in connection with the present proceedings are estimated at 
approximately $60 000. That is an extraordinary amount in an action where, apart 
from hospital records, the plaintiff’s evidence consisted of two affidavits of the 
plaintiff, one of seven pages and the other of three pages with some annexures, 
together with two other affidavits each or three or four pages. That is not to say 
that the case does not raise some quite difficult questions, but nevertheless the 
sum of $60 000 is, I consider, out of proportion, considering the amount involved 
and the type of case it is.’
Cost capping is not always of benefit however. In Zappia v Parelli,193 costs were capped 
at $100 000 (from total costs of $197 494). However, these costs obliterated the plaintiff’s 
provision award of $100 000 from an estate of only $130 349. This was an action with no 
apparent benefit to anyone except the lawyers involved. It is clear that plaintiffs can be 
left with significant shortfalls in total costs payable where there are costs caps on the 
amount payable out of the estate, since lawyers will not necessarily limit their costs to the 
amount of the cap.194
It has been suggested that costs in family provision cases have escalated in New South 
Wales because of the cap on personal injuries damages in that state. This has resulted 
in increasing litigation in family provision cases pursued by plaintiff lawyers in lieu of 
personal injuries work.195 Whether this is perception or reality, it is certainly the case 
that there are far more court cases on family provision in New South Wales than in 
187 [2007] NSWSC 803.
188 [2007] NSWSC 143.
189 [2007] NSWSC 832.
190 [2007[ NSWSC 1405.
191 [2008] NSWSC 215.
192 [2008] NSWSC 215 at paragraph [4].
193 [2007] NSWSC 972.
194 Phillipa Alexander, ‘Proportionality of costs in Family Provision Act matters’ (2008) 
Precedent 49 (Issue 86, June 2008).
195 Personal interviews with partners of law firms, 2008.
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other states, possibly because of the notional estate provisions in the New South Wales 
legislation.196 It is possible that a fixed maximum scale for legal costs for family provision 
matters will be introduced by the Supreme Court even in the absence of the proposed 
new legislation. Such a scale would be for small estates where the value of assets in the 
estate does not exceed $750 000. 197
Judicial commentary on costs was also evident in the South Australian case of Bowyer v 
Woods where Debelle J said:198
  ‘ ‘…In my opinion, the legislature has made it clear that in appropriate cases a 
costs order can be made against an applicant, and some of the old cases must 
now be approached with care. the old rule which, as i say, was a common 
practice not to award costs against the plaintiff who failed, can no longer 
be accepted as a general proposition…’ There is, therefore, a substantial body 
of consistent opinion as to the rules which ordinarily operate in relation to an 
unsuccessful application. The principles are that, generally speaking, there will be 
no order as to costs of an unsuccessful application. The court may in its discretion 
make an order in favour of an unsuccessful applicant who makes a reasonable 
application founded on a moral claim or obligation. While it is unnecessary to 
decide the issue in this case, the cases also suggest that the court may in its 
discretion order an unsuccessful applicant to pay costs where the claim was 
frivolous or vexatious or made with no reasonable prospects of success or 
where the applicant has been guilty of some improper conduct in the course 
of the proceedings.’ (emphasis added)
The attempt to normalise legal costs throughout the jurisdictions of Australia has not 
been an easy task. Despite the model legislation resulting in Legal Profession Acts in 
each state except South Australia199 there are difficulties in implementation which make 
some Acts more effective than others. This is despite the common requirement in each 
Act that costs be disclosed to clients before, or as soon as possible after, the retainer. 
Rather than similarity, there are differences in each state in dealing with costs issues. 
For example, in New South Wales, costs assessment under the Legal Profession Act 
2004 (NSW) currently does not apply to beneficiaries under a will,200 though this will 
presumably be overcome by new section 99(3) of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW).
196 Lisa Carty, ‘Laws to cut costs in family disputes’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
27 January 2008, reports that there are about 600 family provision cases in New 
South Wales each year, of which only about 250 are settled out of court. However, in 
Queensland for example, where early mediation is compulsory in these cases, there are 
few cases proceeding to court.
197 See generally: The Honourable Mr Justice John P Hamilton, Containment Of Costs: 
Litigation and Arbitration, Address to the Bar at the opening of the Law Term, 1 June 2007.
198 (2007) 99 SASR 190, [2007] SASC 327 at paragraph [68], in part quoting from Gillard J 
in re Sitch [2005] VSC 383.
199 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW); Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic); Legal Profession 
Act 2006 (ACT); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld); Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (Tas); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). The Legislative Council of 
South Australia passed the Legal Profession Bill 2007 on 26 February 2008, but it is 
subject to a deadlock in the South Australian Parliament as at July 2008.
200 Phillipa Alexander, ‘Proportionality of costs in Family Provision Act matters’ (2008) 
Precedent 49, 50 (Issue 86, June 2008).
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In Queensland, the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) 201requires that costs of an action 
be assessed by an independent accredited assessor, a requirement which has caused 
some difficulties in finding sufficiently experienced assessors.202 Since early mediation 
is compulsory in family provision cases in Queensland, very few family provision cases 
proceed to trial. Nevertheless, there has also been critical judicial comment on the 
issue of costs in family provision cases in Queensland. In Manly v The Public Trustee of 
Queensland203 McMeekin J said:
  ‘I wish to say two things about the costs position. The costs are said to have 
amounted, if one includes all parties, to the sum of approximately $180 000. 
Firstly, they are out of proportion to the work and difficulty involved in this case. 
Secondly, there is little point to litigation in these modest estates. the executor 
is entitled and, save perhaps in a clear case, duty-bound to uphold the Will. 
parties and their legal advisors would be well advised to bear this firmly in 
mind before embarking on litigation in such circumstances.’(emphasis added)
In Manly, the costs amounted to about 40% of the value of the estate, but McMeekin J 
did not ultimately make an order for costs, even though he considered the applicant’s 
claim to be entirely without merit:204
  ‘The applicant’s claim for costs seems to me to be entirely without merit. Further, 
in my view, the beneficiaries and the respondent have a strong case for their costs 
to be met by the applicant. Her failure in the application, the modest size of the 
estate, her rejection of an offer, which on my findings was plainly reasonable, and 
her lack of candour in conducting the application, all provide powerful reasons 
why I should consider that the overall justice of the case should result in her 
bearing the burden of the costs. However I have come to the view that I should not 
order the applicant to pay the beneficiaries’ costs.’
This was reversed on appeal, with the applicant having to pay her costs.205 Daubney J 
observed (McMurdo P and Mackenzie AJA concurring):206
  ‘As to the question of costs, there is, in my view, no reason why the 
unsuccessful appellant should not pay the respondents’ costs of the 
appeal…the value of this modest estate has already been significantly diminished 
by reason of the costs properly incurred in the challenge at first instance. It 
would, in my view, be quite unjust for this appellant to be relieved from the 
usual consequence of paying the successful respondents’ costs of this appeal, 
particularly if that were to be accompanied by an order which had the effect of 
even further diminishing the value of the estate’ (emphasis added).
201 Part 3.4 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). See also: Practice Direction Number 
7 of 2007 ‘Costs Assessment: Interim Arrangements’ dated 28 June 2007, and ‘Notice 
Regarding Practice Direction 7 of 2007’ dated 3 October 2007.
202 Chris Merritt and Alana Buckley-Carr, ‘Push for uniform cost disclosure rules’ The 
Australian (Sydney), 20 June 2008.
203 [2007] QSC 388 at [114]. The costs decision itself is Manly v The Public Trustee of 
Queensland (No 2) [2008] QSC 47.
204 Manly v The Public Trustee of Queensland (No 2) [2008] QSC 47 at [14] and [15].
205 Manly v The Public Trustee of Queensland [2008] QCA 198.
206 Manly v The Public Trustee of Queensland [2008] QCA 198 at [41] and [42].
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The comments in Manly at first instance were clearly also directed at the lawyers 
involved. Similarly, in Oswell v Jones207 Chesterman J commented unfavourably on 
the amount of costs, which totalled around 50% of the value of the estate, with one 
applicant’s costs much larger than the others. Chesterman J somewhat acidly remarked 
that ‘the applicant, it appears, has chosen to litigate expensively’.208 
In Victoria, the case of Re Thompson (dec’d): Lundstrom v Attorney General for the State 
of Victoria209 illustrated the costs controversy in a case where the testatrix had left one 
quarter of her residuary estate to the Victorian State Opera (VSO). However, at the time 
of her death this company had ceased to exist. In the resulting indecorous squabble 
between Opera Australia (which had taken over the business of the VSO), and two minor 
opera companies seeking a cy-près settlement, at the expense of family members who 
might have taken on intestacy due to the lapse of the gift, costs of over $1 million were 
incurred. Though not a family provision case, the costs issue has perhaps become 
generalised in wills cases. Hansen J said:210
  ‘…whatever apprehension the estimate might reasonably have induced in the 
residuary beneficiaries could only have been increased by the suggestion that 
costs were now in the order of $1 100 000. This, at least prima facie, seems 
high stakes indeed for what is, after all, a proceeding for the answer to certain 
questions concerning a testamentary gift that could not take effect and where 
it was not argued that the gift lapsed to pass on an intestacy, or that it passed 
to the other residuary beneficiaries, or that there was not a general charitable 
intention. The ‘contest’ became one between OA, MO and MCO who vied to be a 
recipient to the greatest extent of the VSO share, and in this process costs have 
been incurred. The residuary beneficiaries have not been involved in this process 
yet, on OA’s submission, they should bear three-quarters of the costs occasioned 
thereby…Considering the matter overall, and having regard to all that counsel has 
said, I conclude that in the very particular circumstances of this matter and for the 
reasons advanced by the residuary beneficiaries and the Attorney-General in their 
written and oral submissions, the just and equitable approach is that submitted 
by counsel for the Attorney-General. What was reasonably commenced as an 
administration proceeding with tolerably clear answers, became, following the 
joinder (at their request) of OA, MO and MCO and as between them, akin to an 
adversarial contest over the fund with attendant and substantial cost and expense 
and the substantial displacement of the usual role of the Attorney-General. On the 
basis suggested by the Attorney-General the costs of OA, MO and MCO relating to 
the cy près aspect would be taxed as between solicitor and client and paid out of 
the VSO share.’
South Australia allows for a Master to deal with applications in small estates on the 
papers, but Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania have not done anything specific 
(apart from the model legislation mentioned above) to control costs escalation in court 
cases relating to wills to date. 
207 [2007] QSC 384.
208 [2007] QSC 384 at [8].
209 [2006] VSC 313.
210 [2006] VSC 313 at [42] to [47]
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Solicitor or executor negligence can also contribute to high costs in will cases. In Dimos 
v Skaftouros,211 Dimos, a solicitor acting as executor of the will of Skaftouros, was found 
to have been slow and recalcitrant in dealing with the property under the will, and in 
paying the beneficiaries. In part, this led to excessive costs being incurred. Dimos was 
ultimately removed as executor. The same sorts of issues can arise in specific family 
provision cases, which can add to overall costs. In family provision matters costs can 
escalate because of unnecessary affidavit evidence being produced, often as a result 
of inexperience or incompetence by law firms newly engaging in this area of the law. 
Executors will inevitably have lower costs, since the burden is on the applicant to provide 
appropriate and relevant affidavit evidence, but executors should not incur unnecessary 
expenses in pursuing evidence, or in cases of small estates.212 In states which do not 
require early compulsory mediation, this will involve executors making clear that costs 
may waste the entire estate and making attempts at an early compromise or settlement.
The costs issue is definitely problematical in every jurisdiction. It has been suggested that 
truly uniform costs disclosure rules would be an advantage in Australia, but the means 
of achieving these, given that there has already been a model bill adopted in each state, 
is not clear.213 Another round of ‘uniform model bill’ adoption is the only way forward if 
states are really committed to uniformity on this issue.
4.2 alternative dispute resolution
Mediation in family provision cases should arguably reduce costs, since the issue would 
not go to court if successfully mediated. In Queensland, some kind of early alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) is compulsory under Practice Direction 8 of 2001 which has the 
object of ‘encouraging the early consensual resolution by all parties’ and ‘to reduce cost 
and delay’.214 The relevant requirement is that there should be an ‘early and inexpensive 
resolution’ of the issues by submission to ‘an ADR process such as mediation or case 
appraisal as agreed between the parties or as may be ordered by the Court’.215 However, 
some practitioners interviewed for this research have pointed out that the process of 
ADR is not necessarily inexpensive, with average fees around $100 000, and daily fees 
of $4000-7000. Others though claim that these sorts of fees for mediation are excessive 
and evidence of price-gouging.216 In the absence of fixed fees, it is difficult to know what 
a fair fee level for compulsory mediation is. It may be that in states where mediation is 
compulsory, fees should be set to enable certainty for applicants and executors.
211 [2004] VSCA 141.
212 See Szlazko v Travini [2004] NSWSC 610 at [11]; Mitchell v Hamilton [2005] NSWSC 
1097 at [40] and [44]. See: John K De Groot and Bruce W Nickel, Family Provision in 
Australia, 3rd edition, Lexisnexis Butterworths, 2007, at paragraph [6.5].
213 Chris Merritt and Alana Buckley-Carr, ‘Push for uniform cost disclosure rules’  
The Australian (Sydney), 20 June 2008.
214 At clause 2.
215 At clause 8(b).
216 Interviews with partners of law firms, 2008.
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Another form of alternative dispute resolution which could be available in family provision 
disputes is ‘collaborative law’.217 This is a process where, unlike in a mediation, there is 
no third party to help decide the issue, but rather the parties to the dispute and each 
of their lawyers collaborate to bring about a settlement. The process involves a series 
of round table meetings, usually each of two hours, which are held by the parties and 
their respective lawyers until a settlement is reached. The lawyers are not able to begin 
court proceedings or to threaten to take the issue to court during the process, and if a 
settlement is not reached cannot later represent their clients in court proceedings. The 
object of this process is to come to ‘creative’ settlements. Costs should be lower in this 
process because there is much less paper work involved – few letters, no affidavits, no 
court documents and no pleadings.218 All the necessary work is done in the meetings, 
and if a settlement is reached in three or four meetings then clearly costs should reflect 
that fact. However, as with mediation there are no set levels of costs in this process, and 
some law firms will charge much higher rates than others.
4.3 time limits and other practical issues
Time limits for application vary in each jurisdiction,219 and although these can be 
extended with leave of the court, the technicalities attached to them may result in claims 
for negligence against solicitors.220 For example, applications and their accompanying 
affidavits must be filed and served within the time limits laid down. Despite these time 
limits, mediation commonly will not be finalised until 18 months to two years after the 
death of the deceased, and court cases until two to three years after the death of the 
deceased.221 Moreover, some applicants have been permitted to make applications 
217 This was suggested by only one of the interviewees for this research. Collaborative law 
practice began in Australia in 2005, and there are lawyers working in the area in each 
state. See: www.collaborativelaw.asn.au for each state and territory’s organisation 
(if formed to date) – www.collabprofessionalsnsw.org.au; www.qldcollablaw.com.
au; www.liv.asn.au/collablaw/; www.collaborativeprofessionalswa.com.au; www.
collaborativepracticecanberra.com.au. 
218 www.collabprofessionalsnsw.org.au, accessed on 5 June 2008.
219 Succession Act 2006 (NSW) section 58(2) allows 12 months after the death of the 
testator; the previous Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) section 16(1)(b) allowed 18 
months from the death of the deceased; Administration and Probate Act 1951 (Vic) 
section 99 allows 6 months from the grant of probate; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) 
section 44(3) allows 9 months from the date of the deceased’s death; Inheritance 
(Family Provision) Act 1971 (SA) section 8(1) allows 6 months from the grant of probate 
or administration; Inheritance (Family and Dependants’ Provision) Act 1972 (WA) section 
20(5) allows 12 months from the grant of administration; Testator’s Family Maintenance 
Act 1912 (Tas) section 11 allows 3 months from the grant of probate; Family Provision 
Act 1970 (NT) section 9 allows 12 months from the grant of administration; Family 
Provision Act 1969 (ACT) section 9 allows 12 months from the grant of administration. 
220 Holdway v Arcuri No 2 [2007] QSC 378 at [51] and [52].
221 Anthony Collins, Practical Considerations in Family Provision Applications, Continuing 
Professional Development Seminar, Brisbane, 27 March 2008; personal interviews with 
practitioners, 2008.
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after extraordinarily long periods of time have passed since the death of the testator, as 
evidenced by the Ansett estate applications.222 It is not clear whether these applications, 
26 years after the testator’s death, are entirely based on change of circumstances, or 
just lack of knowledge by the applicants of their ability to apply. However, given that 
both applicants were provided for at the time of Ansett’s death, and that one of the 
current applicants was a lawyer, the decisions allowing the applications seem unduly 
generous. This is more so perhaps given that any further provision to the applicants will 
inevitably come from the charitable trust share of the estate. Whilst applications against 
charitable trusts can be made, and charitable trusts can fail for drafting or other technical 
reasons,223 this would be a harsh outcome for any benefiting charities after so long a 
period of time.
Although time limits are measured from the date of death or probate, the circumstances 
of the applicant to be taken into account are those present at the date of mediation or 
trial. The reason for this is that a will may have been made a long time before the death 
of the deceased, and the deceased’s circumstances may have substantially changed 
before his or her death. In particular, circumstances and events which are reasonably 
foreseeable at the date of death may be taken into account in determining whether 
proper provision has been made for the applicant, and then an order made which 
reflects the value of the estate at the date of the hearing.224 This necessitates an updated 
valuation of the estate at the time of mediation or trial.
Orders made in each jurisdiction can also vary. In all jurisdictions except Queensland, 
an order of the court by way of settlement takes effect as a codicil made by the testator 
immediately before death. In Queensland, the estate is held subject to the order even 
though the order may be an effective variation of the will.225
222 See for example, Ashhurst v Moss [2006] VSC 287, and Ansett v Moss [2007] VSCA 161; 
finally in Ansett v Moss [2008] VSC 277, the applicants have been permitted to make 
application for further provision 26 years after the testator’s death. 
223 Frances Fredriksen Testamentary Charitable Trusts, Legalwise Seminar – Trusts, 
Brisbane, 15 November 2007.
224 Coates v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 494 per Dixon 
CJ at 507-509; White v Barron (1980) 144 CLR 431 at 447-448.
225 Anthony Collins, Practical Considerations in Family Provision Applications, Continuing 
Professional Development Seminar, Brisbane, 27 March 2008.
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Family Provision and GiFts to charity  
in wills226
In this section the paper turns to examining the nature and history of charitable bequests 
in our law and the attitudes of judges to testamentary freedom to give to a charity rather 
than to family. There has been an ebb and flow over the centuries of the line that is drawn 
by the state or judges. Finally, the scant statistics on charitable bequests in Australia 
are examined to provide further context to the discussion of family provision contests 
affecting charities.
5.1 charitable giving in Wills
Although inheritance is, in general, linked to family blood ties either by forced shares 
or by requirements of family provision, there are limits placed on both. In addition, the 
right to inherit within a family can be restricted by the right of bequest to non-family 
members or to charity. Bequest law has its origins in Roman law, but the reasons for 
its introduction in Roman law no longer apply,227 and some testators might regard the 
right of bequest to be very wide. However, this is not supported by legislation in family 
provision jurisdictions, which require provision for the family ahead of bequests to non-
family members or to charity.
Therefore, although not primarily introduced to deprive charities of philanthropic 
bequests, a survey of the case law reveals that this has been one of the effects of family 
provision legislation over time (see Appendix A). Theoretically, a deceased’s wishes are 
supposed to be honoured, no matter how inappropriate or outlandish these may seem to 
be in a family’s eyes. In Grey v Harrison, the Victorian Court of Appeal said:228
  ‘It is one of the freedoms that shape our society, and an important human right, 
that a person should be free to dispose of his or her property as he or she thinks 
fit. Rights and freedoms must, of course, be exercised and enjoyed conformably 
with the rights and freedoms of others, but there is no equity, as it were, to 
interfere with the testator’s dispositions unless he or she has abused that right. 
To do so is to assume a power to take property from the intended object of the 
testator’s bounty and give it to someone else. In conferring the discretion in the 
wide terms found in section 91 [of the relevant Victorian Act], the legislature 
intended it to be exercised in a principled way. A breach of moral duty is the 
justification for curial intervention and simultaneously limits its legitimate extent.’
226 Gifts in wills can refer to devises of real property, and legacies or bequests of personal 
property. In this section, the term bequest has been used as a general term for gifts in wills.
227 This was often to provide heirs where there were no immediate relatives. Incorporation 
of non-relatives as heirs into a family, by adoption or even manumission, was common in 
Roman times. This was often the only way of introducing new blood lines into restricted 
family genetic pools, particularly of patrician families, but over time, even in powerful 
plebeian families.
228 (1997) 2 VR 359, at 366
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Although international human rights treaties do not refer directly to the disposal of 
property on death, all refer to the family as the fundamental ‘group unit of human 
society’, and to the right to privacy in relation to one’s affairs in relation to family, home 
or correspondence.229 However, succession law, which includes family provision law, is 
not governed by any public international law regime, such as those contained in human 
rights treaties, so the term is used loosely in the above quote from Grey. If there are 
international aspects to a particular will, this is a matter for private international law, and 
is governed by the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating 
to Testamentary Dispositions230 as expressed in domestic laws of those countries who 
are parties to it, or in some countries by domestic laws giving a similar effect. 
Charitable giving law is commonly traced back to the Charitable Uses Act 1597,231 
which was revised in 1601.232 The background to this enactment in England was a fast 
developing secular nation state during Elizabethan times, with corresponding wealth 
and desire for improvement. The accepted norm of the sixteenth century became that 
the poor were a proper charge on society, and that if private charity failed to provide the 
necessary support, the state should intervene. Where the Church had been the trustee of 
charitable funds before the Reformation, in more secular times it was seen as appropriate 
that charities also be secular in nature.233 This culminated in substantial charitable giving 
in the period 1601-1640, most from the increasingly wealthy merchant classes.234 The rise 
in philanthropy and the positive effects this had on poverty and ignorance unfortunately 
came to a halt when the civil war and all its consequences reduced England again to 
mediaeval standards of provision for its poor and homeless.
Moreover, the possible impetus to both inter vivos giving and charitable bequests in wills 
given by the Charitable Uses Act 1601 was later limited by successive Mortmain Acts 
operative between 1736 and 1960 in the UK.235 Although Mortmain Acts had been in 
place since the Statute of Mortmain 1279, they had at first been aimed at preventing land 
from falling into the ‘dead hand’ of the Catholic Church. Since land equates with power, 
the transfer of land from secular to religious purposes was naturally of 
229 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Articles 12 and 16(3); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, Article 10; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Articles 17 and 23. 
230 A 1961 Convention of the Hague Conference on Private International Law: http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=40. Australia is a party, together with 
31 other nations.
231 39 Eliz.1, c.6 (1597)
232 43 Eliz.1, c.4 (1601). See also: Brian O’Hagan, ‘The History of UK Charity’, PNN Online, 
August 13, 2001, 1. 
233 In 1480-1490, about 65% of charitable benefaction was religious in nature, while in the 
60 years of the Elizabethan period only 7% of benefactions were for religious purposes. 
See: W.K. Jordan, ‘The English Background to Modern Philanthropy’ (1961) 66(2) The 
American Historical Review 401, 402.
234 Ibid, 403. Jordan, in investigating all the wills lodged in selected counties of England and 
Wales between 1480 and 1660, found that wealthy merchants gave on average 17% of 
their wealth to charity, contributing 43% of the total charitable funds during Tudor times. He 
estimates that this equates to the huge sum of over £6 million donated to charity in that time.
235 The last Act in the series was The Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888 (UK). 
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concern to the state authorities in England. The purpose of the Statute was to prevent 
this happening, particularly by bequests in wills. However, the purpose of the Statute 
became progressively clouded as the state authorities allowed land to be alienated to 
the Church by the selling of royal licences on payment of a fine. Thus, there appears an 
early example of a well-founded policy of government converted to a revenue-raising 
mechanism. 
In the time of Henry VIII, two statutes were enacted to limit the passage of land to 
chantries in wills.236 A 1532 Act provided that devises of land to chantries for periods of 
more than 20 years were ‘prejudicial to the King and other landholders’ and lands so 
devised would be escheat to the mesne lord (would revert to the freeholder, if any, or 
to the Crown). A 1545 Act appropriated all lands owned by chantries to the Crown. The 
Act’s preamble ‘alleged mismanagement of chantry property, self-dealing by donors and 
patrons, and perversion of the purposes for which chantries had been established’.237 
The preamble also referred to the crippling cost of various wars, and of the maintenance 
of the royal estate. Thus, we have an example of government policy which allows 
expropriation of private property, given for charitable purposes, without compensation, in 
favour of the Treasury. Thankfully the Elizabethan period was not so riven with hypocrisy, 
giving a wide meaning to ‘charitable uses’. 
The Charitable Uses Act 1601 defined charitable purposes and did not affect the 
already established custom of creating charitable trusts which protected against the 
law of mortmain, and could project into perpetuity the charitable impulses of a testator. 
However, the Mortmain Act 1736 invalidated charitable gifts of land or buildings, and 
acted to protect heirs from disinheritance by charitable benefaction in wills.238 The result 
of this Act was that judges progressively widened the definition of ‘charitable uses’, 
so that a variety of charitable bequests could be invalidated in wills in order to protect 
heirs. The impetus to this change in policy regarding charity was the 18th century mode 
of thinking about personal responsibility. When the Hanoverians came to the throne and 
the Whigs took control of parliament, the notion that the state owed anything to the poor, 
or indeed, that any wealthy individual owed anything to those less well-endowed died 
away. The Whigs embraced a form of economic rationalism which awarded the victor 
the spoils, and made charitable giving less fashionable. This was taken to the extreme in 
the early 19th century, until the Victorian era, when subscribing to charity while living and 
testamentary independence for the will-maker again encouraged philanthropy. In the 19th 
century, while freedom of testation was unlimited in England and its dominions, a more 
reasoned approach was taken in US commentary with suggestions that to consider the 
right of bequest to be without limits or ‘an almost natural right’ had ethical ramifications 
beyond what might have been an accurate statement of the common law at the time.239 
236 Chantries were chapels on private land usually given over to the singing of masses for 
the dead. After the Reformation, this use was regarded as superstitious.
237 Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Book Review of the History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827 by 
Gareth Jones, (1970) 14(1) The American Journal of Legal History 91, 92.
238 A.H. Oosterhoff, ‘The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review’ (1977) 
27(3) The University of Toronto Law Journal 257, 279.
239 Max West, ‘The Theory of Inheritance Tax’ (1893) 8 (3) Political Science Quarterly 426, 
429. West gives the example of a Wisconsin statute (Laws of 1891, chapter 359) which 
limited the freedom of bequest by providing that no person leaving a widow, child or 
parent could bequeath more than half his estate to any benevolent, charitable, literary, 
scientific, religious or missionary society.
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The subsequent move between 1900 and 1938 to limit testamentary independence by 
family provision legislation in some common law jurisdictions had the undoubted effect 
of reducing some charitable bequests in wills. Of course, many argue that this sort of 
legislation is not an infringement on testamentary independence, because its original 
purpose was to provide family maintenance only, and testamentary freedom was to be 
otherwise retained. But the case law shows that the courts have gradually expanded their 
discretion, using the moral duty argument.
Clearly, the impetus to philanthropy in wills has varied in each historical period, 
depending on the mood of the times. In the 21st century, should the right to make 
bequests to charity again be unlimited? Or should provision for family take precedence? 
This expresses the philosophical nub of the family provision argument. Is accumulated 
wealth within a family the property of the family in perpetuity? Or should a testator 
have the freedom to alienate family wealth to charitable or other causes? The human 
rights treaties mentioned above all provide that the family is the central unit of human 
organisation and that its interests should be actively protected and promoted. If this is so, 
it is possible to argue that the maintenance of family wealth within the family unit through 
inheritance is important to both the perpetuation of the family and of society itself. Total 
freedom of testation would threaten this process. 
It is possible to argue more narrowly that consanguinity is an end in itself. This is certainly 
the original basis of family provision law, that consanguinity, if nothing else, binds the 
generations of a family. Obligations to the ‘call of blood’ have supported the moral claim 
notion in family provision law – a parent has a moral duty to his or her children, even from 
beyond the grave, and even if their relationship while living was less than satisfactory. 
Testamentary freedom might permit this obligation to be ignored.
On the other hand, human rights treaties also protect individual rights as personal rights, 
and testamentary freedom is presumably one of these personal rights. Testamentary 
freedom embodies the concept of ownership of property and the right to pass on 
property by will even though the testator is dead. The testator’s ownership survives his 
or her death, which can seem a bizarre notion, but is one which is crucial to dealing 
with property in all systems of political organisation which are not based on community 
property. Testamentary freedom is really about control of property by the dead person, 
and can also lend itself quite readily to control of the living by the dead person. The 
testator can either provide for the members of his or her family, or not. He or she can 
attach conditions to the bequests made, provided they are not against public policy. 
He or she can make commentary on any relations, exact revenge, and assert his or her 
personality in ways which may not have been possible in life.
In the 19th century the individual right to testamentary freedom was expressed to be:240
  ‘The law of every civilised people concedes to the owner of property the right of 
determining by his last will, either in whole or in part, to whom the effects which he 
leaves behind him shall pass. yet it is clear that, though the law leaves to the 
owner of property absolute freedom in this ultimate disposal of that which 
he is enabled to dispose, a moral responsibility of no ordinary importance 
attaches to the exercise of the right thus given…The English law leaves 
everything to the unfettered discretion of the testator, on the assumption that, 
though in some instances, caprice or passion, or the power of new ties, or artful 
contrivance, or sinister influence, may lead to the neglect of claims that ought to 
240 Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5 LR QB 549, at 563-565, per Cockburn CJ.
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  be attended to, yet, the instincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind 
may be safely trusted to secure, on the whole, a better disposition of the property 
of the dead and one more accurately adjusted to the requirements of each 
particular case, than could be obtained through a distribution prescribed by the 
stereotyped and inflexible rules of the general law…’(emphasis added).
The original family provision legislation in New Zealand was not meant to be other than a 
statutory adjunct to the expression of this form of testamentary freedom. A testator might 
dispose of his property as he saw fit, but not before he had responded to his ‘moral 
responsibility’ for proper provision for his widow and children. Having thus ensured 
by statute that he had adequately followed his ‘instincts, affections and [the] common 
sentiments of mankind’, he was free to engage in whatever testamentary frolic he chose. 
However, as with all discretionary legislation, family provision law soon took on a life of its 
own. What was proper? What was adequate? What was the content of a testator’s moral 
responsibility? What persons were family members? What property was the estate for 
provision purposes?
In the 21st century, total testamentary freedom is not found in any organised legal system, 
so the choice is really one between a discretionary system of family provision law and a 
system of forced shares, with the testator having the freedom to dispose of the residue 
to the benefit of any person or cause. Does either system lend itself more easily to 
charitable bequests?
It is difficult to say that the US elective forced share system itself promotes philanthropy 
at death. Many influences are at work in relation to charitable bequests in wills in the US, 
most notably the estate tax. In the US system of elective forced shares, it is clear that 
after the widow’s share is provided for, any or all children may be disinherited almost 
with impunity,241 so that bequest of the residue to charity is made easier. Perhaps this 
accounts in part for the size of philanthropic testation in the US, in addition to an estate 
tax system which allows spousal and charitable exemptions of 100 percent. However, 
even in the US children can use the common law doctrines of undue influence,242 insane 
delusion, testamentary libel and lack of testamentary capacity to challenge a parent’s 
will.243 There is also provision for the pretermitted child (a child born or adopted after a 
will is made, and omitted entirely from that will), who may be able to apply for his or 
241 This does not apply to Louisiana, which, with a civil law system, has a forced share (the 
legitime) for children under 23. However, pressure was brought to bear on Louisiana to 
reduce the legitime age limit to 23. 
242 See for example, Carpenter v Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. 730 S.W. 2d 502 (Arkansas 
Court of Appeal, 1987). 
243 Ronald Chester, ‘Should American children be protected against disinheritance?’ (1997) 
32(3) Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 405, 412. However, these are rare events 
in US jurisprudence.
66
her share of an estate as if the deceased had died intestate.244 Indeed, it could perhaps 
be argued that undue influence cases in the US, though not a common occurrence, 
operate in a quasi-family provision manner to support the courts’ view that family should 
be provided for before non-family, or even charities. In Carpenter v Horace Mann Life 
Insurance Co, the Arkansas Court of Appeal stated:245
  ‘Where the provisions of a will are unjust, unreasonable and unnatural, doing 
violence to the natural instinct of the heart, to the dictates of parental affection, 
to natural justice, to solemn promises, and to moral duty, such unexplained 
inequality is entitled to great influence in considering the question of testamentary 
capacity and undue influence.’ (emphasis added).
This could be a statement from any case in family provision jurisdictions of the past 100 
years, and similar cases in the US argue for a strong cultural bias, based on moral duty, 
towards family protection when the issue is brought before the US courts.246 Grappling 
with the particular circumstances of each case was something which gave the original 
family provision legislation, in the view of some American commentators, a strong ethical 
appeal, in addition to its emphasis on awards based on need.247 Since the American 
system is one of elective forced shares to specific family members, usually spouses, US 
commentators are almost universally impressed with the judicial discretion allowed in 
family provision laws, particularly in relation to the flexibility of applicant permitted, moral 
claims, and the way such laws can deal with changing social circumstances. 
It is clear that bequests to charity in Australia and other family provision countries will 
always be reviewable by the courts. It can never be said that a will is the final word in a 
discretionary system of family provision law. As the Privy Council expressed it in Bosch v 
Perpetual Trustee Co.:248
  ‘The task of exercising the power must always be one of great difficulty and 
delicacy. It must always be one largely of guesswork, especially in a case like the 
present, which is concerned with children of tender age of whose needs in the 
future nothing can be predicted with certainty.’
However, their Lordships then had no difficulty at all in predicting with a great deal of 
certainty what they considered would be an appropriate amount for each child, even 
though the children were, at the time of the case, only 5 and 6 years of age. The bequest 
of £257 000 to the University of Sydney was reduced by a total of some £100 000 plus 
the costs of the action. This sort of decision is commonplace in family provision law.
244 Uniform Probate Code (US) Article II Part 3, 2-302. In some states of the US, a child 
born before the will is made may also be covered by pretermitted child legislation.
245 Carpenter v Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. 730 S.W. 2d 502, at 507. See, for greater detail of 
undue influence cases in the US: Melanie B. Leslie, ‘The Myth of Testamentary Freedom’ 
(1996) 38 Arizona Law Review 235, 290.
246 Ibid. 268.
247 Joseph Laufer, ‘Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom: A Report on Decedent’s 
Family Maintenance Legislation’ (1955) 69(2) Harvard Law Review 277, 313. This is still 
the view of many US commentators. See for example, Ronald Chester, ‘Should American 
Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?’ (1997) 32(3) Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Journal 405.
248 [1938] AC 463, at 483 per Lord Romer.
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5.2 charitable giving in Wills in australia
While it is obvious from the case law that the family provision laws themselves will affect 
charitable bequests, this is not the entire picture in Australia. An estimated 58% of adult 
Australians have made a will and charitable bequests can only come from those wills.249 
Charitable testation has not been the norm in Australia in the past, and in current surveys 
many Australians do not expect to be able to leave a legacy to their children when they 
die, much less to charity, because of the rising cost of health and aged cared.250 In 
research for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, Olsberg and Winters 
found that only 7% of respondents overall had made a charitable bequest in their will. Of 
baby boomers, only 5% had made such a provision, though 10.8% of those aged over 75 
had done so, and 13.4% of those living alone. The findings included:
table 4: Will-makers’ intentions as to charitable bequests in australia
demographic characteristic charitable bequest of some type in will (%)
Overall 7.0
Male 5.5
Female 8.6
Age 50-59 5.5
Age 60-74 7.3
Age 75 and over 10.8
Living with spouse/partner 3.5
Living with family/other 8.3
Living alone 13.4
Working full-time 5.7
Working part-time 7.0
Self-funded retiree 9.1
Pensioner/part-pensioner 8.9
Own home – no mortgage 7.2
Own home – mortgage 4.8
Renting privately 8.9
Renting publicly 6.3
Retirement village 14.8
Source: Diana Olsberg and Mark Winters, Ageing in Place: intergenerational and intrafamilial housing transfers 
and shifts in later life, a report prepared for the Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, AHURI Final 
Report No. 94, October 2005, 65-66, 90-93.
249 ACOSS, Giving Australia: Research on Philanthropy in Australia, October 2005, 35.
250 Diana Olsberg and Mark Winters, Ageing in Place: intergenerational and intrafamilial 
housing transfers and shifts in later life, a report prepared for the Australian Housing 
and Urban Research Institute, AHURI Final Report No. 94, October 2005, 65-66, 90-93. 
The research was based on a survey of 6789 respondents, integrated and correlated 
with qualitative data from focus groups and internet chat rooms. For similar findings 
from the UK, see Karen Rowlingson, ‘‘Living Poor to Die Rich?’ Or ‘Spending the Kids’ 
Inheritance’? Attitudes to Assets and Inheritance in Later Life’ (2006) 35(2) Journal of 
Social Policy 175, 176-177. 
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Similar outcomes were found in research looking at patterns of transmission at death in 
Victoria.251 This research sampled wills in 2005-06 and found that 6.9% of testators left a 
charitable bequest, in line with the intentions expressed in the data above. These bequests 
totalled 1.79% of the gross value of estates sampled, and 4.21% of the non-property value 
of the estates sampled. The largest estates (over $2 million) were most likely to include a 
charitable bequest (23.9% of the estates in this category included a charitable bequest), 
but these bequests were the least in value, at 1.34% of the total value of the estates. This 
contrasts with findings in the US, and with research on inter vivos giving in Australia.252 Of 
the smaller value estates (less than $0.5 million), only 5.71% made charitable bequests, but 
these amounted to 1.81% of the value of the estates.
Most testators (85%) left their estates to their children in equal shares, with only 1% 
generation-skipping, and fewer than 15% leaving estates to children in unequal shares, or 
to other beneficiaries than their children (e.g. siblings, friends). Again, this concurs with 
the findings of Olsberg and Winters as to intentions of their respondents, despite some 
observations from respondents referring to the ingratitude and selfishness of children.253 
Apparently, even the latter observations do not drive an increase in philanthropy in 
Australian wills in practice. Similar findings and observations were made in research 
from the UK and Japan, suggesting that cultural and legal mechanisms are difficult to 
overcome in the quest to increase philanthropy at death.254 
These findings agree in part with those of less formal ‘lifestyle’ research which identifies 
varying percentages of Australians as having left, or intending to leave, a charitable 
bequest in their wills. For example, the Australian Lifestyle Survey identified the following 
testamentary intentions:255
251 Christopher C. Baker, ‘How Victorians Leave Their Money – Patterns of Transmission 
and Giving’, unpublished, accessed at www.swin.edu.au, 17/30.
252 Paul G. Schervish and John J. Havens, in Millionaires and the Millennium: New Estimates 
of the Forthcoming Wealth Transfer and the Prospects for a Golden Age of Philanthropy 
(1999) Wealth Transfer Report, Center on Wealth and Philanthropy, Boston College, 
posit an increasing value of philanthropy from the wills of the very wealthy over the next 
50 years. Giving while alive does increase with wealth levels, though not markedly: 
M. McGregor-Lowndes and C. Newton, ‘An Examination of Tax-Deductible Donations 
made by Individual Taxpayers in Australia in 2004-05’ Working Paper No. CPNS 37, 
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Non-Profit Studies, Queensland University 
of Technology, May 2007, 2; K.Madden and W.Scaife, Good Times and Philanthropy, 
The Australian Centre for philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University 
of Technology, March 2008, 51. See also: Paul G. Schervish and John J. Havens, ‘The 
Mind of the Millionaire: Findings from a National Survey on Wealth and Responsibility’ 
(2001) 32 New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising 75.
253 It is possible too that baby boomers are spending or have spent large sums on the 
education or housing costs of their children. On the issue of investment in human capital 
of this type see: John H. Langbein, ‘The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth 
Transmission’ (1987-88) Michigan Law Review 722, 734-736.
254 Misa Izuhara ‘Negotiating Family Support? The ‘Generational Contract’ between Long-
term Care and Inheritance’ (2004) 33(4) Journal of Social Policy 649, 654-658; Theresa 
Lloyd, Why Rich People Give, Report published by Philanthropy UK and the Association 
of Charitable Foundations, UK, pp186-191.
255 Australia Post, Australian Lifestyle Survey, an ongoing survey which can be accessed 
at https://www.firstdirectsolutions.net.au/default.aspx. The purpose of this survey is to 
determine Australia Post consumers’ preferences in direct mailings.
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table 5 : testamentary intentions in lifestyle surveys
Will leave a 
legacy to  
charity (%)
may possibly 
leave a legacy  
to charity (%)
Will or may 
leave a legacy  
to charity (%)
Will not leave a 
legacy to  
charity (%)
New South Wales 3.4 17.2 20.6 19.6
Queensland 3.2 18.3 21.5 23.0
Victoria 3.0 15.8 18.8 22.1
Western Australia 2.9 17.2 20.1 20.7
South Australia 2.9 16.2 19.1 23.7
Tasmania 2.8 16.6 19.4 16.7
Source: Australia Post, Australian Lifestyle Survey, an ongoing survey which can be accessed at https://www.
firstdirectsolutions.net.au/default.aspx.
Other consumer research identifies 14% of Australians over 60 as having left a charitable 
bequest.256
Since most testators in the formal research state that they have left their estates to 
their children in equal shares, the possibilities for family provision applications would 
seem limited, and this has certainly been the case in Australia. Although family provision 
applications are increasing in Australia, applications involving bequests to charity are not 
commonplace, but when they do occur can have serious implications for the charities 
concerned. Is the fear of litigation amongst family members, or between family members 
and charities the reason why so few will-makers in Australia include a charitable bequest 
in their wills? Certainly, it is not a lack of wealth, since wealth is increasing in Australia.257 
It is more likely to be that will-makers take a particular view about property rights as 
discussed above – family property belongs to family, not to ‘outsiders’. 
If charities wish to increase philanthropy at death, how can they change this view? Whilst 
wealth levels are important, these will not necessarily convert to testamentary charity. As 
at 30 June 2006, total net private wealth in Australia was $7464 billion at market prices, 
representing net private wealth of $361 000 per person, having grown at an average of 
11.2% per year in the ten years from 1996. By the beginning of 2007, this had increased 
to $362 300 per person, with about 10% of households having wealth of more than 
$1million. The growth in household wealth in 2005 – 2006 alone was 19% in nominal 
terms, 15.4% in real terms, and 13.9% per capita. 
256 See www.includeacharity.com.au quoting research conducted by Instinct and Reason, 
a Sydney based research and consultancy firm. Includeacharity.com.au is a website 
sponsored by the Australian Red Cross, Mission Australia, the Heart Foundation and the 
Cancer Council Australia to raise awareness of and offer guidance on charitable bequests 
in wills. The page entitled Facts and Figures contains references to several informal 
studies of testamentary intentions (accessed 4 January 2008).
257 Australian Government, Invest Australia, Axiss Australia, Private Banking in Australia 
2007, 4; Australian Treasury, Economic Roundup Summer 2007, ‘Australian Net Private 
Wealth’, 84. 
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Of this wealth, dwelling assets represent 55%, business assets 38%, consumer durables 
3%, government securities and other investments 2%, and money assets 1%.258 Of the 
1% in money assets, 55% is tied up in superannuation, 26% in equity investments such 
as shares, and 19% in currency, deposits and bonds.259 The problem for charities in this 
data seems obvious. Most Australian individual wealth is tied up in housing assets or 
business assets, neither of which is easily the subject of bequests, unless converted into 
charitable trusts on death or other tax preferential vehicles such as prescribed private 
funds while the donor is still alive. 
Charities need to note that Australians are cash and securities poor, having been 
dissavers for much of the last twenty years. Nor are there any tax incentives for charitable 
bequests of cash or securities in wills. Much of the literature on attracting bequests is 
American, and of marginal use in Australia since the US estate tax system, very high 
medical costs for a last illness and cultural differences present a substantially altered 
landscape for attracting bequests, particularly from older Australians. 
258 Australian Treasury, Economic Roundup Summer 2007, ‘Australian Net Private Wealth’, 86. 
259 Australian Government, Invest Australia, Axiss Australia, Private Banking in Australia 2007, 6.
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the views oF estate lawyers and charity 
bequest oFFicers
As part of this research, the views of estate lawyers and charity bequest officers were 
sought to help provide some insight into the nature of the forces and dynamics present 
in family provision disputes generally. More specifically, views were also canvassed on 
the impact of family provision law on charitable bequests. We were keen to draw on the 
practical experience of both groups to develop a list of strategies to improve the position 
of charities in obtaining and retaining charitable bequests.
There appears to be little research about the charity-lawyer relationship generally,260 so 
we took the opportunity to explore the opinions of estate lawyers about the strategies 
that charities use to increase charitable bequests, and their professional dealings with 
charities when making wills with charitable bequest provisions. We also sought the 
views of charity bequest officers not only about family provision contests, but also their 
attempts to market bequests to a lawyer’s clients through lawyers.
Given the lack of previous empirical research in this area, the exploratory nature of this 
research and the difficulty of administering a survey-based instrument, we decided on 
a qualitative research strategy of personal interviews through a series of open ended 
questions. The strategy was to interview lawyers who were regarded as specialists 
in estate law in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. The professional legal 
bodies either have ad hoc advisory committees of expert members to advise them on 
estate matters or lists of accredited senior estate practitioners from which we could 
identify suitable candidates for interview. In one case it was possible to take an hour 
of a regular advisory committee meeting to hold a focus group style discussion on 
the research issues. Most interviews were done in person, but some for convenience 
were by telephone and all were about 30-60 minutes in length. Bequest officers from 
large national charities were interviewed in each state, and these interviews sometimes 
included their in-house legal counsel.
Towards the end of the interviews it became apparent that so-called ‘plaintiff lawyers’ 
were being mentioned frequently by both specialist estate lawyers and bequest officers 
as being a driver of the increase in family provision litigation. We arranged additional 
interviews with lawyers through the plaintiff lawyers’ professional association to explore 
these claims further.
A semi-structured interview framework was used which contained questions on 
background demographics, the interviewee’s experience with wills and charitable 
bequests generally, and the interviewee’s experience with family provision claims and 
bequests (see Appendix B). These questions were first piloted with estate law staff of two 
specialist estate law practices in Brisbane. The interviews were taped and transcribed to 
provide accuracy of quotes and to assist post-interview reflection by the researchers. 
260 Adrian Sargeant and Toni Hilton, ‘The Final Gift: Targeting The Potential Charity Legator’ 
(2005) 10(1) International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing 3.
section 66
72
The qualitative data were analysed using a multi-stage content analysis approach.261 
Initially, responses to each group of questions were reviewed. Single complete thoughts 
represented the unit of analysis in this study. Transcripts were inspected and thoughts 
(sentences and phrases) identified and represented on a single piece of paper each. 
Narratives were subsequently analysed using a paper and piles method with each 
categorised and coded by creating piles representing the emergent and similar concepts 
and themes. To determine the themes, categories identified that had similar themes were 
collapsed to reduce the total number of categories. Lastly, the remaining categories were 
labelled with a title that reflected each group’s meaning. 
To ensure that bias did not influence the analysis all qualitative data were coded by two 
raters: the researcher and one person for whom the purpose of the study was unknown. 
Major initial differences in coding were discussed and rationalised between the raters in 
order to reach agreement. If agreement could not be reached the narratives in question 
were excluded from the analysis.262 
The research was conducted between the beginning of February 2008 and the end of 
June 2008. Interviewees were representative of senior practitioners in estate law in law 
firms from Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane (17), a plaintiff law association (1), plaintiff 
law firms from Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane (4), barristers acting both for clients and 
as mediators (4), government and private trustees (3), representatives of large charities 
(7), and a law society committee (7). 
We present the findings of these interviews under the following headings. First we 
examine the attitudes of estate practitioners towards charitable bequests generally 
and charities’ marketing attempts to lawyers. Second, we examine the estate lawyer’s 
experience of family provision claims generally. Third, we report the response of bequest 
officers to family provision claims and their experiences of mediation of such claims. 
Fourth, the views of mediators who often deal with such matters are examined, and 
finally, this section of the paper draws together the suggestions made by interviewees 
about how charities might deal more effectively with family provision claims.
6.1  What is practitioners’ experience With Wills and bequests 
generally?
‘Of all the thousands of wills I have prepared, I could count on one hand the 
number that have included a bequest to charity…’
6.1.1 laWyers and charity advertising
All practitioners interviewed regarded the will with a charitable bequest as an exception 
to the norm. Whilst many of these practitioners are also involved in creating increasing 
numbers of prescribed private funds for their clients, the same could not be said of 
charitable bequests.
261 B. Berelson (1952) Content Analysis in Communication Research Oxford, Free Press of 
Glencoe; O.R. Holsti (1969) Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, 
New York, Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
262 M.B. Miles and A. M. Huberman (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage.
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How can charities improve their position? Practitioners pointed to the issue of the actual 
numbers of wills being made in Australia. Intestate estates cannot of course contain 
any charitable bequest, so without a will being made, charities are probably missing out 
on the possibility of bequests from almost half of Australians dying in any given year.263 
Even where a will is made, practitioners commented on the rarity of charitable bequests 
in wills, with one saying that of all the ‘thousands of wills she had prepared, she could 
count on one hand the number that had included a bequest to charity’. This was the 
common view, that nearly all testators would rather leave their estate to the remotest or 
most estranged relative than to charity. Certainly, statistics show this ‘bias to family’ to be 
true, with research showing that only about 7% of wills in Australia contain a charitable 
bequest,264 although of course some of these bequests will be both large and significant. 
Why is this reluctance so wide-spread?
Some practitioners suggested that charities did not advertise enough, so that will-makers 
(as opposed to lawyers) were not aware of them, or just did not think about them when 
they were making their wills. Some suggested that charities did not need to advertise, 
but rather to engage in some effective PR, promoting in the mass media the ‘good news 
stories’ which arose in the course of their work. Other practitioners were firm in the belief 
that advertising just did not work for charities, since all bequests, in their experience, 
were based either in personal ‘stories’ such as family illness, or personal connections 
with the charity concerned (perhaps through volunteering or inter vivos giving), or on 
mass media coverage of discrete events which put the work of the charity ‘in the face’ of 
the bequestors. A couple of practitioners suggested that bequest marketing by charities 
was poorly segmented, so that the wrong groups were targeted for bequests.
However that may be, there were some comments from practitioners that charities were 
not highly thought of by clients, and so were never likely to benefit by bequests from will-
makers with these opinions. The comments included that most people leave a bequest 
to charity as a last resort, because they consider everyone else but a charity to be more 
deserving; that charities have incompetent bureaucracies, are inefficient, are not really 
charitable, or have unreasonable and burdensome administrative costs; and that charities 
are a ‘rip-off’ and not trusted by clients to make proper use of any bequest. These are 
serious credibility issues for charities to deal with in order to improve their bequest 
income, and it is an issue for the whole sector.
It appears that few clients ask for advice on charitable bequests, with most coming 
through the legal office door with the specific charity firmly in mind. In any event, 
practitioners were clear that they would not give any specific advice on charities and 
bequests, since that would be ethically improper. Two practitioners who could remember 
a situation where a client had asked for assistance in finding a charity did use annual 
charity books saying:
  ‘on the odd occasion when the client would say, well I’m interested in leaving 
some money, say for cancer research, you just hand them the book and say, well 
here’s the cancer section, go tell us which one you want to leave it to.’
263 ACOSS, Giving Australia: Research on Philanthropy in Australia, October 2005, 35. This 
research estimates that only 58% of adult Australians have made a will.
264 See section 5.2 above.
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Given the many years of practice of such specialist estate lawyers this is sobering for 
those bequest officers who might have a different conception of a ‘paternal’ trusted 
family lawyer guiding his clients to make a wise choice between competing charities.
Many practitioners thought that advertising activities directed at them by charities were 
sub-optimal. Their almost universal view was that advertising by charities in legal journals 
was really a total waste of time and money if directed at them, that charity handbooks 
and similar publications were seldom used, and that letters and brochures ‘went 
straight into the bin.’ Some admitted that material was put onto a general file, or charity 
handbooks were placed in the firm library. 
The reason given for these actions was that charity publications of this type were of 
little use to the lawyers. Firstly, they did not share them with clients because the issue 
of choosing a charity never arose, or the lawyer would not offer such assistance to a 
client. Secondly, the main reason for a lawyer to have reference to a charity is to obtain 
the correct ‘legal’ name of the charity for the purposes of a charitable bequest, and 
few would rely on such publications as an indication of the correct legal name. This 
is because often the ‘trading’ or ‘common name’ of a charity is not their legal name 
required in a will. For example, many leave a gift to the ‘Salvation Army’, but this would 
not be the appropriate term to use in a well-drawn will as the preferred charity might be: 
THE SALVATION ARMY AUSTRALIA SOUTHERN TERRITORY GENERAL WORK; The 
Trustee for THE SALVATION ARMY (NSW) PROPERTY TRUST; THE SALVATION ARMY 
(WA) PROPERTY TRUST; or even THE SALVATION ARMY TRADING COMPANY LIMITED; 
and many other variations, all of which are charities.
Lawyers telephoned, emailed or used charity websites to try to ascertain the correct 
name of a charity for the will. There were some comments that the websites were badly 
designed and impenetrable for a person seeking information on bequests. The latter 
point could be discounted by the lack of skills of senior practitioners of a certain age 
who seldom turn on a computer, or have personal assistants who do such tasks for 
them. However, even younger practitioners commented on the relative uselessness of 
many charity websites, particularly in easily finding whether the charity had deductible 
gift recipient (charitable) status. Most practitioners who wished for clarification on 
bequest clauses used the telephone to contact bequest officers directly on the point. 
Some mentioned that their phone calls were not returned by charities and that often 
receptionists had difficulty finding the appropriate person in the organisation for the 
lawyer to talk to about the naming issue. 
One lawyer recounted an exchange with charity staff who were trying to ascertain the 
identity of their client which went past what they considered to be polite. Lawyers would 
not reveal such instructions without the express consent of their client and suspected 
that the charity staff knew this, but still persisted relentlessly to the point of irritation.
6.1.2 charities and advertising
Many charities advertised in legal journals and charity handbooks, all had websites 
with bequest information on them, and some sent out letters or brochures to legal 
firms. Charities seldom investigated the true effectiveness of these activities, although 
one large charity representative said that they ‘appeared to be getting their money’s 
worth’. Another representative of a large charity said that advertising had no value 
since bequests were based on personal relationships. All had bequests officers or 
similar personnel who dealt with bequest queries, with large charities having bequest 
departments dedicated to this activity. In addition, all charities had recommended 
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bequest clauses on their websites, and available in their brochures and letters, and from 
bequest officers by telephone. They ensured the telephone receptionist knew about 
bequests, why lawyers might ring and how to handle such inquiries.
It is left for further research to investigate the benefit of charity-listing publications which 
have larger audiences than just lawyers. An issue worth investigating is that non-estate 
specialist lawyers may use the publications, as may individuals before they visit lawyers 
to have wills made and those wishing to make a gift whilst living. They may also have a 
place for those will-makers who write their own wills.
6.2 What is practitioners’ experience With family provision claims? 
‘I’m surprised plaintiff lawyers haven’t pursued family provision more – it’s lucrative 
and there’s a pot of money there…as barristers have always said of these cases, 
why waste a good estate on the beneficiaries?’
Experience with family provision claims varied from a few per year to as many as 30 per 
year, but all practitioners had the perception that claims were increasing in number.  
Legal practitioners, mediators and trustees nominated the following drivers of family 
provision disputes:
Greed•	
Family agendas exacerbated by greed •	
Unresolved anger and other emotional issues left open within the family which become •	
merged into greed as the application proceeded – ‘greed takes over the emotional 
landscape and emotion is reduced to dollars and cents’
The attitude of ‘entitlement to inheritance’ which now pervades the culture (rather than •	
seeing an inheritance as unexpected, or a windfall bonus)
Changing value systems which mean that it is no longer considered inappropriate •	
behaviour to challenge a will
The wide-ranging nature of the permitted applicants in the legislation and wide court •	
discretion allowed
Multiple marriages, with partners and children of each blended family vying for shares •	
of the estate of a deceased
Increasing numbers and legal recognition of de facto and same sex partnerships •	
leading to claims on estates from partners and children of these relationships
Lack of closeness in families of all kinds•	
Growing numbers of elderly and dependent parents•	
Growing numbers of Generation Y young people living at home into their 20s and 30s •	
who may be classed as ‘dependent’ or ‘under a disability’
More cultural groups in Australia who value and support extended family •	
arrangements, with associated possibilities for findings of dependency
A generous community interpretation of need and moral worth, reflected in court •	
decisions
Moral claims of family being treated as paramount•	
More wealth and consequent larger estates•	
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Rising real estate prices leading to increasing wealth in otherwise modest estates, and •	
a need for an inheritance to enter a rising real estate market
The superannuation guarantee levy and encouragement to greater superannuation •	
savings resulting in larger estates for people who might otherwise have remained in 
modest circumstances
The entry of plaintiff law firms into the area of family provision applications, using •	
advertisements to increase awareness of rights of claim, and running the actions as if 
they were speculative personal injuries claims. 
Nearly every practitioner immediately nominated ‘greed’ as the driver behind family 
provision claims, with the other nominated drivers seen as subsidiary to greed. The greed 
agenda was said to be exacerbated by the family dynamics/emotional issues category, 
where family members were engaged in internecine conflict based on past hurts or 
perceived parental slights which added malice to the mix in family provision cases. As 
one practitioner expressed it, ‘greed takes over the emotional landscape, and emotion is 
then reduced to dollars and cents’. 
The issue of blended families was held by some to be a driver, while others only 
nominated this category when prompted. 265 In this case, the dispute often resulted when 
a will was made in the early stages of a new blended family, and:
  ‘What was a short term relationship after five or 10 years becomes a long term 
relationship and therefore more provisions should be made. It’s not easy to get it right.’
However, all practitioners mentioned increasing wealth, particularly in the context of real 
estate prices and superannuation savings, as a relatively new impetus to claims. This was 
particularly evident in Sydney. One senior Sydney practitioner noted:
  ‘claims which in the past, if you had a house, it might have been worth $200 000 
20 years ago, the legal costs mightn’t have been that different to run a Family 
Provision Act claim, it may not have been worthwhile doing so financially. These 
days that house might be worth a million dollars, the costs aren’t that different, it 
is worth having a shot at it, especially because in general terms the costs are paid 
by the estate.’
Those who had given more philosophical consideration to the issues behind increasing 
claims mentioned the ‘entitlement’ culture and the treatment of moral duty by the courts 
as a cause of claims. With the courts seeing testamentary duty, particularly of parents, as 
a moral duty to support children by inheritance, it is perhaps only natural that more adult 
children and other categories of claimant should consider their right to inheritance as 
absolute. Such a view propels more claimants into the family provision pool of applicants.
265 The overall rate of divorce for those married is 33%. Of those divorced, 56% of men 
could expect to remarry, and 46% of women. This represents a relatively large potential 
number of blended families over increasingly long life-spans. Blended families can 
give rise to claims in family provision between step-children and step-parents, but the 
specific number of such claims is not capable of quantification. The recognition of same 
sex arrangements also adds to this pool: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Divorces, 
Australia 2006, released 7 August 2007; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social 
Trends 2007, ‘Lifetime Marriage and Divorce Trends’, released 7 August 2007. 
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Most practitioners, particularly those with some family law experience, noted that 
they could not help feeling that some of their clients could benefit from relationship 
counselling to assist them to deal with past hurts and perceived injustices that were 
often part of the desire to pursue a family provision application. Some clients actually 
looked forward to their ‘day in court’ where a judge could make a determination about 
their issue. Others noted that in mediations there were conflicting objectives running: 
the mediator was looking for a figure that would satisfy all concerned, whereas some 
applicants had one eye on the amount to be awarded, but the other on a process of 
vindication. We heard the following sentiments in many interviews:
  ‘especially relating to disputes between siblings or relatives and that’s some seem 
to want to use the money as a point, if you like, to demonstrate that the testator 
loved them as much as their other sibling that may have been left more money in 
the Will or something along those lines. So tensions which are perhaps more often 
seen in the Family Court can be brought out in Family Provision Act matters…’
Senior practitioners took a somewhat negative view of applicants in many cases, particularly 
where plaintiff law firms were involved. They saw these firms as inexperienced and costs-
hungry, advertising for clients,266 and then being overly aggressive in pursuing claims. 
In the opinion of senior practitioners, barristers, and mediators, plaintiff firms generated 
inappropriate and unnecessary affidavits, thus driving up costs and causing judges to 
comment adversely on their practices.267 Moreover, although these actions are not really 
speculative, since if you are entitled to claim, you are likely to obtain an award, plaintiff 
law firms sometimes treat them as such, looking for a quick settlement of about $30 000 
or $40 000 as ‘go away money’. This would equate to a day’s costs in some jurisdictions, 
especially in New South Wales. Others suggested that if the applicant could not demonstrate 
need, then $10 000 or $20 000 was sufficient ‘go-away money’, depending on the size of 
the estate. So even if an applicant is not economically needy, they can still win a prize, which 
suggests undue generosity built into the system of family provision law. 
Cost capping by state governments or future adverse costs decisions in courts will 
become crucial in this process, as both will affect the practice of law firms in charging 
costs.268 However, even long-established firms differed widely in their costs, with some 
having strict and limited costs schedules, and others using their discretion as to costs 
to charge substantially more. This represents a costs lottery for applicants,269 but in one 
sense involves no immediate pain because at present costs are borne by the estate in 
almost all cases. All that happens is that the size of the estate for distribution is reduced 
accordingly, sometimes to very little or nothing. Hence the notion that ‘every player wins 
a prize’, although the size of the prize may, as in the lottery, be disappointingly small. 
Indeed, in the emotional storms that can be family provision claims it can be argued that 
‘really everyone loses’.
266 Advertisements include statements such as ‘Have you been left out of a will? We can 
pursue your legal rights to inheritance on a no win-no fee basis’ or ‘See us to win your 
rights under a will’. 
267 See section 4.1 above.
268 See the amended Succession Act 2006 (NSW) at sections 99(2) and 99(3), and as an 
example of an adverse costs decision, Manly v The Public Trustee of Queensland [2008] 
QCA 198 at [41] and [42].
269 See the pointed comments of Chesterman J in Oswell v Jones [2007] QSC 384, 
particularly at [8], on this issue.
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Following frequent mention by both practitioners and charity bequest officers of the role 
of ‘plaintiff lawyers’ during our interviews, we sought to interview plaintiff lawyers about 
family provision applications. Our interviews with senior practitioners in the national 
plaintiff law firms quickly established that family provision work was not part of the 
strategic direction of their firms. Some would not undertake such work or it was only a 
minor part of an individual practitioner’s work. 
Further inquiries reveal that much smaller firms with litigation practitioners are becoming 
more active in this field of estate law. They often advertise in suburban ‘throw away’ papers. 
They appear to be ‘tagged’ as plaintiff lawyers by the fairly stable and cohesive group 
of practitioners who have been estate and will specialists for many years. Some of the 
comments of the established estate lawyers and bequest officers about ‘plaintiff lawyers’ 
need to be placed in the context of lawyers who have not until recently been practising in 
this space. It is likely that some of the new entrants have been on a learning curve and also 
challenging some unwritten practices or assumptions of the more experienced lawyers. 
Some suggest that plaintiff lawyers’ advertising for those discontented with a will to come 
forward should be banned. However, as one practitioner noted:
  ‘…why shouldn’t people know about their rights?...is it correct to restrict a 
person’s right to know their legal rights?’
It is in our view difficult to lay the blame on ‘plaintiff lawyers’ when it is the law itself 
which allows such claims to be made. Clearly there are issues for the profession about 
appropriate conduct of proceedings and costs, as well as the law. This has been 
recognised in New South Wales. The new Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) 
which replaces the previous Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), has as one of its objects 
‘to enable the making of regulations to control costs and advertising of legal services 
in relation to [family provision] applications’.270In his second reading speech on the new 
legislation, the New South Wales Attorney-General said:271
  ‘The bill also contains the power to make regulations regarding advertising of legal 
services in connection with proceedings for family provision: advertising that is 
often aggressive, unrealistic and seeks to exploit the vulnerable.’ 
6.3  hoW do charities respond to family provision applications? 
‘Charities are no different from any other beneficiary – they are all subject to 
family provision applications…claimants without money can overturn testamentary 
freedom entirely.’
Bequest officers interviewed saw the drivers of the increasing numbers of family provision 
claims which disadvantage them as:
A wider class of applicants being allowed to apply by legislators, or by the •	
interpretation of legislation by the courts
Self-interest by claimants – ‘it’s not the money, it’s the principle’•	
An entitlement culture, with the right to inheritance being seen as more absolute  •	
than previously
270 Succession Amendment (Family Provision) Bill 2008 (NSW), Explanatory note, at 1.
271 The Hon. John Hatzistergos, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, second reading 
speech, June 26, 2008, at 2.
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Increasing numbers of blended families and therefore of step-children entitled to apply•	
Lack of respect for the wishes of the deceased, particularly by baby boomer •	
applicants now benefiting from their parents’ estate
More awareness of these applications from advertising by plaintiff law firms•	
Charity representatives expressed their frustration that ‘no one is ruled in and no one is 
ruled out’ of family provision claims, and that they ‘needed to dig their heels in’ about 
bequests without really knowing how this could be achieved. They felt frustration too that 
‘no one is doing anything about legal costs’ which they felt were disproportionate, but 
over which they had no real control. As one officer stated:
  ‘The least it’s cost us recently…[is] about $1600, the most is probably…nearly a 
quarter of a million. On average it’s probably…costing, between $1000 and $10 000.’
And,
  ‘We’ve always lost something. There isn’t one where the defendant has – where 
the plaintiff has gone away and said, no, we won’t take anything back. I think it’s – 
once you get mediation, you know that, if you’re going to walk out of there, you’re 
going to have to pay something…We’re going to have to pay. I’ve never been 
anywhere where it looked like we wouldn’t pay.’
However, charities had done no research on these matters, merely experiencing an 
increasing number of claims, and having to make informed guesses at the causes behind 
this increase. The drivers charities nominated may well be the actual causes of the increase 
in family provision applications, but evidence is needed of these alleged drivers. Moreover, 
they adopted a kindly stance, suggesting that family provision disputes at mediation or 
in court can result in the exposure to scrutiny and airing of unresolved emotional issues 
within families. Mediation in particular can bring about ‘emotional reconciliation and a 
means of recognition’ of marginalised family members with a share of any available estate 
‘as the conduit to achieve this’. Whilst it might be useful that mediation can be a ‘cathartic 
experience’, judges have made the point that family provision applications should not be 
used as a means of family or sibling emotional point-scoring.272
6.4  What has been charities’ mediation experience? 
‘Charities don’t want to be vultures on a deceased’s estate, but need to take part 
in mediation, show interest in it, and not be nebulous, just expecting windfalls…on 
the basis of que sera, sera’.
Charities faced with a family provision claim which will affect a bequest made to them 
had varied responses. We were interested in their procedures, policies and strategies for 
dealing with family provision cases and if they had found any preventative strategies.
On the issue of bequests to charity generally, the findings do not augur well for charities. 
As previously mentioned, case law surveys show clearly that few reported cases result in 
a positive outcome for charities.273 Representatives of charities interviewed for this 
272 Bentley v Brennan; Re Bull (dec’d) [2006] VSC 113 at [24] and [31].
273 See Appendix A. 
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research reflected that view. Their experience of the compulsory mediation which 
precedes litigation in family provision claims always involved the charity giving up some of 
the bequest willed to them. One charity representative expressed the general frustration 
of the charitable sector with this situation by saying that ‘they never allow that a charity 
could just win’. The position seems to be that charities will always give way in the face 
of a family provision application, even to the extent that they will be generous to the 
applicant or applicants, since ‘charities are supposed to be charitable’. 
One charity interviewed took what it saw as a principled approach, agreeing that 
family came first, and that bequests should be treated as windfalls. There was also a 
theologically inspired argument that everyone can be forgiven no matter what they do, 
so that the charity would not be part of any punishment of, for example, an adult child 
who should have been a beneficiary but was punished by a parent by being left out of a 
will. This position was not supported by others however, who took the view that charities 
should not treat bequests as windfalls, but as another source of income. As income, 
it should be pursued – indeed, the directors of a charity should see it as their duty to 
pursue bequests in order to fulfil the will-maker’s wishes.
Charities can make mediation work for them by always attending mediations in person 
(not just by their lawyers), and making it plain that the bequest would be used for 
the public benefit. Some reported that ‘what is missing in the case of mediations is 
attendance with attitude’ on the part of many charities. Non-attendance or attendance 
with the obvious adoption of a supine acceptance of a poor outcome does not assist the 
process. As judges have recently pointed out, charities need to submit affidavits of their 
worthiness, pointing out the work that they do and that it is in the public interest, or that 
it saves governments money, or that it is for the greater good.274 
Records needed at the mediation are all documents and correspondence relating to 
the bequest, a copy of the will, a copy of the grant of probate (if needed), any progress 
reports from lawyers, and copies of affidavits etc. Good records are needed by charities 
because of turnover of bequest officer staff. Keeping and producing sufficiently detailed 
records of the history of the bequest was often important for their lawyers to argue 
issues, but not a critical point in most instances. One ‘war story’ that was told several 
times by different bequest officers was of the family provision applicants having no inkling 
of the relationship of the deceased with the charity. They were often taken completely 
by surprise with the regularity and size of donations, volunteering, or services rendered 
over the years. In certain situations, lawyers could skilfully gain ground by bringing such a 
situation to light, but this is not anywhere near a sure fire strategy.
However, as one legal practitioner acting for charities pointed out, records should not be 
so detailed that they become a weapon against the charity in the family provision claim. 
Several very experienced practitioners pointed out that it was a fine line between good 
record keeping and going too far. 
274 Auckland City Mission v Brown [2002] NZLR 650; [2002] NZCA 33. See also: Nicola 
Peart and Bill Patterson ‘Charities and the FPA: a turning tide’ (2007) New Zealand 
Law Journal 53, 56. Peart and Patterson surveyed all the New Zealand decisions post 
Auckland City Mission to the end of 2006 and found that courts to that date had become 
less ‘generous’ in family provision claims to adult children, which, where charities were 
also beneficiaries, was definitely advantageous to them.
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Another lawyer suggested that charities are treated by executors as ‘mushrooms’, left in 
the dark as to everything from being notified about the bequest, obtaining a copy of the 
will (to which they have a right only in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and the 
Northern Territory), and other documents such as affidavits, copies of grants of probate, 
and information as to interim distributions.
Along with this theme were a number of instances of bequest officers reporting what 
appears to be quite unprofessional behaviour. For example: 
  ‘The other thing that we came across recently this question of the fact that there’s 
no supervision of an executor and we’ve had a couple, one in particular where 
we were alerted by another charity that (name of organisation deleted) and this 
other charity were the beneficiaries under a will and we’d never been notified 
by the executor who was a lawyer in a small practice in the suburbs in Sydney. 
That was one where we exerted a little bit of pressure and the other charity had 
some friends in high places that also exerted some pressure and lo and behold 
the money turned up. But it was very fortuitous that we actually found out and it 
just sort of brought home to me the fact that there’s no oversight that an executor 
actually disburses the money.’
Some charities have policies in place to deal with family provision claims, particularly 
those who rely on bequests, and/or have large bequest incomes. These larger charities 
recognised the need for good file notes, independent legal advice for bequestors, and 
to encourage bequestors to discuss the bequest with family beforehand. However, even 
though some charities were involved in the subsequent drafting of the will containing a 
bequest, they did not want to seem rapacious, counting the public relations implications 
of family complaints about coercion to be too great a cost. 
Attendance at mediations and sound record keeping are well-advised, but the issue of 
legal costs for charities is paramount. Costs in mediations, not to mention litigation, can 
be high, and charities pointed out that they needed to be ‘commercially realistic’ about 
outcomes and costs. If other charities were involved there was the chance to share legal 
advice and representation to contain legal costs. As one senior estate practitioner said:
  ‘I’ve had a number where the charities and I’ve attended with the charities as 
their representative attending mediation, if only to put a face to a name because 
it’s always easier to take something away from somebody who’s just a name on a 
sheet of paper as opposed to somebody who’s flesh and blood and representing 
the organisation and who can give some chapter and verse about the works that 
the organisation does which can often be quite compelling.’
And another:
  ‘I do think that they ought to probably take a more active interest in how the 
proceedings go and yeah stick in their two bobs worth, as you suggested, and if 
there is a connection with the testator pointed out – they’re always served with the 
documents – so they should turn up at the – you know they could appoint counsel 
or just send someone along – I mean it’s just a matter of showing an interest 
because I think it affects people’s – it affects the parties’ attitude to how things 
should turn out.’
Given that they cannot ‘just win’, costs must always be a consideration. Costs were 
described by charities as ‘destructive’ and ‘excessive’, and they had the unavoidable 
policy of ‘not throwing good money after bad’. This being so, their position was 
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undermined from the start in that they had to adopt a position of compromise in order 
to minimise their own costs. Many saw costs of plaintiffs as disproportionate, with some 
seeing costs vaporise whole estates (costs of both sides are almost always paid out of 
the estate) because of entrenched positions of enmity between family members, family 
members wanting ‘their day in court’ regardless of the legal realities, or positions of anti-
charity bias from overly aggressive plaintiff lawyers.
6.5  What is the vieW of mediators?
‘In mediation, you get what you pay for – a mediator who charged less than  
$2000 per day would not be worth hiring…’
Mediators naturally had a more positive view of the role of mediation, while 
acknowledging that it always involved a compromise from applicants and charities. 
Some practitioners (but certainly not all) and all mediators interviewed felt that early 
mediation was the key to successful outcomes at mediation. While mediation is 
compulsory after filing in Queensland, other states have court-ordered mediation as 
part of the litigation process. This was felt by both practitioners and charities to be too 
late in the proceedings. Once the court process has begun, greed takes a leading role, 
and positions at mediation are consequently more entrenched. Mediators and some 
practitioners agreed that early mediation led to a more collaborative settlement, and that 
this was always better than ‘a court-ordered disaster’.
The view of mediators on the issue of costs was that ‘you get what you pay for’. While 
they agreed that costs quoted by some practitioners of $100 000 for a mediation might be 
excessive, they felt that if mediators were to charge any less than $2000 per day they would 
not be worth their hire,275 and that $4000-$7000 quoted by some solicitors as an example of 
mediation costs was high, but probably appropriate for senior barristers acting as mediators. 
Capping of costs was universally condemned, with some practitioners suggesting that judges 
who criticised costs in family provision cases were ‘out of touch with practice’. 
Other issues raised by practitioners and mediators were that mediation is a skilled 
process, requiring much ‘life experience’, so that older mediators were more successful. 
Even if age is not the best indicator of a mediator’s skills, he or she must be both well-
prepared and sensitive in dealing with the often very difficult family problems raised. 
Indeed, in Queensland, because of the early mediation requirement, 95% of mediations in 
family provision cases are successful, with very few cases proceeding further.276 This can 
be compared with a success rate of mediation of about 42% in the approximately 600 
cases going to court each year in New South Wales, which does not have the same type 
of early mediation intervention which is compulsory in Queensland.277
275 Although one large charity had experienced mediation costs of between $1000 and 
$10 000. Court costs for the same charity in a family provision case had run as high as 
$750 000.
276 There have been only 39 reported cases in Queensland in the last ten years. Last year, 
there were more than 600 cases in family provision commenced in New South Wales 
courts, of which about 250 were settled by court-ordered mediation: see Lisa Carty, 
‘Laws to cut costs in family disputes’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 27 January 
2008.
277 This should change in New South Wales via a new Supreme Court practice direction in 
the wake of the new legislation on family provision law discussed above.
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Only two of the practitioners or mediators interviewed had any knowledge or experience 
of collaborative law as it is now being practised in some states, as an alternative to 
mediation. Collaborative law began in Australia in 2005 and is a process where, unlike in 
a mediation, there is no third party to help decide the issue, but rather the parties to the 
dispute and each of their lawyers collaborate to bring about a settlement. The process 
involves a series of round table meetings, usually each of two hours, which are held by 
the parties and their respective lawyers until a settlement is reached. The lawyers are 
not able to begin court proceedings or to threaten to take the issue to court during the 
process, and if a settlement is not reached cannot later represent their clients in court 
proceedings. The object of this process is to come to ‘creative’ settlements. Costs 
should be lower in this process because there is much less paper work involved – few 
letters, no affidavits, no court documents and no pleadings.278 All the necessary work is 
done in the meetings, and if a settlement is reached in three or four meetings then clearly 
costs should reflect that fact. However, as with mediation there are no set levels of costs 
in this process, and some law firms will charge much higher rates than others.
Whether collaborative law will improve costs and outcomes in family provision disputes 
remains to be proven, since it is primarily used in family law cases (dissolution of 
marriage and related matters) at present. Certainly the barristers and mediators 
interviewed for this research had a negative view of the collaborative law process when it 
was raised with them, but this may be regarded as vested interest perhaps.
6.6   can charities deal With family provision claims more 
effectively? 
‘Make reasonable and proper provision for those for whom you should make 
reasonable and proper provision…just be fair…otherwise, do you really want to 
leave your money to the legal profession?’
Whether because of the wide range of permitted applicants or not, the number of 
applications for family provision is rising in Australia. For example, family provision 
applications in Queensland dealt with by the Public Trustee rose by 77% in 2006-2007.279 
Is it possible for charities to put policies in place which will completely avoid family 
provision claims in Australia? The short answer is no. Can these claims be dealt with 
more effectively? The short answer is only in very limited ways. Practitioners asked about 
ways of avoiding family provision applications in general, universally replied that there 
were ‘none’. They stated that a solicitor should advise the client about the possibility of 
family provision claims, but could not in the end stop a client from making a foolish or 
improvident will, or one which contained an ineffective/ abusive/ defamatory statement 
278 www.collabprofessionalsnsw.org.au, accessed on 5 June 2008.
279 Public Trustee of Queensland, Annual Report 2006-2007, 54. Figures for total 
applications are not available from court records in Queensland.
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of reasons as to why a particular person was omitted from the will. Their advice also 
included:
Make a will, as there can be no bequests to charity in intestacy.•	
But do not use a home-made, store-bought or on-line will kit (these were universally •	
condemned by legal practitioners, mediators, trustees, and charities as causing more 
problems than anything else they had to deal with): these were regarded by lawyers 
‘as great news for lawyers’, or as (ironically) ‘excellent fun – part of the do-it-yourself 
culture of Australia’ or ‘Oh I love them (DIY Wills), I think they should be actively 
promoted, they bring the most fascinating court cases you can ever imagine.’ On-line 
wills done pro bono for charities are regarded as equally poisonous by lawyers. One 
bequest officer leaned over to the side of his desk to a large filing tray and indicated 
that this was his nightmare tray of DIY wills with bequests to his charity. The cost of 
a well-drawn will is worth every cent in the opinion of all respondents, including large 
charities.
Make a defensive will – leave assets to all children equally, no matter how unworthy •	
they might seem: ‘make reasonable and proper provision for those for whom you 
should make reasonable and proper provision’.
Give comprehensive instructions, so that a solicitor has a clear idea of who might •	
make a family provision claim.
If leaving (say) one child out of a will, it may be desirable to give a statement of •	
reasons outside the will, as permitted under section 100 of the New South Wales Act 
(previously section 32 of the 1981 Act). However, this can be a ‘double-edged sword’ 
in litigation, and has to be viewed with caution as appropriate advice. It is better to be 
fair in the first place, so that omitted family members do not react with shock that they 
have been left out of the will, and so seek ‘ unnecessary’ redress in order ‘to prove 
that the testator loved them as much as their siblings’.
Place assets in an •	 inter vivos trust or a joint tenancy (this will not necessarily be 
effective in New South Wales because of notional estate provisions).
Give away everything before you die – ‘die with nothing’. On this point, it is possible to •	
establish a Prescribed Private Fund (PPF) or ancillary fund while you are alive. This is 
a tax-effective way to place money or property in a vehicle which will benefit eligible 
deductible gift recipients (DGRs) in Australia. The terms PPF and DGR are defined for 
tax purposes, and the requirements must be strictly adhered to, but a PPF presents a 
means of ‘dying with nothing’, but benefitting many.
Never remarry (this point and the previous one may be regarded as based on •	
experience, but not in expectation of being the norm). 
Give everything you wish to give to charity while you are alive.•	
Discuss the will with family if that is appropriate to your cultural context. It was •	
suggested that this is only useful in a patriarchal family situation, and where 
undertaken inappropriately could cause family tensions to ‘explode’. Several senior 
estate practitioners cautioned against this as a ‘magic bullet’ from bitter experience 
of their clients. As one remarked, ‘I’ve had one instance where a father sat everyone 
around and said this is what’s happening. You have to have a somewhat patriarchal 
environment for that to work and I have seen instances where that has caused all the 
tensions of the past to explode during a person’s lifetime rather than before. So that’s, 
there’s no magic formula in any of this.’ 
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Involve the family in charitable giving while you are alive, and set up charitable trusts •	
or PPFs while you are alive with the agreement and active involvement of family 
members. It was pointed out by bequests officers interviewed that family members 
often do not know of the connections between the deceased and his or her preferred 
charities, and react with shock on two levels – that they have been left out of a will, 
and that the deceased was so involved with charitable giving, or a charity’s activities.
Avoid discretionary trusts in wills (but these may be more useful while a donor is alive).•	
Do not allow persons holding power of attorney to have unfettered freedom – it was •	
suggested that some holders of powers of attorney will run down estates purposely 
while the testator is dying. This was a common theme of some bequest officers who 
saw large amounts of the estate dispersed via such mechanisms while the will-maker 
was alive, leaving little in the estate upon death.
Do not try to totally avoid family provision claims by, for example, changing your name •	
and moving interstate, so that family members will not know that you have died. This 
was described by one lawyer as ‘just sad’.
General advice to charities from solicitors, barristers, mediators and trustees included:
Stand up for your bequests – file an affidavit defending the bequest at the least. •	
Although this is not free (unless legal advice is given pro bono), it represents a better 
position than adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude to obtaining something from a will. 
Charities are definitely disadvantaged by their attitude of ‘letting well alone’,280 but are 
very vulnerable to costs ‘rip-offs’ in taking a sterner attitude to obtaining bequests. As 
one lawyer put it, ‘deal with family provision claims boldly, but also professionally and 
commercially’.
Always appear personally at mediations, and not just by your lawyers. Explain clearly •	
what the money is to be used for and how it will benefit the public.
Try to show a demonstrable connection to the testator making the bequest. Did that •	
person have a prior connection with your charity? A prior history of donations? Or a 
history of services provided by or to the charity? Charities have very little competing 
moral claim as the law stands – provision for family comes first, and the only hope 
of improving that position is to show a history of previous connection which is both 
strong and provable via good file notes of contact and discussions, a record of regular 
donations, a record of regular contact via membership or receipt of newsletters, and 
preferably continuous contact from the time the bequest is made in the will until the 
time of death. Of course, it is more difficult for a person of modest means to have 
established this type of contact with a charity, and yet such a person may leave a 
bequest in his or her will. This will present greater difficulty for a charity. 
280 See for example, Townsend v Nichols [2008] NSWSC 466 at [46] where Associate 
Justice Macready said: ‘… nor was there any evidence of the deceased’s 
relationship with the charities benefited under the will. However, having regard 
to the nature of the deceased’s disabilities it is obvious that the deceased wished to 
benefit a number of charities who assist people afflicted as he was afflicted after his car 
accident. i should mention that the plaintiff does not suggest that any provision for 
her should come from the children’s share but should fall on the share passing to 
the charities’ (emphasis added).
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If more than one charity is involved in the bequest (e.g. each has been left an equal •	
share of the residual estate), those charities should adopt a common stance. 
It may be desirable for groups of charities to place a law firm on retainer for the •	
purpose of ensuring that bequests are obtained by the group, thus sharing costs and 
obtaining better quality legal advice. This and other types of concerted action puts the 
pursuit of bequests on a more ‘business-related footing’.281
Suggestions for improving family provision outcomes generally included:
To make the jurisdiction national (using the federal court system), rather than state-by-•	
state, or a uniform jurisdiction through uniform succession law.
To introduce mandatory mediation very early in the process (on the Queensland •	
model) so that more collaborative outcomes could be achieved. This could utilise 
counsellors and/or independent solicitors, and could be government or law society 
funded (this suggestion is really suggestive of the collaborative law model).
To ignore the detail of family provision law as it currently stands in reviewing the law, •	
or trying to make it uniform, and instead look at inheritance law generally in Australia. 
Inheritance law should not be bogged down in the detail of family relationships – 
indeed it was suggested that the whole model of family provision law taken from New 
Zealand was flawed because its genesis was in a situation that applied only in New 
Zealand in 1900.282 Given the complexity of relationships which can occur in the 21st 
century, perhaps thought should be given to a fixed share system in Australia.
These suggestions were not widely supported, however, when put to other interviewees. 
The national model, which would require a referral of power to the commonwealth, was 
felt by some to not give any real advantages, since federal courts in each state have 
their own ‘quirks’ and interstate assets can easily be dealt with in the Supreme Court, 
as at present. Most interviewees had a poor opinion of the uniform succession law 
(including family provision law) proposals which have been afloat for almost fifteen years 
without any noticeable progress, though most felt that they would eventually be put 
in place, following the current New South Wales model (but minus the notional estate 
provisions, which seem to be regarded as a New South Wales legal frolic). The second 
suggestion is a collaborative law proposal, so it may be that collaborative law could form 
a useful part of the family provision law alternative dispute resolution armoury. The third 
proposal would require a major overhaul of the law in each state, which seems an unlikely 
outcome, though not necessarily an undesirable one.
281 See e.g. www.includeacharity.com.au, a combined bequest-raising website for the Red 
Cross, the Cancer Council of Australia, the Heart Foundation and Mission Australia.
282 See section 1 above.
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recommendations For charities
One of the aims of this paper was to provide some practical assistance to charities 
about how best to deal with family provision applications. There are three ways in which 
we suggest that charities can seek to deal with this issue. First, to have good internal 
policies in place, as well as actually implemented, in order to prevent disputes about 
bequests. However, this will not prevent disputes. Second, to have a considered and 
professional attitude to dealing with family provision disputes once they arise. Third, 
advocacy for law reform should be considered because there are significant current 
national law reform proposals open for discussion and charities need to be advancing 
their cause in any such discussions. Estate lawyers should not be the only significant 
voices at the table.
7.1 prevention
Clearly prevention is the best cure, but the strategies are limited as most charities have 
little idea that they may receive a particular bequest. Those charities which actively seek 
bequests should ensure that their policies and procedures are current and appropriate to 
the changing nature of wills and estate law, as well as implemented. The main issues that 
we have identified are:
having independent legal advice for the testator making a bequest to charity – this 1. 
may be crucial to a successful defence to a family provision claim in order to avoid 
accusations of undue influence. Some charities offer free will-making services which 
may give rise to allegations of undue influence and care should be taken in such 
undertakings;
having an arms length relationship between the charity and the testator, without any 2. 
undue influence, harassment, intimidation or coercion from the fundraiser to the 
donor while the donor is alive (these things can give rise to a claim in equity under 
the doctrine of undue influence/unconscionable conduct/unconscionable dealings, or 
the possibility of a claim of unconscionable bargain which could result in the bequest 
being invalid and brought back into the estate after the donor’s death); 
where appropriate, having a family member or legal representative present during 3. 
bequest negotiations to avoid any allegations of undue influence or coercion;
if the testator is near death, or is elderly, or is incapacitated physically or mentally, the 4. 
measures in 1-3 above are absolute requirements; 
having a realistic bequest policy that acknowledges that a person should provide 5. 
for those who are in actual fact dependent upon them and only after they have been 
looked after should charities receive any proceeds.
stating the full legal name of the organisation that will receive the bequest, and using 6. 
appropriate words to indicate the type of bequest, including use of a recommended 
form of bequest clause (approved by lawyers) – this will avoid the need for an 
application to the court to clarify the bequest, or for a cy-près application, which may 
fail in the light of a family provision application. Such information should be readily 
available on the charity’s web site and systems should be in place to have lawyers’ 
questions answered prompted by the designated person.
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Clearly a good place to start to develop such policies is the Standard of Bequests 
Fundraising Practice published by the Fundraising Institute Australia in 2007. One of 
the clauses recommends that a potential donor seek independent legal advice.283 
This is crucial to a successful defence to a family provision claim, as any evidence 
of undue influence will be fatal to the charity’s defence to a claim. Clause 7 of the 
Standard deals with the necessity for an arms length relationship, without the presence 
of undue influence, harassment, intimidation or coercion from the fundraiser to the 
donor. Clause 7.3(e) refers to the important matter of having a family member or legal 
personal representative present during bequest negotiations. Clause 5.1 of the Standard 
recommends that a donor must state the full legal name of the organisation that will 
receive the bequest, and use appropriate words to indicate the type of bequest. 
While these matters can never guarantee that a family provision claim will not succeed 
as against a charity, they may assist a court to balance the many factors which need 
to be taken into account. Indeed, there are few reported cases in Australia where the 
integrity of the charity in question is impugned during a family provision application case. 
Two cases involving evangelical churches have raised these matters, but in one case 
the applicant was wholly unsuccessful, and in the other the applicants were partially 
successful in clawing back some of the inter vivos donations as notional estate. One 
case involving the aged care home the testatrix lived in also raised this issue, and 
in that case the applicant son was awarded the entire estate in lieu of the aged care 
home.284 Therefore, the cases rarely revolve around the nature and style of the charities 
concerned, but are wholly concerned with whether the testator or testatrix has made 
proper provision for the applicants before the court.
7.2 a professional attitude to family provision matters
The clear message from lawyers and mediators is that charities need to adopt a 
professional and considered approach to dealing with family provision disputes when 
they arise. Charities that regard bequest income as a ‘mere windfall’ or have had a 
blanket policy of not being involved in any way in such disputes in any circumstances 
should revisit this policy. In some cases where the estate is small and the facts establish 
that there is a clear case, such an approach may be sustainable. However, in other 
circumstances, other strategies may be clearly appropriate to put forward the charities’ 
case in a professional and measured way. This may range from merely examining the 
documents surrounding the matter, to appearing at the mediation, or to joining with 
other mentioned charities to formally make submissions to the court. This is a delicate 
balancing act with internal diversion from core mission, often requiring input from the 
governing body. In addition, legal costs and reputational risks need to be managed by 
staff. Our interviews suggested that charities who were managing in this fashion, and 
particularly those who attended mediations as appropriate, were saving more of their 
bequests. They also believed that they were still ahead despite the direct and indirect 
costs of doing so. The other clear message is that this is a specialist area of the law and 
you should choose your lawyer accordingly.
283 FIA Standard of Bequests Fundraising Practice, Clause 4.1 (c) regarding the use of 
promotional materials, http://www.fia.org.au/Content/NavigationMenu/Advocacy/
Documents/Standard
284 See Appendix A.
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In New Zealand, it has been suggested that following the decision in Auckland City 
Mission v Brown,285 charities should move beyond a merely supine acceptance of the 
decision of the court in a family provision case, but should actively pursue their interests 
in the case by submitting affidavits and other documentation to inform the court of the 
nature of the work and its importance to society.286 In that case, Richardson P, delivering 
the judgement of the court, said:287
  ‘As well, charities such as the Cancer Society, the City Mission and the Salvation 
Army are regarded under our laws as serving the public good. In contemporary 
less closely knit communities affected by the economic and social changes of the 
last 15 years, charities may properly be regarded by altruistic testators as having 
an enhanced role. it is not unreasonable that the charities draw the attention 
of the court to their work and the benefits for the public which they can 
achieve with the support of substantial donations.’ (emphasis added)
This may be so, but subsequent decisions in Henry v Henry288 and Montgomerie v Public 
Trust289 do not necessarily support an aggressive stance by charities. Uncertainty of 
outcome in a discretionary jurisdiction makes costs a consideration, and even if New 
Zealand courts have shown themselves to be less willing to entertain family provision 
claims which seem to them unnecessary, they have made no real change to the 
underlying moral duty basis of provision,290 nor have Australian courts yet evinced any 
change in their approach to such claims.
285 [2002] 2 NZLR 650; [2002] NZCA 33.
286 Nicola Peart and Bill Patterson ‘Charities and the FPA: a turning tide’ (2007) New 
Zealand Law Journal 53, 56. Peart and Patterson have surveyed all the New Zealand 
decisions post Auckland City Mission to the end of 2006 and find that courts have 
become less ‘generous’ in family provision claims to adult children, which, where 
charities were also beneficiaries, was definitely advantageous to them.
287 [2002] NZCA 33 at [40].
288 [2007] NZCA 42
289 [2007] NZHC 804
290 Some commentators in New Zealand see a more forceful move by the courts towards 
testamentary freedom, particularly in the case of large estates. See: John Caldwell, ‘The 
war of the wills’ New Zealand Lawyer, Issue 84, http://www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz/
LinkClick.aspx?link=763&tabid=146, viewed on 23 September, 2008. Caldwell suggests 
that 10% of the estate has become an unofficial benchmark for adult children claiming 
provision based on psychological grounds (a moral claim), and 20% of the estate where 
there are both financial and psychological grounds. See also: Nicola Peart and Bill 
Patterson ‘Charities and the FPA: a turning tide’ (2007) New Zealand Law Journal 53. 
Peart and Patterson have surveyed all the New Zealand decisions post Auckland City 
Mission to the end of 2006 and find that courts have been less ‘generous’ in family 
provision claims to adult children, with 22% of cases unsuccessful for the adult children, 
a threefold increase on the failure rate in 1995.
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7.3 laW reform
As discussed earlier in this paper, there has been considerable proposed national law 
reform with respect to family provision issues for well over a decade. This culminated with 
the model Family Provision Bill 2004. However, the model Bill as a whole has not been 
adopted in any jurisdiction. The closest approximation to the model Bill is the New South 
Wales amendment to the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), the Succession Amendment 
(Family Provision) Bill 2008 (NSW), which was passed by the Legislative Council on 24 
September 2008, and sent to the Legislative Assembly on the same day for concurrence. 
The model Bill’s provisions seem to suggest that by limiting the permitted applicants 
to a spouse, de facto spouse and a non-adult child, there will be narrowing of the 
current law which will benefit charities by limiting the possibility of bequests to charity 
being overturned by applications from other family members or dependants. However, 
the model Bill allows that applications to be made by persons who may have a claim 
through dependency. Clause 10(1) of the model Bill allows the court to make an order for 
provision if the person is an appropriate applicant, and the will has not made adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of that person. 
The numerous matters to be taken into account by the court in this situation are listed 
in clause 11(2).291 If the matters to be taken into account are applied only to the three 
categories of applicant, the applicant list will indeed be narrowed. This contrasts with the 
situation in Victoria where a similar list is provided in the legislation, but without a list of 
eligible applicants. The list of matters is so wide that it could be argued that applications 
could be made in Victoria by persons who do little more for the deceased than provide 
regular neighbourly assistance. 
The new legislation in New South Wales has not altered the possible applicants for 
provision from the previous New South Wales law, except in one way.292 It has attempted 
to narrow the ability of persons in a close personal relationship to apply by altering the 
nature of the definition of a person in a ‘domestic relationship’. Under the New South 
Wales provisions in the new Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006, a de facto spouse 
will be able to apply as of right (as is currently the case), but a person in a close personal 
relationship with the deceased (not being a spouse or a de facto partner) will only get an 
order if in all the circumstances making the application is warranted (which changes the 
current position).293 Section 60 sets out the matters to be taken into account by the court 
in determining whether an applicant is an eligible person, which are the same matters 
as in the model Bill. However, these matters may only be taken into account in respect 
of the eligible persons listed in new section 57. The New South Wales Attorney-General 
took the view that the model Bill’s clause 10(1) was intended as a separate category of 
applicant, and one which was extremely wide. In his second reading speech he said:294
  
291 See section 3.3.3. These matters are modelled on the current Victorian legislation, the 
Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), section 91(4) (e)-(p).
292 Succession Amendment (Family Provision) Bill 2008, Explanatory note, 3.
293 Section 59(1)(b).
294 The Hon. John Hatzistergos, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, second reading 
speech, 26 June 2008, at 1.
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  ‘The model bill restricts the list of those who are automatically entitled to make 
an application for provision to spouses, de facto partners and non-adult children 
of the deceased. It contains a ‘catch-all’ category of claimant permitting anyone 
to whom the deceased owed a responsibility to provide maintenance, education 
or advancement in life to apply to the court for a family provision order. such 
a change may lead to a flood of new claims being made on estates from 
people who are not currently entitled to apply in new south Wales. Adult 
children would also be forced to demonstrate the requirement of the deceased’s 
responsibility to them. This may lead to more lengthy and expensive litigation, as 
adult children seek to prove they meet this requirement. The bill, therefore, does 
not adopt the model bill eligibility provisions.’(emphasis added)
In any event, the 2004 model bill does not represent major law reform. If inheritance 
law was to be completely reviewed, then it is possible that more testamentary freedom 
would be appropriate in the circumstances of the 21st century, including a comprehensive 
social security system. It is difficult to understand why, in 2008, an adult of full capacity 
and understanding cannot choose to leave the entirety of his of her estate to a charity 
of his or her choosing, after providing for any surviving spouse (including a de facto or 
same sex partner of more than 2 years standing) and dependent children (defined as 
those under 25 or under some disability). Major law reform could involve a system of 
fixed shares for spouses and dependent children, and freedom for the remainder, or 
testamentary freedom with a family provision requirement for spouses and dependent 
children only. While some might argue that this casts the burden of caring for hapless 
relatives onto the social security system, and therefore taxpayers generally, it can equally 
be argued that increased bequest income would relieve the social security and charitable 
subsidy systems of at least the same amount, and with less uncertainty attached.
In the absence of more profound law reform proposals on inheritance law generally, it 
would seem advisable that charities should support the current uniform family provision 
law proposals. They could suggest that the model bill to be adopted, minus the notional 
estate provisions which do not generally assist charities in pursuing bequests, and with 
the proviso that the applicant pool be restricted rather than widened by the clause 11(2) 
list of matters to be taken into account. This would provide a more limited applicant pool, 
and be a move towards testamentary freedom to leave a charitable bequest in a will.
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selected cases on Family Provision law in 
australian and new Zealand jurisdictions 
which have involved charities
The cases listed below are all the major reported cases in family provision law involving 
bequests to charity. As bequests to charity in wills are rare in Australia, there are not a 
large number of cases to be considered. Most family provision disputes are intrafamilial 
in nature, and do not involve legal points of interest, so are not included in the law 
reports. The cases below include all the cases on bequests to charity and family 
provision considered by the High Court of Australia and by the Courts of Appeal of the 
various states and territories. Some states have very few reported cases on the point 
(e.g. Queensland) while some have a great many cases, not all of which are reported 
(e.g. New South Wales). It is evident from a consideration of these cases that there are 
few principles to be discerned in these cases, which are very factually based. The main 
principle which has arisen over time has been the primacy of moral claims propounded 
and applied by the High Court (see Section 3 above).
case name year court state claimant charity/ies 
involved
outcome
Royal North 
Shore Hospital v 
Crichton-Smith
1938 High Court NSW Widow Six charities 
in all
The widow was not entitled to 
maintenance expressed in the 
will since she already had such 
maintenance because of a deed 
of separation. The charities 
received her share.
Bosch v 
Perpetual 
Trustee Co 
1938 Privy Council NSW Two minor sons 
left legacies of 
£15 000 each
Remainder 
of estate of 
£257 000 left to 
the University of 
Sydney
Legacies to sons increased from 
£15 000 each to £25 000 each; 
residue to the university after 
costs.
Dehnert v 
Perpetual 
Executors 
and Trustees 
Association of 
Australia Ltd
1954 High Court VIC Adopted daughter Charities not 
named
The adopted daughter had the will 
varied in her favour to three times 
the original legacy.
Thomas v 
Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd
1955 High Court NSW Daughter and 
granddaughter
Eight charities 
in all
After expiry of a trust, proceeds 
of will declared to be under 
intestacy. Daughter and 
granddaughter appropriate 
beneficiaries as against charities.
Pontifical 
Society for the 
Propagat-ion 
of the Faith v 
Scales
1962 High Court QLD Widow and adult 
son
Ten charities 
in all
At first instance, widow provided 
with the income from £20 000, 
and adult son with £3000 and 
£10000 on the death of his 
mother; adult son’s provision 
denied in toto on appeal.
Hughes v 
National 
Trustees 
Executors 
and Agency 
Company of 
Australasia Ltd 
1979 High Court VIC Only son of a 
testatrix who left 
entire estate to 
charity
Bethlehem 
Home for the 
Aged, Bendigo
Entire estate awarded to son 
despite some evidence of bad 
relations between the testatrix 
and the son.
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case name year court state claimant charity/ies 
involved
outcome
Green v 
Perpetual 
Trustee Co 
Limited
1985 NSWSC NSW Two sons, one 
a heroin addict, 
left nothing in 
will, claiming 
as against 4 
charities
Four charities 
named in will as 
beneficiaries of 
three-quarters 
of estate
Charities reduced to one-quarter 
of estate. Sons given one-quarter 
each. Heroin addicted son 
awarded $3000 after six months 
off drugs, and a further $3000 
after twelve months off drugs. 
A sum of $65 000 was set aside 
in trust to buy a house or to be 
invested in a house by the trustee. 
This sum was to revert to the 
charities in equal shares if the son 
could not stay off drugs for 10 
clear years.
Maybury v Public 
Trustee
1986 NSWSC NSW Step daughter of 
testator
Seven charities 
left 2/3 of a $1 
million estate
Will varied to leave step daughter 
a home unit worth $110 000 and 
$40 000 cash.
Hoadley v 
Hoadley
1988 NSWSC NSW Son of testator 
left no provision; 
daughter claiming 
increased 
provision
Heart 
Foundation 
of Australia; 
Sydney Hospital 
Foundation 
for Research 
(named as 
residuary 
beneficiaries)
Daughter awarded increased 
provision to $80 000; son 
awarded $65 000 to be held on 
trust with the proviso that if he 
had not ten clear years out of 
prison by 28 February 2007, the 
$65 000 was to go to the charities 
equally.
Anasson 
v Phillips; 
Pompeus v 
Phillips
1988 NSWSC NSW The only daughter 
and grandchildren 
of testatrix
Microsearch 
Foundation 
left about $2.5 
million of a $3 
million estate
Legacy to the Foundation 
reduced to $750 000.
Quek v Bulllock; 
Quek v Beggs
1990 NSWSC NSW Two children 
of testatrix left 
without provision; 
claim to notional 
estate
South Granville 
Baptist Church
Notional estate found. Two 
real estate properties and the 
proceeds of another donated inter 
vivos declared to be the estate, 
totalling about $450 000, to be 
divided equally.
Re Gardner 1994 QSC QLD Only adult 
daughter of 
testatrix
Testatrix left 
entire estate 
to Amnesty 
International 
(Qld) and the 
Sisters of 
Charity
Daughter awarded $100 000 out 
of a net estate of about $220 000
Public Trustee v 
Rosa Alvaro
1995 SASC SA Widow and 
children of 
testator
Anti-Cancer 
Foundation of 
the Universities 
of South 
Australia; 
the Asthma 
Foundation of 
South Australia 
Inc.
The will making the bequests to 
the charities involved was set 
aside as invalid because of the 
deceased’s mental state at the 
time of the making of the will. An 
earlier will leaving the deceased’s 
estate to his wife and children 
was to be reinstated.
Byrne v Galland 1995 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter of 
testator 
Testator left 
entire estate in 
equal shares to 
the Royal NSW 
Institute for 
Deaf and Blind 
Children and 
the Challenge 
Foundation
Adult daughter awarded $90 000 
from a total estate of about 
$99 000.
Grant v Public 
Trustee
1996 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter 
and son
Whole estate of 
$690 000 left to 
charity
Daughter awarded $50 000 and 
son awarded $75 000.
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case name year court state claimant charity/ies 
involved
outcome
Shearer v Public 
Trustee; Hawke v 
Public Trustee
1998 NSWSC NSW Two daughters 
and one son (all 
adults) left no 
provision at all in 
their mother’s will
National Heart 
Foundation of 
Australia and 
the Australian 
Kidney 
Foundation in 
equal shares
The will was not varied.
Brokenshire 
v The Equity 
Trustees 
Executors 
Agency 
Company Ltd
1998 VSC VIC Nephew omitted 
from will which 
he challenged 
as made under 
undue influence
Eaglehawk 
Uniting Church
Nephew unsuccessful.
Kent-Biggs v 
ANZ Executors 
Trustee 
Company Ltd
1999 NSWSC NSW Adopted daughter 
claiming from 
step-mother’s 
estate
University of 
Sydney
Will varied to award $100 000 
for adopted daughter, leaving 
about $1.1 million (after costs and 
commission) for the University of 
Sydney.
Re Wright 1999 QSC QLD Only adult 
daughter of 
deceased left 
$50 000.
Remainder of 
total estate of 
$675 000 left to 
a single charity.
Will varied to provide $225 000 
for the adult daughter. Remainder 
to charity.
Mitrovic v 
Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd
1999 NSWSC NSW Adult niece of 
testatrix left 
$5000
Remainder of 
estate left to 
charity
Will varied to award adult niece 
$125 000.
Richard v AXA 
Trustees Ltd
2000 VSC VIC Adult daughter 
with a psychiatric 
illness left in the 
hands of the 
trustees with 
discretion as to 
the disbursement 
of both income 
and capital
Entire residual 
estate left to 
a charitable 
trust for the 
benefit of the 
Brotherhood of 
St Laurence, 
the Royal 
Victorian 
Institute for the 
Blind and the 
Salvation Army.
Will varied to award daughter 
$650 000 of which not more 
than $550 000 was to be used 
to purchase a house, and the 
remainder to be invested.
Schultz v 
Goldsmith
2000 NSWSC NSW Adopted son left 
25% of the estate
Salvation 
Army, Eastern 
Territory (25%), 
the Lutheran 
Concordia 
College of 
Adelaide 
(25%), and the 
Smith Family 
organisation of 
Griffith (25%)
Adopted son awarded 50% of the 
estate, with the remaining 50% 
to be divided equally among the 
three charities.
Wolnizer v Public 
Trustee
2001 NSWSC NSW Only surviving son 
(an undischarged 
bankrupt) who 
received one 
third of the estate 
in the will, but 
requested a 
larger share
WIRES (NSW) 
(1/12) and 
the Bobby 
Goldsmith 
Foundation 
(3/12)
The will was varied in the son’s 
favour to reduce the legacy to 
the Bobby Goldsmith Foundation 
by 1/12. All other bequests were 
unvaried.
Marshall v 
Redford
2001 NSWSC NSW Children of 
testator whose 
whole estate was 
left to charity
RSPCA (NSW) One son compromised for 
$91 500, leaving a net estate 
of $255 453. The will was then 
varied to award $40 000 to the 
daughter, and $75 000 to the 
other son. The remainder went to 
the RSPCA.
Hogan v Clarke 2002 NSWSC NSW Estranged 
daughter
Children’s 
Hospital 
Westmead (by 
succession)
Plaintiff’s claim denied; bequests 
to charity contained in will 
retained
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Lee v Hearn 2002 VSC VIC Non-relative, 
sometime carer, 
claiming a moral 
duty owed to him
The whole 
estate (except 
for some 
specific 
legacies) was 
bequeathed 
to a charitable 
trust
The claimant’s right to provision 
was refused.
Blundell v 
Curvers
2002 NSWSC NSW Husband claiming 
an interest in 
substantial 
artworks 
collection left 
solely to charity
Various 
charities 
(unnamed)
Artworks ordered to be sold and 
husband granted half-interest in 
proceeds of sale of artworks.
Pata v Vumbuca 2002 NSWSC NSW Nephew Challenge 
Foundation, the 
Deaf & Dumb 
Society of New 
South Wales 
and the New 
South Wales 
Institution for 
Deaf & Blind 
Children (in 
equal shares)
Legacy to the nephew of $70 000, 
a life estate in a home worth 
$450 000 and a capital sum 
of $240 000 for repairs to the 
property. The charities to retain 
the residual rights to the property 
after the nephew’s death (i.e. 
their legacy to be reduced from 
approx $350 000 each, and the 
remainder deferred). 
Edwards v Terry 2002 NSWSC NSW Only son claiming 
an increase in 
the 15% of his 
mother’s estate 
left to him
Royal Bind 
Society and 
the Salvation 
Army originally 
left 40% each 
of the estate 
(the executor 
was left 5% 
which was not 
disputed)
Son successful in claiming almost 
71% of the remaining estate, 
the executrix retaining 5%. The 
remaining estate (24%) was split 
equally between the charities.
Novak-Niemela 
v Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd
2002 NSWSC NSW Widow and adult 
son
Apart from 
small bequests 
to the widow 
and son, the 
entire estate 
was tied up in a 
trust until 2080 
which could pay 
at its discretion 
the widow, son, 
grandchildren, 
and the 
Salvation Army 
Property Trust. 
After 2080 the 
trust assets 
were to be paid 
60% to the 
Salvation Army 
and 40% to 
the testator’s 
grandchildren, 
or (as 
substitute) 
great-
grandchildren.
The widow was awarded the 
testator’s interest in a home unit, 
and $100 000 and the son was 
awarded a bequest of $408 000 
out of the total estate of about 
$1.5 million (after costs). 
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The Auckland 
City Mission v 
Brown
2002 NZCA NZ Adult daughter 
claiming 
increased 
provision
Auckland City 
Mission and the 
Salvation Army 
(both these 
charities were 
left the residue), 
and the Cancer 
Society (left 
a specific 
bequest of 
$500 000). The 
deceased’s 
will left some 
$3 million to 
charity, 
This was an appeal from the High 
Court of New Zealand which had 
increased the adult daughter’s 
provision to $1.6 million. This 
appeal reduced that to just 
over $850 000 (about 20% of 
the estate) to be paid from the 
residue of the estate. This case 
has now been distinguished 
decisively as turning very 
particularly on its facts in both 
Henry v Henry [2007] NZCA 42 
and Montgomerie v Public Trust 
[2007] NZHC 804. These latter 
cases restore the status quo as 
regards applications by adult 
children in New Zealand.
Mahon v The 
Perpetual 
Trustee
2004 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter 
claiming home 
unit and lump 
sum from father’s 
estate 
Mackillop 
Family Services 
Ltd as trustee 
for the St 
Vincent de 
Paul Boys 
Orphanage, 
Melbourne
Adult daughter awarded home 
unit and lump sum of $40 000 
effectively halving the legacy to 
the orphanage.
Perry v Ollif fe 2004 NSWSC NSW Adult daughter 
(other sibling 
made no claim) 
left income on 
half the estate for 
20 years (which 
had expired) 
with 80% of the 
residual estate to 
go to charities
New South 
Wales Cancer 
Council and 
Salvation Army 
NSW Property 
Trust
Each daughter granted 37.5% of 
the capitalised estate, and the 
two charities 9.5% each (two 
grandchildren of the deceased 
received 3% each).
Carstrom v 
Boesen
2004 NSWSC NSW Claimant in 
position of 
daughter 
(though possibly 
not biological 
daughter) left 
$75 000 of 
$300 000 total 
estate; each 
charity received 
$47 000
Salvation 
Army, the St 
Vincent de Paul 
Society, the 
Uniting Church 
In Australia 
Property Trust, 
the Smith 
Family
Claimant awarded $150 000 of 
the $300 000 estate, the amount 
to be taken from each charity’s 
provision.
Phillips v Hunt 2005 NSWSC NSW Widow left only 
a life interest in 
the matrimonial 
home, but 
application for 
family provision 
made out of time
Trustees of 
the Sisters of 
Mercy (North 
Sydney) for the 
purposes of Our 
Lady’s Home 
at Waitara; 
St Gabriel’s 
School for Deaf 
Boys at Castle 
Hill conducted 
by the Christian 
Brothers; 
Trustees of 
the Sisters of 
Charity for the 
purposes of the 
Sacred Heart 
Hospice at 
Darlinghurst.
The time for application being 
extended, the court ordered that 
the will be varied so that the home 
could be sold and the proceeds 
paid to the widow to the extent of 
70%; 30% to be paid to the three 
named charities. 
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Hunt v Delaney 2005 NSWSC NSW Two of three 
siblings 
abandoned by 
their deceased 
mother as 
children, and left 
no provision in 
her will
St Vincent de 
Paul Society 
and the Royal 
Blind Society in 
equal shares
$150 000 to the son and $200 000 
to the daughter out of a total 
estate of around $430 000.
Morton v Little; 
Price v Little
2005 NSWSC NSW Adult daughters 
left legacies of 
$20 000 each
Foundation for 
the National 
Parks and 
Wildlife due to 
receive over $1 
million
One adult daughter awarded 
$350 000 and the other $100 000, 
reducing the charitable bequest 
to around $590 000. 
Powell v 
Monteath
2006 QSC QLD Stepson with 
no provision in 
stepmother’s will
Queensland 
Cancer 
Fund and 
National Heart 
Foundation of 
Australia (Qld)
Stepson awarded a lump son of 
$40 000 out of a total estate of 
approximately $235 000.
Groser v Equity 
Trustees
2007 VSC VIC Widow left a life 
interest in home
The estate 
(except for 
specific 
legacies to 
children and 
grandchildren) 
was 
bequeathed 
to various 
charitable 
trusts.
The court ordered that the 
home be sold to provide for the 
continuing care of the widow in 
a nursing home or hostel (similar 
to Phillips v Hunt). However, Mrs 
Groser subsequently died before 
this order could be finalised – see 
Groser v Equity Trustees Ltd 
[2008] VSC 163.
Nelligan v 
Crouch
2007 NSWSC NSW Same sex partner, 
though the 
relationship had 
ceased before 
the death of the 
testator
Whole estate 
left to Royal 
Flying Doctor 
Service (RFDS), 
after gift to 
Crouch as 
executor failed
Partner awarded a legacy of 
$100 000, effectively reducing 
the legacy to the RFDS by about 
two-thirds.
Trustees for the 
Salvation Army 
Property Trust v 
Becker
2007 NSWCA NSW Friend of testatrix 
left almost the 
entire estate by 
second will in 
contention, with 
small legacies to 
the charities.
Testatrix left 
entire estate to 
the Salvation 
Army and the 
Royal Flying 
Doctor Service 
in equal shares 
under first will 
in contention
Second will declared valid; 
charities deprived of all but small 
legacies and had to bear the 
burden of costs. An application 
for leave to appeal to the High 
Court of Australia was rejected by 
that Court with costs against the 
charities.
Ansett v Moss 2007 VSCA VIC Second son of 
testator denied 
relief at first 
instance.
Testator, after 
providing 
for wife and 
children, left 
the bulk of his 
estate (valued 
at the time of 
his death in 
1982 at $8.27 
million) to a 
charitable trust
On appeal, the court said that 
‘arguable that a wise, just 
and wealthy testator had a 
duty to make better provision 
for vicissitudes facing a son 
currently without financial means.’ 
Therefore, appellant’s prospects 
of success ‘not necessarily 
negligible’ if he made a further 
application. The second son, and 
his sister (who had earlier won the 
right to pursue further provision 
from the estate), will now both 
pursue further provision. The 
unusual aspect of this case is that 
the testator died in 1982, and any 
further provision must come from 
the charities’ share.
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Abrego v 
Simpson
2008 NSWSC NSW Husband of a 
marriage of short 
duration left only 
the contents of 
his wife’s home, 
provided he 
collect them 
within three 
months of her 
death. In her will, 
she accused him 
of physical and 
emotional abuse.
After pecuniary 
legacies, 
she gave the 
residue of 
her estate 
as follows: 
1/17th to the 
Foundation 
Fighting 
Blindness, 
1/17th to 
Diabetes 
Australia 
(NSW), 1/17th 
to the Cancer 
Council of New 
South Wales, 
7/17ths to 
St Gabriel’s 
Church at 
Bexley for the 
charitable 
purposes of 
that church and 
the remaining 
7/17ths to 
St Patrick’s 
Catholic Church 
in Sydney for 
the charitable 
purposes of 
that church.
The husband was awarded a 
life interest in the matrimonial 
home and a pecuniary legacy of 
$50 000. The other pecuniary 
legacies were not interfered 
with. Therefore the substantial 
costs were borne by the residue, 
reducing the amount to be 
distributed to the charities by 
more than $120 000. 
Jacques v 
Public Trustee of 
Queensland
2008 QSC Qld Daughter left 
a house and 
$30 000 plus the 
income of a trust 
of the residue 
set up by the 
deceased for 
her daughter’s 
maintenance and 
support during 
her lifetime. The 
remainder of the 
trust after the 
daughter’s death 
left on trust to 
the two named 
charities
Queensland 
Cancer Fund 
and the 
Australian 
Neurological 
Foundation 
(Queensland 
Bequest Fund)
The daughter made application 
for a change in the trust 
arrangements so that the bulk of 
the capital should be paid into 
her superannuation fund. This 
would have deprived the charities 
of the bulk of the capital in the 
remainder. The judge declined 
to interfere with the trustee’s 
investment arrangements, thus 
preserving the position of the 
charities. The charities were not 
represented in the action.
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Groser v Equity 
Trustees Ltd
2008 VSC VIC Trustees, seeking 
to determine 
whether prior 
order concerning 
Mrs Groser could 
be carried out 
given her death 
(see Groser v 
Equity Trustees 
Ltd [2007] above, 
and Attorney 
– General (Vic) 
seeking to protect 
the interests 
of the charities 
under the trust 
established by Mr 
Groser
Charitable trust 
set up under Mr 
Groser’s will
Order concerning Mrs Groser 
could not be carried out, given 
her intervening death. Charitable 
interests protected. All costs 
borne by estate.
Townsend v 
Nichols
2008 NSWSC NSW Sister of 
deceased 
claiming to be a 
dependant
A one sixth 
part of the 
estate was 
left to each of 
The Australian 
Cancer 
Foundation 
for Medical 
Research; 
The Australian 
Quadriplegic 
Association 
Limited; The 
Salvation 
Army; and The 
Paraplegic and 
Quadriplegic 
Association 
of New South 
Wales
The sister was successful in her 
claim, and was awarded $200 000 
taken from the charities’ shares 
of the estate. Costs were also 
payable from the estate.
The charities did not appear or 
give evidence at the hearing.
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question Framework For cPns Project:
Family Provision and PhilanthroPy
introduction:
Thank you for participation•	
Purpose of research•	
Brief background of ACPNS and its role•	
Assurances of confidentiality•	
Double-checking of permission to take notes•	
Explanation of how unattributed quotes may be used in the final report•	
Feedback of summary of research findings•	
questions – laWyers:
demographic
How many years have you been in practice?
What is your current position in the firm?
Are you an accredited specialist in succession law?
Describe the succession practice of this firm – general/specialist?
Which other lawyers should we speak to about this topic?
bequests
Do clients ask for advice on bequests?
Are they influenced by your opinion?
How many times have you assisted in determining the charity for a clients’ bequest?
What influenced you to suggest that charity?
Specifically, did you rely on advertising in legal journals?
Did you use a charity handbook? For what purpose?
What other sources of information did you rely on to find a charity to recommend?
Are clients influenced by charity advertising or other promotional methods?
Did clients rely on the internet only?
Do they prefer to leave their bequest to a specific charity?
Do they leave specific legacies and bequests, or do they leave residual estates?
Do you inform them about the Queensland Community Fund?
What do you consider were the main influences on clients who did include a bequest in 
their wills?
What do you consider were the main objections by clients to leaving a charitable bequest?
Do you have any charities as clients?
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family provision 
How many family provision disputes do you deal with?
What drives such disputes?
Have you noticed any increases in these applications?
Do these disputes usually involve specific bequests or residuals?
How many disputes are mediated? 
How does mediation operate?
How many go to court? 
What costs issues arise? 
How are costs awarded in general? 
What strategies can be implemented to avoid family provision applications?
Are these best implemented in the will? 
Or are they best implemented via inter vivos planning through trusts, companies etc?
What other strategies can a will-maker employ? Discussion with children? Having 
children present for will making? Having independent financial advice?
questions – charities:
demographics
Number of bequests over 5 years? 10 years?
Value of these bequests? Percent of income represented?
Do you have bequest fundraising staff?
advertising and other promotional activities
Do you advertise in legal journals?
Do you list in charity handbooks?
What are your most successful forms of promotion for bequests?
How much do you spend on advertising for bequests? Is this amount worth spending?
Have you researched the effectiveness of your bequest fundraising efforts?
Do you have a recommended bequest clause for wills?
Do you have a recommended bequest clause for wills?
How are requests for will-making assistance dealt with? 
Do you have your own specialist staff? Recommend a law firm?
Have you had any difficulties with home made wills? Those made with will kits?
Have you experienced difficulty with bequest clauses which were unclear? 
Have you had to make any applications cy-pres?
Does your governing body have ethical guidelines for attracting bequests?
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family provision claims
If faced with a family provision application which will affect a bequest to you, how do you 
usually respond?
Do you regard this as a serious issue?
Does mediation result in good outcomes for you?
Have you had to go to court over such claims?
Are legal costs a consideration?
Does your governing body have a policy for dealing with family provision applications?
Do you have any recommended preventative strategies to avoid family provision claims?
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